# Round 2 v. Kentucky GS

## 2AC

### Prolif

#### Human fallibility makes deterrence ineffective

Krieger, 12 [July 12th, David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, “Why Waltz is Wrong”, <http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/db_article.php?article_id=377>]

In essence, Waltz puts his faith in nuclear deterrence and justifies this in historical terms. But the history is short and there have been **many close calls**. During the 67-year period since the dawn of the Nuclear Age there have been **numerous accidents**, **miscalculations** and threats to use nuclear weapons. Fifty years ago, the US and Soviet Union stood at the precipice of nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Waltz’s faith in nuclear deterrence reflects **a belief in rationality**, a belief that all leaders will behave rationally at all times, including under conditions of extreme stress. This **defies our understanding of human behavior** **and the ever-present potential for human fallibility.** ¶Another way to view the historical data from which Waltz finds comfort is by an analogy of a man jumping off a hundred-story building. As he passes floor after floor, he wonders why people on the ground are showing concern for his well-being. He ignores the approaching ground and focuses his attention on the fact that nothing bad has happened to him yet. In Waltz’s theory of nuclear deterrence, there is no hard ground below, nor gravity acting upon the jumper. He argues that “history has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability. When it comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever, more may be better.” While having more may be better, it may also be far worse. ¶ Martin Hellman, a professor emeritus of electrical engineering at Stanford University and an expert in risk analysis, argues that a child born today has a ten percent or greater chance of having his or her life cut short by nuclear war. Unlike Waltz’s analysis, risk analysis takes into account the odds of an event occurring and doesn’t base its analysis of the future simply on what the historical record shows at a given point in time. Ten coin flips may produce ten straight “heads,” but it would be unwise to assume that the results between heads and tails would not even out over time. With nuclear weapons, the consequences of being wrong in one’s projections are, of course, far more dire than with coin tosses.¶ Another analogy that has been used to describe the standoff between nuclear-armed powers, particularly the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War, was of two men standing up to their waists in the same pool of gasoline and each man being ready to strike an unlit match. If either man struck the match, both men would be consumed by the fire that would result. With nuclear weapons, the conflagration would not stop at the two men – it would include their families, their communities, their countries and the world. ¶ Waltz makes the bet that no leader of a nuclear weapon state will ever strike the match or allow the match to fall into hands that will strike it. It is a folish bet to make. The two men, and the rest of us, would be far safer if the gasoline were drained from the pool. In the same way, the world would be much safer if nuclear weapons were abolished, rather than shared in the hope they would enhance security in the Middle East or elsewhere.¶ Waltz may believe that it is precisely the threat of conflagration that keeps the men from striking the matches. For many, even most, men he may be correct, but the fact is that neither Waltz nor anyone else can predict human behavior under all conditions. **There may be some leaders in some circumstances for whom striking the match would seem rational.** In addition, even if neither man were to strike a match, lightning may strike the pool of gasoline or other sparks may ignite the pool from unforeseen causes. **Instances of accidents, madness and human fallibility abound**.¶ Nuclear weapons have brought humankind to the precipice. These weapons threaten cities, countries, civilization and complex life on the planet. It is the responsibility of those of us alive on the planet now to abolish these weapons of mass annihilation, not justify their spread, as Waltz would have us do.

#### Prolif turns conventional war – causes aggression

Kroenig, 12 [May 26th, Matthew Kroenig: Assistant Professor of Government, Georgetown University and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future? Prepared for the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, <http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&tid=30>]

Regional instability: The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers contributing to regional instability. States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military attack from other states, but states with nuclear weapons can be confident that they can deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive to be more aggressive in the conduct of their foreign policy. In this way, nuclear weapons provide a shield under which states can feel free to engage in lower-level aggression. Indeed, international relations theories about the “stability-instability paradox” maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional instability.[[1]](#footnote-1)[64] Historically, we have seen that the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their possessors and contributed to regional instability. Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear-weapon states and that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy.[[2]](#footnote-2)[65] Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to initiate militarized disputes against India.[[3]](#footnote-3)[66] Currently, Iran restrains its foreign policy because it fears a major military retaliation from the United States or Israel, but with nuclear weapons it could feel free to push harder. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up support to terrorist and proxy groups and engage in more aggressive coercive diplomacy. With a nuclear-armed Iran increasingly throwing its weight around in the region, we could witness an even more crisis prone Middle East. And in a poly-nuclear Middle East with Israel, Iran, and, in the future, possibly other states, armed with nuclear weapons, any one of those crises could result in a catastrophic nuclear exchange. Nuclear proliferation can also lead to regional instability due to preventive strikes against nuclear programs. States often conduct preventive military strikes to prevent adversaries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Historically, the United States attacked German nuclear facilities during World War II, Israel bombed a nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981, Iraq bombed Iran’s Bushehr reactors in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s and Iran returned the favor against an Iraqi nuclear plant, a U.S.-led international coalition destroyed Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure in the first Gulf War in 1991, and Israel bombed a Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007. These strikes have not led to extensive conflagrations in the past, but we might not be so lucky in the future. At the time of writing in 2012, the United States and Israel were polishing military plans to attack Iran’s nuclear program and some experts maintain that such a strike could very well lead to a wider war in the Middle East.

#### Proliferation will be rapid and escalate – kills stability – multiple reasons.

**Horowitz, 2009**

[April, Michael, Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” journal of conflict resolution, vol 53, no 2]

Learning as states gain experience with nuclear weapons is complicated. While to some extent, nuclear acquisition might provide information about resolve or capabil-  ities, it also generates uncertainty about the way an actual conflict would go—given  the new risk of nuclear escalation—and uncertainty about relative capabilities. Rapid proliferation may especially heighten uncertainty given the potential for reasonable  states to disagree at times about the quality of the capabilities each possesses.2 What  follows is an attempt to describe the implications of inexperience and incomplete  information on the behavior of nuclear states and their potential opponents over time.  Since it is impossible to detail all possible lines of argumentation and possible  responses, the following discussion is necessarily incomplete. This is a first step.  The acquisition of nuclear weapons increases the confidence of adopters in their  ability to impose costs in the case of a conflict and the expectations of likely costs if  war occurs by potential opponents. The key questions are whether nuclear states  learn over time about how to leverage nuclear weapons and the implications of that  learning, along with whether actions by nuclear states, over time, convey information  that leads to changes in the expectations of their behavior—shifts in uncertainty—  on the part of potential adversaries.  Learning to Leverage?  When a new state acquires nuclear weapons, how does it influence the way the  state behaves and how might that change over time? Although nuclear acquisition  might be orthogonal to a particular dispute, it might be related to a particular secu-  rity challenge, might signal revisionist aims with regard to an enduring dispute, or  might signal the desire to reinforce the status quo.  This section focuses on how acquiring nuclear weapons influences both the new  nuclear state and potential adversaries. In theory, system wide perceptions of nuclear  danger could allow new nuclear states to partially skip the early Cold War learning  process concerning the risks of nuclear war and enter a proliferated world more cog-  nizant of nuclear brinksmanship and bargaining than their predecessors. However,  each new nuclear state has to resolve its own particular civil–military issues surrounding operational control and plan its national strategy in light of its new capa-  bilities. Empirical research by Sagan (1993), Feaver (1992), and Blair (1993)  suggests that viewing the behavior of other states does not create the necessary tacit  knowledge; there is no substitute for experience when it comes to handling a nuclear  arsenal, even if experience itself cannot totally prevent accidents. Sagan contends  that civil–military instability in many likely new proliferators and pressures generated by the requirements to handle the responsibility of dealing with nuclear weapons  will skew decision making toward more offensive strategies (Sagan 1995). The ques-  tions surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear command and control suggest there is no magic  bullet when it comes to new nuclear powers’ making control and delegation decisions (Bowen and Wolvén 1999).  Sagan and others focus on inexperience on the part of new nuclear states as a key  behavioral driver. Inexperienced operators and the bureaucratic desire to “justify”  the costs spent developing nuclear weapons, combined with organizational biases  that may favor escalation to avoid decapitation—the “use it or lose it” mind-set—  may cause new nuclear states to adopt riskier launch postures, such as launch on  warning, or at least be perceived that way by other states (Blair 1993; Feaver 1992;  Sagan 1995).3  Acquiring nuclear weapons could alter state preferences and make states more  likely to escalate disputes once they start, given their new capabilities.4 But their  general lack of experience at leveraging their nuclear arsenal and effectively communicating nuclear threats could mean new nuclear states will be more likely to  select adversaries poorly and to find themselves in disputes with resolved adver-  saries that will reciprocate militarized challenges. The “nuclear experience” logic also suggests that more experienced nuclear states  should gain knowledge over time from nuclearized interactions that helps leaders  effectively identify the situations in which their nuclear arsenals are likely to make  a difference. Experienced nuclear states learn to select into cases in which their com-  parative advantage, nuclear weapons, is more likely to be effective, increasing the  probability that an adversary will not reciprocate.  Coming from a slightly different perspective, uncertainty about the consequences  of proliferation on the balance of power and the behavior of new nuclear states on  the part of their potential adversaries could also shape behavior in similar ways (Schelling 1966; Blainey 1988). While a stable and credible nuclear arsenal communicates clear information about the likely costs of conflict, in the short term,  nuclear proliferation is likely to increase uncertainty about the trajectory of a war,  the balance of power, and the preferences of the adopter.

### 2AC Warming

#### Warming causes extinction – try or die for new nuclear construction

**Weart, 12** [March 26th, Spencer, After receiving a doctorate in physics and astrophysics, Spencer Weart worked on solar physics before he turned to the study of the history of science. From 1974 until his retirement in 2009, he was director of the Center for History of Physics at the American Institute of Physics. He has published numerous papers and books, including The Discovery of Global Warming and [The Rise of Nuclear Fear](http://www.amazon.com/Rise-Nuclear-Fear-Spencer-Weart/dp/0674052331/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1332339097&sr=1-2), which was published last year. “Shunning Nuclear Power”, <http://e360.yale.edu/feature/shunning_new_nuclear_power_plants_will_lead_to_warmer_world/2510/>]

Japan has shut down almost all its reactors, and it’s unclear how many will ever restart. Germany has [decided to phase out its nuclear power industry](http://e360.yale.edu/feature/germanys_unlikely_champion_of_a_radical_green_energy_path/2401/), and Italy and other nations are canceling ambitious plans for expansion. In the United States, prospects for additional reactors hang by a thread. Other nations, including India and China, [continue to press ahead with their nuclear programs](http://e360.yale.edu/feature/chinas_nuclear_power_plans_unfazed_by_fukushima_disaster/2432/), but there can be little doubt that the Fukushima crisis [has been a setback](http://e360.yale.edu/feature/japans_once-powerful_nuclear_industry_is_under_siege/2383/) to prospects for a nuclear renaissance. These blows to the world’s nuclear industry will have severe unintended consequences, most notably because they will inevitably lead to more burning of fossil fuels. Over the past half-century, wherever a nuclear reactor was not built, a coal-fired power plant usually was constructed to ¶ While nuclear reactors make me nervous, the consequences of fossil-fuel burning terrify me.¶ supply the necessary electricity. In future decades, the fewer nuclear reactors, the more coal, natural gas, and oil will be consumed. To be sure, there are promising alternatives like wind and solar, and increases in efficiency so that fewer power plants will be needed. Yet realistically these cannot meet the intense demand for rising economic prosperity, especially in China and other developing nations. And while nuclear reactors make me nervous, the consequences of fossil-fuel burning terrify me. The harm done to human health and the environment by all the nuclear accidents and nuclear waste releases in history is minor compared with the harm caused by the mining and burning of coal, with other fossil fuels not far behind. And there is worse: global warming, caused largely by the emission of heat-trapping gases from fossil fuels. If emissions continue to increase in a “business as usual” fashion — let alone if they increase even faster as reactors are phased out — future generations will suffer as we destabilize the climate system that has supported human civilization for thousands of years. Rising sea levels, droughts in key agricultural regions, and ever-worsening heat waves will threaten people just as the world’s population is [projected to expand from 7 billion today to 10 billion](http://e360.yale.edu/feature/the_world_at_7_billion_can_we_stop_growing_now/2426/) by 2100. We will see the impoverishment of some of the ecosystems on which our society depends. While nuclear power offers no magical solution, it could help us avoid the worst. But wasn’t Fukushima a health disaster? Not in the way you’d expect. Thanks to the openness of Japanese society and prompt evacuation, nobody received the kind of radiation that struck Soviet citizens after the 1986 Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine. So let’s look at Chernobyl as a baseline. The most visible harm there was due to ingestion of radioactive iodine, most commonly by children drinking milk from cows that had eaten radioactive grass in the contamination zone. Ingestion of radioactive iodine has caused nearly 5,000 children and young people to contract thyroid cancer in the ensuing 25 years, although most are doing well following surgery. The World Health Organization has projected that [as many as 50,000 new cases of thyroid cancer could occur](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2000/apr/26/internationalnews) among young people affected by Chernobyl in the coming decades. But the Japanese were protected from this large-scale contamination, and few if any excess thyroid abnormalities are expected. What about other health problems? Some scientists believe that radiation at the levels to which millions of people farther from Chernobyl were ¶ Feelings of deep horror and dread have become the normal response to radioactivity.¶ exposed — moderately above the level of normal background radiation that we all receive — brings an increase in the rate of cancer. However, the increase, if any, has been too minuscule to detect amid the enormous number of cancers that afflict people anyway. Other scientists cite a variety of reasons to argue that low levels of radiation are completely harmless. We just don’t know. It’s the uncertainty itself that has had the greatest impact on most of the Chernobyl survivors. Feeling themselves contaminated by mysterious and uncanny forces, millions became anxious and depressed. Many hesitated to have children, fearing their babies would be deformed. Adding to this were the dislocations of forced evacuation; no wonder psychosomatic illnesses proliferated. Overall, mental health problems caused far more harm for most Chernobyl survivors than the radioactivity. Even more after the Three Mile Island accident, it was not radioactivity but anxiety that caused health problems. The same problems are now being detected among the evacuees from Fukushima. Feelings of deep horror and dread have become the normal response to radioactivity. Of course it is natural to fear anything that might cause cancer and birth defects. But ordinary elements like arsenic also act in these ways, and many widely used chemicals are still more potent in causing all sorts of dangers, without evoking the same widespread fears. For example, a recent National Academy of Sciences study reported that [the smoke emitted by coal-fired power plants causes 10,000 premature deaths](http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php/?record_id=12794) among Americans every year — yet agitation against existing plants is slight. Nor has severe pollution of water supplies in some areas resulted in large-scale evacuations. Radioactivity gets special treatment for historical reasons. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings created a picture of horrid devastation. Then ¶ Oil spills and the daily contamination from coal and gas burning have not inspired such visceral fears.¶ opponents of nuclear weapons fastened on the radioactive fallout from bomb tests, spreading stories of an entire world contaminated, even in the absence of war. Wouldn’t we face radioactive horrors like the gigantic insects that filled popular movies in the 1950s? These mythical fears actually began well before Hiroshima: Mad scientists and their monstrous radiation creations already were featured in science-fiction movies and stories in the 1930s. The mythology did not go away when the Cold War ended. If you play a popular computer game like [Fallout](http://www.nma-fallout.com/fallout1/official_site/) you will battle shambling post-apocalyptic zombies. On top of this is a fear of terrorists with “dirty” bombs, who might use conventional explosives to disperse radioactive materials around a neighborhood, triggering panic, wholesale evacuation, and costly cleanup efforts. Because this imagery has piled on top of the genuine risks of nuclear radiation, the nuclear power industry has been far more closely scrutinized and tightly regulated than other energy source. Oil spills, with their widespread contamination, and the daily contamination from coal and gas burning, have not inspired such visceral fears. Nor has climate change, although it poses the gravest threat of all. Why doesn’t this prospect alarm the public more than the risk from nuclear reactors? One main reason is that there has been nothing like the same deployment of horrific imagery. Television features pictures of ice falling from glaciers, or worried Pacific Islanders and Alaskan natives. But such images — and threats — seem remote in space and time. Indeed the most common icon of global warming ¶ We must not let mythical exaggerations prevent us from staving off the all too real danger of a global climate disaster.¶ is the threatened polar bear — and not everyone cares deeply about this far-away predator. Other common images come from hurricanes battering shorelines and drought-parched farms. But such pictures are nowhere near as dreadful as a looming mushroom cloud. To date, nothing in popular culture has presented a true, vivid picture of what global warming will likely bring, including [the ruin of coral reefs](http://e360.yale.edu/feature/nancy_knowlton_finding_strategies_to_save_coral_reefs/2505/) and refugees fleeing low-lying coasts or drought-parched lands. For the time being, economics is doing as much as public fears to prevent widespread deployment of nuclear reactors. Only if the true costs of fossil fuel burning are taken into account would reactors look cheap. Nevertheless some nations, notably China, [are pushing ahead with nuclear reactor programs](http://e360.yale.edu/feature/chinas_nuclear_power_plans_unfazed_by_fukushima_disaster/2432/). The Chinese are literally choking on their smoke, and rightly worry that climate change can throw them back into abject poverty. Their reactors will not be prohibitively expensive. France, which gets most of its electricity from reactors, long since showed how to sustain an economically sound nuclear industry. But what about nuclear wastes? Certainly we need to guard them carefully. But the tremendous fear of these wastes comes only from the dread of radioactivity, nourished by myths, that puts nuclear reactions somehow on a plane separate from chemical reactions. All the harm ever done by the wastes from the nuclear power industry is tiny compared with the harm done by the wastes from coal, which are vastly more widespread and more difficult to contain. Just in terms of radioactive elements, coal burning releases more into the environment than the world’s nuclear industry.¶ Sometime in the next couple of decades the reality of global warming will become too obvious to ignore. At that point, people will demand a massive deployment of renewable energy sources, huge gains in efficiency... and nuclear power as well. We won’t solve our energy problem by picking and choosing solutions; we will need “[all of the above](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/07/fact-sheet-all-above-approach-american-energy).” But it takes decades to reconstruct an energy system. We do not want to rely in the future on the Chinese for reactors, especially given their record of indifference to safety. The United States and other developed nations need to immediately support the nuclear power industry at a reasonable level. Besides maintaining technical expertise, [we can experiment with new types of reactors](http://e360.yale.edu/feature/the_nuclear_power_resurgence_how_safe_are_the_new_reactors/2287/), which are inherently safer; today we know how to build reactors that are physically incapable of suffering the kind of accidents seen at Chernobyl and Fukushima. We must not let mythical exaggerations prevent us from staving off the all too real danger of a global climate disaster.

#### No tradeoff – abundance and France prove

**Tindale, 11** [Stephen Tindale is an associate fellow at the CER, June 2011, Center for European Reform, <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/pb_thorium_june11-153.pdf>]

The money to support research and development of molten salt reactors need not be taken from renewables or other low-carbon energy supply options. There is more than enough money available in the existing subsidies for nuclear fusion. And the argument that governments which support any form of nuclear power overlook or downplay renewables is disproved by the example of France. France gets over three-quarters of its electricity from nuclear power stations. Yet the French government has supported onshore wind farms and is now giving subsides to offshore wind. It is also subsidising an expansion of the district heating system in Paris, to distribute heat from power stations burning energy crops and waste wood which would otherwise be wasted.

### 2AC Topicality

**Counter-interpretation – primary production**

Energici (provides business intelligence and decision support services to companies and investors active in the wind, solar, hydro, geothermal and bioenergy industries. Specializes in providing robust research, analysis and intelligence coverage of trends and developments) February 2012 “PRIMARY ENERGY PRODUCTION (MONTHLY)” http://www.energici.com/energy-profiles/by-country/europe-m-z/sweden/49-countries/north-america/usa/usa-geothermal/449-primary-energy-production

Definition : Primary Energy Production is the amount of energy converted from a primary energy source in its natural state, such as coal, gas, wind etc. that has not been subjected to any conversion or transformation process. The U.S. Energy Information Administration includes the following in U.S. primary energy production: coal production, waste coal supplied, and coal refuse recovery; crude oil and lease condensate production; natural gas plant liquids production; dry natural gas—excluding supplemental gaseous fuels—production; nuclear electricity net generation\*, conventional hydroelectricity\* (not hydro pumped storage), geothermal electricity\*, solar thermal and photovoltaic electricity\*, wind electricity\*, wood and wood-derived fuels consumption; biomass waste consumption and biofuels feedstock.

**Counter-interpretation – disbursements of public funds for contingent commitments**

Webb, 93 – lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa (Kernaghan, “Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives”, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501 (1993) Hein Online)

In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean disbursements 18 of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures.19 Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies.20 In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created.21 Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used.22 And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration.

By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where *public* *funds are* either disbursed or *contingently committed*, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive *effects* which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming,23 are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as *indirect* incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, thedefinition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and ad hoc industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to *encourage* behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

#### limits are bad

#### A) Prevents holistic education

**Miller,** Professor of Philosophy**, 98** George D, Negotiating toward truth: the extinction of teachers and students, Google Book

Compartmentalization prevents students from seeing the whole. When students are given only a focalized view of reality, then they become more alienated . I would like to expand on this alienation. The alienation arises, on the one hand, from drawing solutions from this compartmentalized solutions that do not work. Education fails to develop holistic perspectives on issues. Secondly, compartmentalized education retards solidarity. We only see our neck of the woods. We don't see how our neck of the woods interacts with other necks of the woods and how the necks of the woods are similar. Compartmentalized learning narrows perspectives.

#### b) Critical thinking

**Miller,** Professor of Philosophy**, 98** George D, Negotiating toward truth: the extinction of teachers and students, Google Book

The fact that the oppressed cannot perceive themes does not mean that themes are absent. It only means that the themes are deeply suppressed by the oppressors. The banking concept of education allows for only a fragmented perspective on reality. Critical thinking grasps interconnections and the whole. We know by understanding the relationship between the whole and the parts. This understanding illuminates limit-situations.

### Natural Gas 2AC

#### Lower natural gas prices now – and they’re key to the economy

**Reuters 12** [“U.S. Export Surge Could Add 5 Million Jobs By 2020: Report”, 9/21/12]

Rising U.S. factory productivity, spurred by falling natural gas prices, could help the nation boost exports of products such as locomotives and factory machinery and add as many as 5 million manufacturing and support jobs by the decade's end, a new analysis found.¶ High worker productivity and low energy prices driven by a surge in shale gas production will give the United States a cost advantage in exports against Western European rivals and Japan in the coming years, according to a Boston Consulting Group report set for release on Friday.¶ By 2015, those factors will make average manufacturing costs in the United States lower by 15 percent than in Germany and France, 8 percent than in the United Kingdom and 21 percent than in Japan, the study projects. Factories' costs in China will remain 7 percent cheaper than those in the United States, however.

#### Shale gas increasing – non-uniques their stuff

**Cekuta 12** [“Unconventional Natural Gas: The U.S. Experience and Global Energy Security”, Robert F. Cekuta, ¶ Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs¶ Address to the 2nd U.S.-Indonesia Energy Investment Roundtable, ¶ Jakarta, Indonesia, ¶ February 6, 2012]

Ladies and gentlemen the reality, something that has surprised many Americans, is that in 2010 the United States produced more natural gas than any country in the world; more than all the countries of the Middle East combined. That one fact alone should give you an idea of the transformative effect of unconventional gas in my country. President Obama mentioned this transformation in his remarks to the Congress in the State of the Union last month. During the last decade, production of unconventional natural gas, which includes shale gas, tight gas, and coalbed methane, grew to reach more than 50 percent of annual U.S. natural gas output. Development of domestic shale gas resources – resources that were once thought technologically and economically unfeasible – has been made possible due to a combination of U.S. government support for research and development and private sector entrepreneurship. The story is not finished; even as we have overcome some of the hurdles to shale gas development, we continue to examine ways to avoid and mitigate environmental and other concerns.

#### No link—LNG in the U.S. is inevitable and the link is linear at best

**Weeks, 5** (Jennifer, E: The Environmental Magazine, “Highly combustible: debating the risks and benefits of LNG,” Nov-Dec 2005, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m1594/is\_6\_16/ai\_n15947809)

"Given the enormity of our energy needs, a segment of our supply has to come from LNG," says former U.S. Representative Philip Sharp, who served as Congressional chair of the National Commission on Energy Policy and is now president of Resources for the Future, an environmental think tank in Washington, D.C. "There's no way that cleaner sources add up to what we need, and gas is much cleaner than coal or oil. LNG should not become an excuse for failing to press forward on energy efficiency and renewable fuels, but we have to deal within the confines of our political and economic institutions, and changes in the energy system are incremental," says Sharp.

#### No link—nuclear baseload power generation is distinct from natural gas peak generation

**CEEG**, Consumer Energy Education Group, **2006**

(“Managing Your Energy Costs”, http://manageenergycosts.com/ManagingCosts.html)

Electricity and Peak Demand

Since electricity cannot be effectively stored, electrical networks must instantaneously balance generation and load, i.e., supply must always equal demand. Therefore, there is a need to build for the peak because sufficient generation capacity must meet maximum instantaneous demand whenever it happens. Meeting varying demands requires a mix of generation capacity including base-load and peak-load generation.

Base-Load Generation vs. Peak-Load Generation

A base load generation unit is one that provides a steady flow of power regardless of total power demand by the grid. This unit runs all seasons except during the time when repairs or scheduled maintenance occur. Base-load plants usually run on low-cost fuels such as nuclear or coal and are massive enough to provide a majority of the power used by a grid. Therefore, these plants have high capital costs to build but low operating costs to run.

In contrast, peak-load units (also known as peakers) are power plants that generally run only when there is a high demand, known as peak demand, for electricity. In the U.S., this occurs in the afternoon, especially during the summer months when the air conditioning load is high. The time a peaker operates may be several hours a day to as little as a few hours per year. If a peaker is only going to be run for a short and variable time, it does not make economic sense to make it as efficient as a base-load power plant. Peak-load units are generally gas turbines that burn natural gas, which are more expensive than coal and nuclear. Therefore, peak-load systems tend to have low capital costs (so it is OK if it lying idle for most of the year) but high operating costs (but then, you don’t run it that often).

#### No econ impact

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

### EIS CP

#### Status quo is the counterplan, and that jacks certainty

**E&E, ’11** (Mike Soraghan, E&E Publishing, 3 February 2011, “NEPA reviews could stall return of deepwater projects,” http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2011/02/03/1)//CC

The future pace of drilling approvals in the Gulf of Mexico might be slowed less by new laws or regulations stemming from last year's massive spill but by a decades-old law that opens the door to longer environmental reviews and litigation. In the wake of last year's Deepwater Horizon oil spill, environmental groups have dispatched attorneys to the Gulf Coast to challenge drilling under the National Environmental Policy Act, or NEPA. And some experts say that could have a profound impact on domestic oil production. NEPA has long been a potent weapon for environmental groups and activists skeptical of drilling in Alaska and the Rocky Mountain West. But such groups had hardly ever turned to it in the Gulf. The legal shift could jolt the delicate choreography that has evolved from steady, predictable and relatively short approval times by Department of Interior regulators. The Gulf could become more like the West, where drilling projects have been delayed for years when judges found that the federal government's environmental analyses were inadequate. "This industry grew up using very complex schedules, and those schedules were dependent on having predictable time frames," said David Bernhardt, who was solicitor at Interior during the George W. Bush administration. "There's inherent uncertainty in the NEPA process and federal decisionmaking." NEPA has been dubbed by some the "Magna Carta" of environmental laws. It requires federal officials to do an environmental impact statement (EIS) when approving plans if the project would cause "significant impact." An EIS can take a year or more and cost more than $1 million.

#### Doesn’t solve –

#### A. One time consultation

**Wasserman 11** (Cheryl, Associate Director for Policy Analysis, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENTS” Ninth International Conference on Environmental Compliance and Enforcement 2011, <http://inece.org/conference/9/proceedings/57_Wasserman.pdf> MGE)

These distinctions can be important to the outcome of the EIA process. Too much emphasis on the adequacy of the EIA document or a one-time determination of “environmental feasibility” reinforces the inadequate attention to ongoing compliance with commitments. All too often EIA requirements fail because they are perceived and implemented as a one-time event.

#### B. Congress says no

**Koenig 2011** (Robert, 10/15, “Congress Seems Frozen as Climate Change evidence accumulates” <http://www.stlbeacon.org/issues-politics/280-washington/114206-congress-seems-frozen-as-climate-change-evidence-accumulates>)

Those waves had little impact on Capitol Hill, however. For the 112th Congress is awash in climate-change skepticism -- in some cases, outright denial. Even though some other nations have taken action, Congress has blocked significant U.S. action to slow the greenhouse gas emissions that most experts believe hasten the process of climate change. "We are the single country in the world that is supposed to be scientific and technically adept, but has a major movement that denies" climate change, said Peter Raven, president emeritus of the Missouri Botanical Garden and an internationally known botanist. Raven, a former president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, a recipient of the National Medal of Science and a member of the National Academy of Sciences, believes the scientific evidence for global climate change is "overwhelming." He served on a National Research Council panel that warned earlier this year -- in the final report of the America's Climate Choices project -- that every ton of greenhouse gases emitted into the atmosphere intensifies the risks related to climate change. The report called for more action to try to limit the extent of climate change and prepare to adapt to its impacts. "The conclusion of the scientific community is clearly that the climate is changing rapidly -- not only in temperature but in other ways as well -- and that human beings are the major factor driving it," Raven told the Beacon. But that conclusion appears to have little impact in the current Congress, especially in the U.S. House. There, leaders of the Energy and Commerce Committee have mounted a campaign this year to block or roll back several Environmental Protection Agency regulations on emissions -- some of which exacerbate climate change. While the House has passed several bills to stop such EPA rules, the Senate so far has blocked them. While he says that intelligent people can disagree on what steps should be taken to slow global warming, Raven worries that "if we make those [issues] political footballs, we would be fostering a kind of anti-science or even anti-intellectual attitude that will make it very difficult for us to be world leaders in science and technology." Some lawmakers in Washington agree with him. U.S. Rep. Henry Waxman, D-Ca., the top Democrat (and former chairman) on the Energy and Commerce Committee, told the Center for American Progress: "I have never been in a Congress where there was such an overwhelming disconnect between science and policy."

#### C. Obama says no

**Cappiello 2011 -** Dina Cappiello is an award-winning environmental journalist who follows the story looking for specific, factual information about environmental problems that communities need in order to push for change (“Gore: On Global Warming, Obama Has Changed Little” 6/22, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=13900390)

The Democrats' leading environmental messenger, Al Gore, is declaring that President Barack Obama has failed to lead on the issue of global warming. In a 7,000-word essay posted online Wednesday by Rolling Stone magazine, Gore says the president hasn't stood up for "bold action" on the problem and has done little to move the country forward since he replaced Republican President George W. Bush. Bush infuriated environmentalists by resisting mandatory controls on the pollution blamed for climate change, despite overwhelming scientific evidence that the burning of fossil fuels is responsible. The scientific case has only gotten stronger since, Gore argues, but Obama has not used it to force significant change. "Obama has never presented to the American people the magnitude of the climate crisis," Gore says. "He has not defended the science against the ongoing withering and dishonest attacks. Nor has he provided a presidential venue for the scientific community ... to bring the reality of the science before the public." http://a.abcnews.com/assets/images/spacer.gif

Gore does credit Obama's political appointees with making hundreds of changes that have helped move the country "forward slightly" on the climate issue, but says the president "has simply not made the case for action." He is the second Clinton administration official this month to express disappointment with Obama on environmental issues. Former Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt, in a speech in early June, said Obama had yet to take up the "mantle of land and water conservation...in a significant way." Gore's comments mark a turnaround for the nation's most prominent global warming advocate, whose work on the climate problem has earned him a Nobel Prize and was adapted into an Oscar-winning documentary.

#### D. Delays

**Greenwire 2009** (“NEPA reviews shouldn't delay stimulus projects, experts say” March 24th, http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2009/03/24/2)

If the economy flounders despite the massive stimulus package, don't blame the federal law that forces government agencies to review their projects' environmental impacts. So say National Environmental Policy Act experts like Nicholas Yost, who led the drafting of NEPA regulations during the Carter administration. The preparation of environmental impact statements under NEPA takes almost three-and-a-half years -- much longer than Yost and others say is needed. The process, they say, can be sped up with strict deadlines, strong leadership from agency chiefs and increased resources and personnel to do reviews.

#### Links to politics

**Rosenbaum 2005** - Professor of Political Science at Univ of Florida (Walter A, *Environmental Policymaking*, Ed. Hatch, p200-201)

In many instances, the EIS process is an early warning system for environmental advocacy and science communities, even though public involvement in the process is often more restrictive than its authors intended. The statutory and regulatory requirements for early public disclosure and review of the agency EIS statements often provide interested and affected parties with a translation of agency programs into comprehensible and relevant language which, in turn, incites political mobilization. This public disclosure is valuable not only to the Washington-based national organizations (that sometimes employ specialized staff for EIS oversight) but especially to smaller state and local organizations otherwise lacking the resources to acquire and interpret the complex and often (deliberately) mystifying, bureaucratic, syntax-adorning program descriptions.

### Elections

**Relations are impossible and won’t result in cooperation**

**LaFranchi, 3/3/12** [Christian Science Monitor, “A cold-war chill US-Russia relations falter over Libya and Syria”, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2012/0303/A-cold-war-chill-US-Russia-relations-falter-over-Libya-and-Syria/%28page%29/2]

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton doffed her diplomatic gloves after Russia vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution on Syria. Calling the February veto "despicable," she laid at Moscow's feet the "murders" of Syrian "women, children, [and] brave young men."

Not to be outdone, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin railed against the United States for indulging its "bellicose itch" to get involved in other countries' internal affairs. And he vowed that Russia will thwart American designs in the Middle East.

Whatever happened to the "reset," President Obama's ballyhooed reorientation of US-Russia relations to a more cooperative path focused on common interests?

Russia would say Libya happened – the conflict where the West and the US in particular demonstrated a zeal for intervention that struck at Russia's sense of sovereignty and of what the UN should and shouldn't do. The US would say Syria happened – revealing Russia's revived obstructionist tendencies on the Security Council and demonstrating Russia's determination to protect an old ally at the expense of the Syrian people.

Both countries might say that what happened is this: The common interests that the "reset" was meant to emphasize – arms control, counterterrorism, the global economy – have taken a back seat to awakened geopolitical rivalries and **diverging** international **visions**.

Add to this the fact that Mr. Putin is expected to return to Russia's presidency in elections Sunday, bringing with him a blame-the-west perspective for explaining many of Russia's ills.

The result is that stormy days lie ahead for US-Russia relations, many say. Progress on issues like missile defense and NATO-Russia relations is likely to remain stalled – and could suffer serious setbacks if the Syria and Iran crises deteriorate further.

"I foresee a tough year for US-Russia relations," says Andrew Weiss, a former director for Russian affairs on the National Security Council under President Clinton who is now a Russia analyst at the RAND Corp. in Arlington, Va. With little prospect for advances, he adds, the Obama administration is likely to focus on preventing backsliding. "The emphasis will be on ensuring that these fast-moving conflicts don't put the remaining areas of cooperation at risk," he says.

Others say the current frictions demonstrate how relations, despite the efforts of three administrations, have never overcome cold-war mistrusts to progress to a deeper level.

"Under both Clinton and Bush, the US made it look like things were moving forward with Russia by focusing on things that were easier to do and that didn't require sacrifice from either side," says Paul Saunders, executive director of the Center for the National Interest in Washington.

Three years ago this month, President Obama said he **hoped to promote** more **cooperation** between the U.S. and Russia. It would be hard to see how that may happen as Vladimir Putin approaches power once again. Host Scott Simon speaks with the U.S. ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, about Sunday's elections in Russia.

#### No impact – Romney will copy Obama on foreign policy

Aaron David Miller, 5-23-2012; distinguished scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Barack O'Romney http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/23/barack\_oromney

And that brings up an extraordinary fact. What has emerged in the second decade after 9/11 is a remarkable consensus among Democrats and Republicans on a core approach to the nation's foreign policy. It's certainly not a perfect alignment. But rarely since the end of the Cold War has there been this level of consensus. Indeed, while Americans may be divided, polarized and dysfunctional about issues closer to home, we are really quite united in how we see the world and what we should do about it. Ever wondered why foreign policy hasn't figured all that prominently in the 2012 election campaign? Sure, the country is focused on the economy and domestic priorities. And yes, Obama has so far avoided the kind of foreign-policy disasters that would give the Republicans easy free shots. But there's more to it than that: Romney has had a hard time identifying Obama's foreign-policy vulnerabilities because there's just not that much difference between the two. A post 9/11 consensus is emerging that has bridged the ideological divide of the Bush 43 years. And it's going to be pretty durable. Paradoxically, both George W. Bush's successes and failures helped to create this new consensus. His tough and largely successful approach to counterterrorism -- specifically, keeping the homeland safe and keeping al Qaeda and its affiliates at bay through use of special forces, drone attacks, aggressive use of intelligence, and more effective cooperation among agencies now forms a virtually unassailable bipartisan consensus. As shown through his stepped-up drone campaign, Barack Obama has become George W. Bush on steroids. And Bush 43's failed policies -- a discretionary war in Iraq and a mismanaged one in Afghanistan -- have had an equally profound effect. These adventures created a counter-reaction against ill-advised military campaigns that is now bipartisan theology as well. To be sure, there are some differences between Romney and Obama. But with the exception of Republicans taking a softer line on Israel and a tougher one on Russia -- both stances that are unlikely to matter much in terms of actual policy implementation -- there's a much greater convergence.

#### Romney will win – independent voters will decide the outcome for him

**Ferrechio, 9/11**/12 – Chief Congressional Correspondent for the Washington Examiner (Susan, The Washington Examiner, “Polls show Romney soars with independent voters”, <http://washingtonexaminer.com/polls-show-romney-soars-with-independent-voters/article/2507679#.UFKaqo1mR9s>)

Recent polls show President Obama enjoying a bounce in the polls following last week's Democratic convention in Charlotte, N.C., but buried in those data is good news for Mitt Romney about voter enthusiasm and the preferences of independents, who could decide the election.¶ The CNN/ORC International poll of registered and likely voters released Tuesday shows likely voters favoring Obama by 52 percent to 46 percent over Romney -- evidence, pundits said, of a post-convention bump for the president.¶ But a figure buried in the report shows Romney leading Obama among likely independent voters, 54 percent to 40 percent.¶ Both Democrats and Republicans believe independents will be critical to deciding the outcome of the election, in part because they make up a growing part of the electorate and are considered up for grabs because they fluctuate in their political preferences from one election to the next.¶ "That's a significant lead," said pollster Ron Faucheux.¶ It was the independent vote that helped Obama win the 2008 election. He won 52 percent of independents, compared with 44 percent for McCain. Independents comprised about 33 percent of the overall vote in 2008.¶ "If Romney can beat Obama among independents this time, he can win the election."¶ A poll conducted two weeks ago by Democracy Corps showed Romney with a 15-point lead among independents, 53 percent to 38 percent.¶

#### Newest polls are shifting to Romney and GOP enthusiasm is higher

**Chambers, 9/13**/12 - Internet journalist and commentator, launched his writing career by creating an alternative conservative student newspaper while in college (Dean, “Mitt Romney possible landslide indicated by polling data released today” <http://www.examiner.com/article/mitt-romney-possible-landslide-indicated-by-polling-data-released-today>)

The latest Rasmussen Reports Daily Presidential Tracking Poll released today shows Mitt Romney back in the lead over President Obama by a 47 percent to 46 percent margin and three percent preferring another candidate. When voters leaning to one of the candidates are included, Romney has a 49 percent to 47 percent lead over the president. The poll also finds the president having a 49 percent approval rating while being disapproved by 51 percent. This is where Barack Obama has been in this poll for months, with the exception of briefly having an approval rating at or above 50 percent for a few days earlier this month that appears to have been a “bounce” after the Democratic National Convention.¶ The Rasmussen poll also found that 49 percent of Republican voters are following the race on a daily basis while just 42 percent are doing so. Likewise, other national surveys of the presidential race have, including the Washington Post/ABC News poll released earlier this week, found a higher “enthusiasm” factor about the race among Republican voters than that of Democratic voters.

#### Alt-causes – debates and labor statistics

**Lombardo, 9/12**/12 - Global CEO, StrategyOne (Steve, “Why This Election Comes Down to Two Days in October,” Huffington Post, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-lombardo/election-monitor-why-this_b_1877815.html>)

Several national polls released this week show that President Obama received a small but meaningful bounce after the conventions. The bounce -- in the 3-5 point range -- is within the median for convention bounces since 1964. The problem for Republicans is that Romney got no bounce from his convention. In fact, his vote share likely shrunk a point or two in the last two weeks. While the Republican convention may have strengthened Romney's position with the base, it did little to expand his coalition. The momentum from "You didn't build that" has been halted. ¶ However, we see nothing in the data yet to suggest this is anything but a dead heat. For all the hand wringing over the GOP convention and the Romney campaign they are in a dead heat with an incumbent President with 55 days to go. When you look at likely voters in key swing states, this thing is truly 50/50. ¶ Here is our take as of 12 a.m. EST: ¶ The murder of Ambassador Stevens and the unrest in Libya will thrust both candidates into the foreign policy fray. It will be very interesting to see how each handles the coming hours and days and how much the media -- and ultimately voters -- focuses on the issue.¶ Look for a higher level of advertising spend from the Romney campaign in key battleground states over the next two weeks. History has shown that the candidate who is clearly in the lead by mid to late September will likely be the winner in November. That doesn't mean things can't change in October -- they can. But sentiment will start to firm up in the next two weeks. The Romney campaign has a $60 million cash-on-hand advantage, and they should use it now. Team Obama defined Romney in the spring using their cash advantage; the Romney campaign should not wait until October. They need to change the dynamic before October 1.¶ The two biggest dates of the campaign are October 3rd and October 5th. The first debate will be held on Wednesday, October 3rd at the University of Denver at 9 p.m. EST. For three reasons this will be far and away the most important debate:¶ It is the first and therefore, unless there is a major blunder, is likely to be the one that sets the image of Romney in stone.¶ We really do not believe that the other two will matter if Romney has a poor debate performance here. Romney has to win this debate pure and simple.¶ This one is purely on domestic policy, i.e. the economy. If Romney can't win this one, he is unlikely to win the other two, barring a miscue by the President.¶ On October 5th at 8:30 a.m. EST the Bureau of Labor Statistics will release the September unemployment numbers. This will be the most impactful announcement of the campaign. If the unemployment rate goes up it could be devastating for the president's reelection chances. Similarly, if it goes down -- especially if it goes below 8 percent -- it may pretty much secure an Obama victory in November.

#### Gridlock inevitable – means no impact

**Curry, 9/11**/12 - NBC News national affairs writer (Tom, NBC Politics, “Romney election could create new scenario for EPA and coal,” <http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/11/13807749-romney-election-could-create-new-scenario-for-epa-and-coal?lite>)

Whether Mitt Romney or Barack Obama wins the presidential election, a congressional impasse in 2013 seems likely. That’s because under most conceivable election scenarios – with Romney or Obama in the White House, and with either Democrats maintaining their Senate majority, or the Republicans taking it – the minority party could use the filibuster threat to block proposals it opposed.

#### No unique link – Obama pushing wind

**Talev, 8/17**/12 (Margaret, “Obama Spars With Romney on Energy Policy in Swing State Pitches”, Bloomberg,http://www.sfgate.com/business/bloomberg/article/Obama-Spars-With-Romney-on-Energy-Policy-in-Swing-3795066.php#ixzz26G2lLu4Q)

President Barack Obama and Republican Mitt Romney put their differences on energy in stark relief today with competing speeches from a center of wind power development and from coal country.¶ At a rally in Oskaloosa, Iowa, Obama criticized Romney for calling the benefits of alternative energy “imaginary” and his running mate, [Representative Paul Ryan](http://www.sfgate.com/?controllerName=search&action=search&channel=business%2Fbloomberg&search=1&inlineLink=1&query=%22Representative+Paul+Ryan%22), for labeling wind power a “fad.”¶ Romney appeared at a coal mine in Beallsville, Ohio, where he promised to achieve energy independence for North America by the end of a second term and hit Obama for regulations that he said were stifling coal production.¶ The two candidates were making their cases in swing states in an election campaign playing out against the backdrop of sluggish U.S. economic growth and an unemployment rate of 8.3 percent. The jobless rate has been stuck above 8 percent since Obama’s first full month in office.¶ Obama in his speech cited the 75,000 U.S. jobs tied to the wind energy industry and contrasted his support for extending a wind energy manufacturing tax credit with Romney’s opposition.

#### Nuclear power doesn’t swing the election

**Wood, 9-13-12**

[Elisa, AOL, “What Obama and Romney Don't Say About Energy,” http://energy.aol.com/2012/09/13/what-obama-and-romney-dont-say-about-energy/]

Fossil fuels and renewable energy have become touchy topics in this election, with challenger Mitt Romney painting President Barack Obama as too hard on the first and too fanciful about the second – and Obama saying Romney is out of touch with energy's future. But two other significant resources, nuclear power and energy efficiency, are evoking scant debate. What gives? Nuclear energy supplies about 20 percent of US electricity, and just 18 months ago dominated the news because of Japan's Fukushima Daiichi disaster – yet neither candidate has said much about it so far on the campaign trail. Romney mentioned nuclear power only seven times in his recently released white paper, while he brought up oil 150 times. Even wind power did better with 10 mentions. He pushes for less regulatory obstruction of new nuclear plants, but says the same about other forms of energy. Obama's campaign website highlights the grants made by his administration to 70 universities for research into nuclear reactor design and safety. But while it is easy to find his ideas on wind, solar, coal, natural gas and oil, it takes a few more clicks to get to nuclear energy. The Nuclear Energy Institute declined to discuss the candidates' positions pre-election. However, NEI's summer newsletter said that both "Obama and Romney support the use of nuclear energy and the development of new reactors."

#### Plan popular with public

Bowman, 4-18-12

[Karlyn, American Enterprise Institute, “Polls on the environment, energy, global warming and nuclear power,” http://www.aei.org/papers/politics-and-public-opinion/polls/polls-on-the-environment-energy-global-warming-and-nuclear-power-april-2012/]

\* President Obama is getting low marks on his handling of gas prices. In a February 2012 AP/GfK-Roper poll, 39 percent approved of the job he is doing in this area. Significant majorities say rising gas prices have caused difficulties in their households. \* The majority of Americans still think nuclear power is safe. In a March 2012 Gallup poll, 57 percent favored using nuclear energy as one way to provide electricity for the United States. But people still wouldn’t want to build a nuclear plant in their backyard. Only 35 percent told CBS pollsters in March 2011 that they would approve of a nuclear power plant in their community, and 62 percent disapproved. \* Americans like an “all-of-the-above” energy strategy that includes more energy production, developing alternative energy sources, more conservation and nuclear power.

#### Plan creates jobs in swing states like Ohio – popular

Korte, 4-27-12

[Gregory, USA Today, “Politics stands in the way of nuclear plant's future,” http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/story/2012-04-13/usec-centrifuges-loan-guarantees/54560118/1]

The stakes are high: It's an election year, and Ohio is a swing state. USEC estimates the project at its peak will generate 3,158 jobs in Ohio, and 4,284 elsewhere. Pike County, home to the centrifuges, has a 13% unemployment rate — the highest in Ohio. The median household income is about $40,000. The average job at USEC pays $77,316. Centrifuge parts are stacked up in Piketon. "It's as shovel-ready as they come," says spokeswoman Angela Duduit. Indeed, the project has enjoyed bipartisan support. A USA TODAY review of DOE records shows that no fewer than 46 members of Congress — 32 Republicans and 14 Democrats — have pressured the Obama administration to approve the loan guarantee for USEC. "Quick action is paramount," said one bipartisan letter. "It is imperative that this application move forward now," said another. The congressional support comes from states such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Kentucky, West Virginia, Missouri, Alabama, Indiana, Maryland, North Carolina and South Carolina— an almost exact overlay of the states that would benefit from the 7,442 jobs the company says would be created.

**Ohio key**

**Sowinski 12** [Greg Sowinski, Lima News, “Senator tells Husky workers he’s got their backs”, Aug 15, 2012]

Brown said Ohio is key for President Barack Obama’s re-election.¶ “Ohio is still the most important state in this election,” he said.¶ But the biggest issue is the economy, he said.¶ “The economy always is,” he said. “We’re going in the right direction but we need to do better.”¶ Brown said the state has reduced unemployment from 10.5 percent to less than 7.5 percent under Obama, and the country has added 500,000 manufacturing jobs after losing 5 million of those jobs.

### Russian HEU Add-on

**US leadership in reprocessing supercharges conversion of HEU**

**Timbers 3** William Timbers president and CEO of the USEC, explains in 2k3: Timbers, President and Chief Executive Officer USEC Inc, 9-19-2k3

(William, "Nuclear Power & Global Security: Mutual Interest, Mutual Opportunities, Delivered at the Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace Second International Non-Proliferation Conference Moscow, Russia. P. <http://www.usec.com/v2001_02/Content/News/Speeches/09-19-03-CEIPMoscowRe>marks.pdf )

While significant steps have been taken by Russia and the United States to strengthen the security of stored fissionable nuclear materials, a different approach goes right to the heart of the matter—the very elimination of nuclear warhead materials.

After several years of consultations, in 1993 Russia and the United States formally agreed to a 20-year, $12 billion program to eliminate 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) taken from dismantled Russian warheads. To put this in perspective, 500 metric tons of HEU is the equivalent of more than 20,000 nuclear warheads. This U.S.-Russian agreement is often referred to it as the “HEU-LEU” agreement or “the Russian HEU Agreement.” We, who are responsible for commercially implementing this agreement, call it the “Megatons to Megawatts” program. I want to take a moment to acknowledge that, over the years, many of you—both Russians and Americans—have played a vital role in making this HEU to LEU program possible and in helping to ensure its continuity. You can be justifiably proud of your role in making this remarkable effort a success. For those of you who are not familiar with Megatons to Megawatts, you may be wondering why a private sector company is involved. That is because the 1993 U.S.-Russian Agreement requires that it be implemented strictly on commercial terms. Simply put, the strategy of the two governments was to ensure that a substantial amount of excess weapons material was irreversibly converted to peaceful uses as quickly as possible and to utilize the dynamics of the commercial market for nuclear fuel to pay for this effort. Their accurate assessment was that the program could commercially sustain itself over the 20-year period through the sale and purchase of fuel derived from warhead materials. Accordingly, in 1994 executive agents appointed by both governments signed a commercial implementing contract—Techsnabexport (TENEX) acting for the Russian government and the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) acting for the United States government. The value of this program also extends beyond its basic mission of eliminating nuclear warhead materials. There is also a human dimension. Proceeds from this program support thousands of Russian workers who take part in the process of transforming HEU into reactor fuel, who work on environmental cleanup and restoration and who enhance the safeguards for these materials. This underscores the importance of addressing issues concerning highly talented people who were previously involved in weapons programs. The talents of these dedicated scientists and engineers, representing a broad range of technical capabilities, can and should be utilized for non-weapons related work. Companies such as USEC stand ready to work with their Russian partners to facilitate and accelerate such endeavors. 2 When you consider the achievements of the Nunn-Lugar and Megatons to Megawatts programs and the human resources implications, it is clear that they have made a definite contribution to reducing the threat of nuclear weapons. But, what about the future? I believe that we can substantially increase the amount of nuclear warhead material that is eliminated by burning it as fuel in a new generation of commercial nuclear power stations. Regardless of where this bomb-grade material may come from, **its conversion into fuel will end its military value.** And last, but not least, the private sector can play a financial and facilitating role in making this happen. Today, the nuclear fuel market is in balance—supply is matching demand. A rapid increase in the number of nuclear power plants would increase the demand for nuclear fuel. While we would meet long-term demand primarily with expanded enrichment capacity, this new demand would also enable accommodation of additional fuel derived from nuclear warhead material. The good news is that we are at an intersection of mutual interests. It is increasingly evident that a global expansion of commercial nuclear power operations is being actively considered—especially in Russia, Asia and the United States. Several events are driving this trend. Events, such as increasing worldwide demand for electricity, power shortages, and global climate change, air pollution and growing dependency upon long, fragile lifelines of energy resources, are increasing the appeal of nuclear power. These factors present us with a unique opportunity. I believe there is a mutual interest among those who advocate the expansion of commercial nuclear power plants and those who seek to eliminate nuclear weapons materials. Advocates of nuclear nonproliferation can accelerate the increased elimination of nuclear bomb-grade materials and secure the dynamics of the marketplace to facilitate these activities Concerns about proliferation are often raised by those opposed to the further development of nuclear power. At the same time, it is widely recognized that there are numerous technical routes to produce nuclear warhead materials and that commercial nuclear power operations, with appropriate and rigorous fuel safeguards, is not the route of choice for those intent on securing weapons materials.

**That solves accidental Russian launch**

**Hecker 1** “Thoughts about an Integrated Strategy for Nuclear Cooperation with Russia”, The NonProliferation Review, Volume 8, Number 2, Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker is a Senior Fellow at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. He was Director of the laboratory from 1986 through 1997. Dr. Hecker has interacted closely with the Russian nuclear weapons complex since the exchange visit of Russian and U.S. nuclear weapons laboratory directors in February 1992.

Although the breakup of the Soviet Union has dramatically reduced the probability of a nuclear exchange, we must remain ever vigilant against the possibility of accidental or unauthorized launches. In the longer term, it will be important to develop a new strategy for strategic stability. The end of the Cold War and the U.S. move toward a national missile defense (NMD) clearly challenge the traditional strategies. A new strategy for strategic stability will evolve slowly and only after the role of traditional arms control, nuclear force structure balance, second-rank nuclear powers, and proliferation issues are reexamined.[14] Observations The cooperative and reciprocal measures taken to date by the United States and Russia to avoid accidental or unauthorized launches are not sufficient to guard against a potential nuclear catastrophe. The **deterioration in Russian military infrastructure and the abysmal economic conditions of its military servicemen have exacerbated the risk dramatically.**

**Global nuclear war**

**Forrow**, MD, **98**

(Lachlan, MD, et al, "Accidental Nuclear War – A Post-Cold War Assessment", New England Journal of Medicine)

Public health professionals now recognize that many, if not most, injuries and deaths from violence and accidents result from a predictable series of events that are, at least in principle, preventable.44,45 The direct toll that would result from an accidental nuclear attack of the type described above would dwarf all prior accidents in history. Furthermore, such an attack, even if accidental, might prompt a retaliatory response resulting in an all-out nuclear exchange. The World Health Organization has estimated that this would result in billions of direct and indirect casualties worldwide.4

### Kritik

#### Epistemological debate is irrelevant - concrete action is inevitable - they fail to create useful knowledge

**Friedrichs, 09** [Jorg, University Lecturer in Politics at the Oxford Department of International Development, “From Positivist Pretense to Pragmatic Practice Varieties of Pragmatic Methodology in IR Scholarship” Pragmatism and International Relations]

As Friedrich Nietzsche ([1887] 1994:1; cf. Wilson 2002) knew, the knower isstrangely unknown to himself. In fact, it is much morehazardous to contemplate theway how we gain knowledge than to gain such knowledge in the ﬁrst place. This is not to deny that intellectuals are a narcissistic Kratochwil lot, with a penchant for omphaloskepsis. The typical result of their navel-gazing, however, is not increased self-awareness. Scholars are more likely to come up with ex-post-facto rationalizations of how they would like to see their activity than with accurate descriptions of how they go about business. As a result, in science there is a paradoxical divide between positivist pretenseand pragmatic practice. Many prominent scholars proceed pragmatically in gen-erating their knowledge, only to vest it all in a positivist cloak when it comes topresenting results. In the wake of Karl Popper (1963), fantasies about ingeniousconjectures and inexorable refutations continue to hold sway despite the muchmore prosaic way most scholars grope around in the formulation of their theo-ries, and the much less rigorous way they assess the value of their hypotheses. In proposing pragmatism as a more realistic alternative to positivist idealiza-tions, I am not concerned with the original intentions of Charles Peirce. Theseare discussed and enhanced by Ryto¨ vuori-Apunen (this forum). Instead, Ipresent various attempts to make pragmatism work as a methodology for IR scholarship. This includes my own preferred methodology, the pragmaticresearch strategy of abduction. As Fritz Kratochwil and I argue elsewhere, abduction should be at the center of our efforts, while deduction and induction areimportant but auxiliary tools (Friedrichs and 2009).Of course, one does not need to be a pragmatist to proceed in a pragmatic way. Precisely because it is derived from practice, pragmatic commonsense is a sold as the hills. For example, James Rosenau (1988:164) declared many yearsago that he coveted ‘‘a long-held conviction that one advances knowledge most effectively by continuously moving back and forth between very abstract and very empirical levels of inquiry, allowing the insights of the former to exert pressurefor the latter even as the ﬁndings of the latter, in turn, exert pressure for the for-mer, thus sustaining an endless cycle in which theory and research feed on eachother.’’ This was shortly before Rosenau’s turn to postmodernism, while he wasstill touting the virtues of behaviorism and standard scientiﬁc requisites, such asindependent and dependent variables and theory testing. But if we take his state-ment at face value, it appears that Rosenau-the-positivist was guided by a sort of pragmatism for all but the name. While such practical commonsense is certainly valuable, in and by itself, it does not qualify as scientiﬁc methodology. Science requires a higher degree of methodological awareness. For this reason, I am not interested here in pragma-tism as unspoken commonsense, or as a pretext for doing empirical researchunencumbered by theoretical and methodological considerations. Nor am I con-cerned with pragmatism as an excuse for staging yet another epistemological debate. Instead, I am interested in pragmatism as an instrument to go about research with an appropriate degree of epistemological and methodologicalawareness. Taking this criterion as my yardstick, the following three varieties of pragmatist methodology in recent IR scholarship are worth mentioning: theory synthesis, analytic eclecticism (AE), and abduction.Theory synthesis is proposed by Andrew Moravcsik (2003), who claims that theories can be combined as long as they are compatible at some unspeciﬁedfundamental level, and that data will help to identify the right combination of theories. He does not explicitly invoke pragmatism but vests his pleading in apositivist cloak by using the language of theory testing. When looking closer,however, it becomes apparent that his theoretical and methodological noncha-lance is far more pragmatic than what his positivist rhetoric suggests. Moravcsiksees himself in good company, dropping the following names: Robert Keohane,Stephen Walt, Jack Snyder, Stephen Van Evera, Bary Buzan, Bruce Russett, John O’Neal, Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink. With the partial excep-tion of Finnemore, however, none of these scholars explicitly links his or herscholarship to pragmatism. They employ pragmatic commonsense in theirresearch, but devoutly ignore pragmatism as a philosophical and methodologicalposition. As a result, it is fair to say that theory synthesis is only on a slightly higher level of intellectual awareness than Rosenau’s statement quoted above. Analytic eclecticism, as advertized by Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, links acommonsensical approach to empirical research with a more explicit commit-ment to pragmatism (Sil and Katzenstein 2005; Katzenstein and Sil 2008).The 7 Even the dean of critical rationalism, Karl Popper, is ‘‘guilty’’ of lapses into pragmatism, for example when hestates that scientists, like hungry animals, classify objects according to needs and interests, although with the impor-tant difference that they are guided in their quest for ﬁnding regularities not so much by the stomach but ratherby empirical problems and epistemic interests (Popper 1963:61–62). 646 Pragmatism and International Relations idea is to combine existing research traditions in a pragmatic fashion and thusto enable the formulation and exploration of novel and more complex sets of problems. The constituent elements of different research traditions are trans-lated into mutually compatible vocabularies and then recombined in novel ways.This implies that most scholars must continue the laborious process of formulat-ing parochial research traditions so that a few cosmopolitan colleagues will beenabled to draw upon their work and construct syncretistic collages. 8 In additionto themselves, Katzenstein and Sil cite a number of like-minded scholars such asCharles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Paul Pierson, and Robert Jervis. 9 The ascription isprobably correct given the highly analytical and eclectic approach of these schol-ars. Nevertheless, apart from Katzenstein and Sil themselves none of these schol-ars has explicitly avowed himself to AE.My preferred research strategy is abduction, which is epistemologically asself-aware as AE but minimizes the dependence on existing research traditions.The typical situation for abduction is when we, both in everyday life and as socialscientists, become aware of a certain class of phenomena that interests us for somereason, but for which we lack applicable theories. We simply trust, although we donot know for certain, that the observed class of phenomena is not random. Wetherefore start collecting pertinent observations and, at the same time, applyingconcepts from existing ﬁelds of our knowledge. Instead of trying to impose anabstract theoretical template (deduction) or ‘‘simply’’ inferring propositions fromfacts (induction), we start reasoning at an intermediate level (abduction). Abduction follows the predicament that science is, or should be, above all amore conscious and systematic version of the way by which humans have learnedto solve problems and generate knowledge in their everyday lives. As it iscurrently practiced, science is often a poor emulator of what we are able toachieve in practice. This is unfortunate because human practice is the ultimatemiracle. In our own practice, most of us manage to deal with many challenging situations. The way we accomplish this is completely different from**,** and far moreefﬁcient than, the way knowledge is generated according to standard scientiﬁc methods. If it is true that in our own practice we proceed not so much by induction or deduction but rather by abduction, then science would do well tomimic this at least in some respects. 10 Abduction has been invoked by numerous scholars, including Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie, Jeffrey Checkel, Martin Shapiro, Alec Stone Sweet, andMartha Finnemore. While they all use the term abduction, none has ever thor-oughly speciﬁed its meaning. To make up for this omission, I have developedabduction into an explicit methodology and applied it in my own research oninternational police cooperation (Friedrichs 2008). Unfortunately, it is impossi-ble to go into further detail here. Readers interested in abduction as a way toadvance international research and methodology can also be referred to my recent article with Fritz Kratochwil (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009).On a ﬁnal note, we should be careful not to erect pragmatism as the ultimateepistemological fantasy to caress the vanity of Nietzschean knowers unknown tothemselves, namely that they are ingeniously ‘‘sorting out’’ problematic situa-tions. Scientiﬁc inquiry is not simply an intimate encounter between a researchproblem and a problem solver. It is a social activity taking place in communitiesof practice (Wenger 1998). Pragmatism must be neither reduced to the utility of results regardless of their social presuppositions and meaning, nor to the 8 Pace Rudra Sil (this forum), the whole point about eclecticism is that you rely on existing traditions to blendthem into something new. There is no eclecticism without something to be eclectic about. 9 One may further expand the list by including the international society approach of the English school (Ma-kinda 2000), as well as the early Kenneth Waltz (1959). 10 Precisely for this reason, abduction understood as ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ plays a crucial role inthe ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence. 647 The Forum fabrication of consensus among scientists. Pragmatism as the practice of dis-cursive communities and pragmatism as a device for the generation of useful knowledge are two sides of the same coin

#### Democracy checks their K impact

**O’Kane 97 –** Prof Comparative Political Theory, U Keele (Rosemary, “Modernity, the Holocaust and politics,” Economy and Society 26:1, p 58-9, AG)

Modern bureaucracy is not 'intrinsically capable of genocidal action' (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalin's USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method. By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very 'ordinary and common' attributes of truly modern societies. It is these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which **stand in the way of modern genocides.**

**Evolution**

**Thayer, 2004** (Bradley, Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict, Introduction)

Perhaps most importantly, Kenneth Waltz's conception of socialization in international relations is very similar to Darwin's concept of natural selection as a process of evolution, making it an example of how evolutionary theory may provide metaphors that better explain state behavior in a competitive environment. In his magnum opus, Waltz explains how the international system forces states to socialize, adapt, and emulate successful states or else fall prey to the depredations of other states.71 The Darwinian model of evolution strongly reinforces Waltz's argument and also allows us to understand how states, like animals in the natural world, adapt to an external environment—at times consciously, but also through unconscious forces like natural selection. Moreover, the metaphor of evolution through natural selection provides insights for scholars who use the systemic analysis of international relations. As I explain in the next chapter, natural selection works through many forces of nature, including external selection pressures, climate, predators, and parasites, but similarly important are individual changes, differences within the genotype, that allow a particular animal with a positive or better adaptation to flourish in a slightly changed environment. Thus, when applied to international relations, we can understand that aspects of the particular state, that is, either positive or negative adaptations, may have significant effects on the international system. We may think of the command economies of the Soviet Union, Cuba, or North Korea as being evolutionary dead ends in the environment of globalization, or as nuclear weapons as contributing to or detracting from the "fitness" of a state in international relations. The condition of the natural world may also serve as a metaphor for international relations. Indeed, probably the most famous metaphor in the history of international relations is Thomas Hobbes's famous description in Leviathan of the "state of nature." As an ecologist and ethologist, Hobbes was not bad. His conception of the natural world captured much of what Darwin would recognize two hundred years later. In the natural world, animals must provide resources—food, water, and shelter—for themselves and perhaps for their genetic relatives and others in very occasional and specific circumstances, such as to attract a mate. They also live in a dangerous environment, constantly threatened by predators as well as their own kind, and by forces of nature, such as disease, parasites, and weather. Animals act the way they do—they are egoistic, fearful of others, and react to threats by fighting, freezing, or through flight—because natural selection has favored these behaviors. They help animals survive in a dangerous world.

#### Abandoning nature causes extinction

Soulé 95– Natural Resources Professor, California (Michael and Gary Lease, Reinventing Nature?, p 159-60, AG)

The decision has already been made in most places. Some of the ecological myths discussed here contain, either explicitly or implicitly, the idea that nature is self-regulating and capable of caring for itself. This notion leads to the theory of management known as benign neglect—nature will do fine, thank you, if human beings just leave it alone. Indeed, a century ago, a hands-off policy was the best policy. Now it is not. Given nature's current fragmented and stressed condition, neglect will result in an accelerating spiral of deterioration. Once people create large gaps in forests, isolate and disturb habitats, pollute, overexploit, and introduce species from other continents, the viability of many ecosystems and native species is compromised, resiliency dissipates, and diversity can collapse. When artificial disturbance reaches a certain threshold, even small changes can produce large effects, and these will be compounded by climate change.' For example, a storm that would be considered normal and beneficial may, following widespread clearcutting, cause disastrous blow-downs, landslides, and erosion. If global warming occurs, tropical storms are predicted to have greater force than now. Homeostasis, balance, and Gaia are dangerous models when applied at the wrong spatial and temporal scales. Even fifty years ago, neglect might have been the best medicine, but that was a world with a lot more big, unhumanized, connected spaces, a world with one-third the number of people, and a world largely unaffected by chain saws, bulldozers, pesticides, and exotic, weedy species. The alternative to neglect is active caring—in today's parlance, an affirmative approach to wildlands: to maintain and restore them, to become stewards, accepting all the domineering baggage that word carries. Until humans are able to control their numbers and their technologies, **management is the only viable alternative** to massive attrition of living nature.

#### Environmental security challenges state legitimacy and lead to a paradigm shift away from militarism

BARNETT, RESEARCH COUNCIL FELLOW IN THE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENQUIRY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE, 2001 [JON, THE MEANING OF ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY: ECOLOGICAL POLITICS AND POLICY IN THE NEW SECURITY ERA, CHAPTER 9, 137-41]

The question of whether it is valid to understand environmental problems as security problems recurs throughout any thoughtful discussion of environmental security. The dilemma should by now be apparent; securitising environmental issues runs the risk that the strategic/realist approach will coopt and colonise the, environmental agenda rather than respond positively to environmental problems (as discussed in Chapter 6). For this reason critics of environmental security, such as Deudney (1991) and-Brock (1991), Suggest that it is dangerous to understand environmental problems as security issues: This book's position on the matter has been emerging in previous chapters. It contends that the problem turns not on the presentation of environmental problems as security issues, but on-the meaning and practice of security in present times. Environmental security, wittingly or not, contests the legitimacy of the realist conception of security by pointing to the contradictions of security as the defence of territory and resistance to change. It seeks to work from within the prevailing conception of security, but to be successful it must do so with a strong sense of purpose and a solid theoretical base. Understanding environmental problems as security problems is thus a form of conceptual speculation. It is one manifestation of the pressure the Green movement has exerted on states since the late 1960s. **This** pressure has pushed state legitimacy nearer to collaps**e,** for if the state cannot control a problem as elemental as environmental degradation, then what is its purpose? This legitimacy problem suggests that environmental degradation cannot further intensify without fundamental change or the collapse of the state. This in turn implies that state-sanctioned environmentally degrading practices such as those undertaken in the name of national security cannot extend their power further if it means further exacerbation of environmental insecurity. While the system may resist environmental security's challenge for change, it must also resist changes for the worse. In terms of the conceptual venture, therefore, appropriation by the security apparatus of the concept of environmental security is unlikely to result in an increase in environmental insecurity (although the concept itself may continue to be corrupted). On the other hand, succeeding in the conceptual venture may mean a positive modification of the theory and practice of national security. It may also mean that national governments will take environmental problems more seriously, reduce defence budgets, and generally implement policies for a more peaceful and environmentally secure world. This dual goal of demilitarisation and upgrading policy may well be a case of wanting to have one's cake and eat it — but either the having or the eating is sufficient justification for the concept (Brock 1996). The worst outcome would be if the state ceased to use the concept of environmental security, heralding the end of the contest and requiring that the interests of peace and the environment be advocated through alternative discourses**.** This is perhaps the only real failure that is likely to ensue from the project of environmental security.

#### Environmental reps good

Kurasawa 4– Prof Sociology, York (Fuyuki, Cautionary Tales, Constellations 11.4, AG)

And yet dystopianism need not imply despondency, paralysis, or fear. Quite the opposite, in fact, since the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain traction against their determinist and absolutist counterparts. Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any course of action produces both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene before they strike becomes compelling. From another angle, dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their own nightmare scenarios (‘Frankenfoods’ and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale for Western feminism, McWorld and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action, spurring citizens’ involvement in the work of preventive foresight.

## 1AR

### Prolif

**Extinction impacts come first**

**Bostrom 7** – Oxford philosophy professor (Nick, April, Humanity's biggest problems aren't what you think they are, transcribed from video 5:22 to 5:52, http://www.ted.com/index.php/talks/view/id/44, AG)

Then, even a one-percentage-point reduction in the extinction risk could be equivalent to this astronomical number, ten to the power of thirty two. So if you take into account future generations as much as our own, every other moral imperative or philanthropic cause just becomes irrelevant. The only thing you should focus on would be to reduce existential risk, because even a tiniest decrease in existential risk would just overwhelm any other, um, benefit you could hope to achieve.

#### High risk of a nuclear accident – experts confirm.

**Below, 2008**

[TIM D. Q. BELOW, Wing Commander for the Royal Air Force, (Master of Arts degree in Defence Studies from Kings College London), “Options for Us Nuclear Disarmament: Exemplary Leadership or Extraordinary Lunacy?,” a Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies for Completion of Graduation Requirements, Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, JUNE 2008]

Despite his relative optimism that proliferation may not present the dangers that other commentators fear, Waltz can not escape the fact that the chances of an explosive accident or an unauthorized or inadvertent launch increase as the number of nuclear states increases. However, he retains his optimism, arguing against the notion that unstable and bordering states necessarily present higher risks than other nations. Ivan Oelrich contends that the real threat is not something external that needs to be *countered*. Rather, it is something internal that the United States is self-generating through its retention of nuclear weapons, and is worsened by maintaining high states of alert. He is particularly concerned that “we [the United States] are not looking at the risks which nuclear weapons *create*.”In his view, nuclear weapons are the only thing that today poses an existential threat to the United States, and the perpetuation of their existence simply prolongs that threat. Meanwhile, Barry Blechman and Cathleen Fisher view **the specific dangers of nuclear accident or inadvertent use as the greatest short term threat.**

#### Their authors overplay empirics—we survived past prolif out of luck

**Betts 2000** – professor and director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia (Richard, Universal Deterrence or Conceptual Collapse Liberal Pessimism and Utopian Realism,” The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order, ed. Utgoff, p. 73)

There are two main rebuttals, and they are convincing. First, the fact of a half-century of nuclear peace between the superpowers leads the optimists to assume that what was, had to be, and to overestimate how intrinsically safe the confrontation was. Although U.S. and Soviet leaders meant to be cautious, there were numerous accidents that raised the risk of inadvertent escalation.Moreover, the tendency of military elites to consider preventive war as a solution more readily than civilian politi­cians do manifested itself even in the United States; in newly nuclear countries with military governments, these tendencies would not be as reliably constrained as they have been.

#### Proliferation causes global chain reactions.

**Yusuf, 2009**

[Moeed, Fellow, Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future Boston University, Brookings Institute Policy Paper No. 11, “Predicting Proliferation: The History of the Future of Nuclear Weapons.” Google Scholar] CMR

The domino effect thesis naturally remained prominent during this period. Again, extreme pessimism on this count has been prevalent since the revelation of the nuclear black market. CIA Director George Tenet sounded a warning immediately after this revelation: “Additional countries may decide to seek nuclear weapons as it becomes clear their neighbors and regional rivals are doing so. The ‘domino theory’ of the 21st century may well be nuclear”.151 A number of chain scenarios have been sketched.152 Most remained as abstract and farfetched as the ones suggested during the Cold War. An Eastern chain starting from Japan spreading to the Koreas, and in turn Taiwan was considered plausible. A Middle Eastern chain is often cited whereby Iranian nuclearization would prompt its Arab neighbors (Saudi Arabia and Syria) and Turkey to follow suit.153 Israel would potentially declare its status at this point. In addition, a tit-for- tat India-Pakistan arms race could cause a shift in China and Iran’s positions, in turn leading the Middle Eastern powers and Taiwan to reconsider their stances. Moreover, Russia may act in reaction to China’s vertical proliferation.154

### Elections

**Bostrom changed his mind**

**Bostrom, 07** [Future of Humanity Institute, Faculty of Philosophy & James Martin 21st Century School, Oxford University, 2009 Gannon Award Recipient, The Future of Humanity, 2007, [www.nickbostrom.com/papers/future.pdf](http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/future.pdf)]

Extinction risks constitute an especially severe subset of what could go badly wrong for humanity. There are many possible global catastrophes that would cause immense worldwide damage, maybe even the collapse of modern civilization, yet fall short of terminating the human species. An all-out nuclear war between Russia and the United States might be an example of a global catastrophe that would be unlikely to result in extinction. A terrible pandemic with high virulence and 100% mortality rate among infected individuals might be another example: if some groups of humans could successfully quarantine themselves before being exposed, human extinction could be avoided even if, say, 95% or more of the world’s population succumbed. What distinguishes extinction and other existential catastrophes is that a comeback is impossible. A non-existential disaster causing the breakdown of global civilization is, from the perspective of humanity as a whole, a potentially recoverable setback: a giant massacre for man, a small misstep for mankind.

**Multilateral environmental policies fail**

**Jogesh 9** (Anu Jogesh, “Global warming talks fail to warm up in Poland,” IBN, 12/13/09, http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:9E3EtssS8VsJ:ibnlive.in.com/news/global-warming-talks-fail-to-warm-up-in-poland/80481-2.html+copenhagen+talks+fail&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=21&gl=us)

New Delhi: It's a race to stop global temperatures from shooting higher that two degrees from 1990 levels. There has been a bid to curb the deadly effects of global warming and the deadline to form a global treaty to do this is 2009. However, there are now new reports that the recently concluded climate summit in Poland - that was to set the tone for these crucial negotiations - has drawn a complete blank. The tug-of-war between the rich and developing nations to curb green house gas emissions is continuing. IPCC Chairman, R K Pauchauri had said that he hoped in Poznan, Poland, the nations would at least agree on some solid principles on which the agreement should be crafted.However, the 189 nations at the all-important climate change meet in Poland may just be returning home with no such agreement.

Even on the last day, reports suggested that the United Nations-led climate talks meant to find a global consensus on slashing green house gas emissions was struggling to make progress. While rich nations have avoided setting targets of any kind, they have been mounting pressure to divide developing countries based on their economic status to get them to commit to binding emission targets -- something India and the rest of the G77 nations are strongly opposed to. Environmentalist Sunita Narain says, "It's a divide and rule policy. You slice off countries and then one takes the lead." There has also been no consensus on how the world will finance initiatives to cut carbon emissions and how developing counties will receive the technology know-how to switch to a low carbon economy. Thanks to the looming recession, even the flag bearer of climate change - the European Union - is now divided on achieving its target of 20 per cent cut in emissions by 2020. Science and Technology Minister, Kapil Sibal says, "Let's move forward when the western world has delivered. They cannot ask for commitments from India without delivering themselves."It's still unclear to many delegates if the world will meet its deadline to frame a climate treaty in Copenhagen next year. And the biggest losers in all this would be island nations, already hit by rising sea levels and the poor developing countries like India, which are facing the prospect of harsher droughts and heavier floods and storms as global warming spreads its tentacles.

#### No asteroids impact

**BENNETT 2010** (James, Prof of Economics at George Mason, *The Doomsday Lobby: Hype and Panic from Sputniks, Martians, and Marauding Meteors*, p. 168-169

Cooler heads intervened. Donald Yeomans of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory said, “The comet will pass no closer to the Earth than 60 lunar distances [14 million miles] on August 5, 2126. There is no evidence for a threat from Swift-Tuttle in 2126 nor from any other known comet or asteroid in the next 200 years.”96 Even Brian Marsden concurred. He retracted his prediction, though he held out the possibility that in the year 3034 the comet could come within a million miles of Earth. Surveying this very false and very loud alarm, Sally Stephens, writing in the journal of the Astronomical Society of the Pacific, observed, “Marsden’s prediction, and later retraction, of a possible collision between the Earth and the comet highlight the fact that we will most likely have century-long warnings of any potential collision, based on calculations of orbits of known and newly discovered asteroids and comets. Plenty of time to decide what to do.”97

#### Newest polls are shifting to Romney and GOP enthusiasm is higher

**Chambers, 9/13**/12 - Internet journalist and commentator, launched his writing career by creating an alternative conservative student newspaper while in college (Dean, “Mitt Romney possible landslide indicated by polling data released today” <http://www.examiner.com/article/mitt-romney-possible-landslide-indicated-by-polling-data-released-today>)

The latest Rasmussen Reports Daily Presidential Tracking Poll released today shows Mitt Romney back in the lead over President Obama by a 47 percent to 46 percent margin and three percent preferring another candidate. When voters leaning to one of the candidates are included, Romney has a 49 percent to 47 percent lead over the president. The poll also finds the president having a 49 percent approval rating while being disapproved by 51 percent. This is where Barack Obama has been in this poll for months, with the exception of briefly having an approval rating at or above 50 percent for a few days earlier this month that appears to have been a “bounce” after the Democratic National Convention.¶ The Rasmussen poll also found that 49 percent of Republican voters are following the race on a daily basis while just 42 percent are doing so. Likewise, other national surveys of the presidential race have, including the Washington Post/ABC News poll released earlier this week, found a higher “enthusiasm” factor about the race among Republican voters than that of Democratic voters.

#### Polls for Obama reflect a convention bounce that’s fading

**Easley, 9/11/12** (Jonathan, “Team Obama has post-convention glow,” The Hill, <http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/248879-team-obama-has-post-convention-glow>)

By Tuesday, there was already evidence that this might be the case. Obama’s 5-point lead in the conservative-leaning Rasmussen poll shrank to 3 overnight.¶ “Today’s data suggests that the president’s convention bounce has started to fade,” Scott Rasmussen wrote.¶ And a Washington Post/ABC News poll released Tuesday showed Obama with 49 percent support to Romney’s 48 among likely voters, a 2-point boost for Obama and a 1-point bump for Romney since the same poll last month.

#### Romney is winning working class whites

**Beaumont, 9/7/12** (Thomas, Star Tribune, “Romney, Obama pursue backing of working-class whites, key to swing states,” <http://www.startribune.com/politics/national/168937626.html?refer=y>)

Romney, the son of a former governor and car company president, made a fortune as a private equity firm executive before serving a term as Massachusetts governor.¶ Romney's profile varies from these working-class voters who are less educated and from smaller cities and rural areas.¶ He put himself more in league with NASCAR owners, noting his friends who own teams, than fans in February while attending the Daytona 500 in Florida.¶ But he'll seek to endear himself again to the sport's largely white audience Saturday, when he plans to attend the Federated Auto Parts 400 in Richmond, Va.¶ Still, he has a commanding lead among these voters: 57 percent preferred the Republican, compared to 35 percent for Obama, according to an Associated Press-GfK poll last month. Romney's support is on par with what 2008 Republican nominee John McCain received from this group, but Obama is doing worse, according to exit polls that showed him at 40 percent four years ago.¶ Romney sought an edge with Obama's decision to allow states to apply for waivers seeking flexibility in how to administer welfare work requirements, a key part of the sweeping welfare realignment President Bill Clinton signed in 1996.¶ Rick Santorum, who performed well among working-class whites during his unsuccessful bid for the GOP presidential nomination, has led the Romney campaign's charge that Obama supports lifting the work requirement, a claim widely debunked by independent fact-checking groups.¶ "(Obama) showed us once again he believes in government handouts and dependency by waiving the work requirement for welfare," Santorum said during his speech to the Republican convention.¶ Diane Carnes of Chillicothe, Ohio, in the state's rural south, said there is a cultural disconnect with Obama. "Southern Ohio is full of people who are disgusted with this president walking away from welfare reform," said Carnes, a Republican. "We are working people, who believe in work."¶ Santorum vigorously dismissed suggestions of racial politics, although Carnes and other Republicans said some rural white voters in swing states still harbor racial opposition to Obama.

#### Working class whites will decide the election

**Beaumont, 9/7/12** (Thomas, Star Tribune, “Romney, Obama pursue backing of working-class whites, key to swing states,” <http://www.startribune.com/politics/national/168937626.html?refer=y>)

DES MOINES, Iowa - President Barack Obama and Republican rival Mitt Romney are working feverishly for an increasingly smaller but crucial slice of the electorate — white, working-class voters.¶ These clock-punching voters — from Iowa's tiny manufacturing cities to Virginia coal country to pockets of Ohio reliant on the auto industry — are considered the potential tipping point in battleground states that will decide the winner on Nov. 6. These voters are also critical to turning less competitive states such as Michigan into suddenly swing states in the final stretch.¶ Romney is trying to expand what polls show is an advantage for the Republican while Obama hopes to narrow the gap. Both candidates are trying to pit these voters against their opponent by stoking a sense of economic and social unfairness, and also by calling on surrogates with stronger ties to these voters. It's why Romney has seized on Obama's decision to give states greater flexibility on welfare work requirements and why Obama turned to former President Bill Clinton, long popular with working-class voters, to make the case for his second-term bid.¶ "In the richest country in the history of the world, this Obama economy has crushed the middle class," Romney said in accepting the Republican presidential nomination.¶ Obama counters that Romney's opposition to a federal bailout of U.S. automakers hurts his chances with working-class whites.¶ "I stood with American manufacturing. I believed in you. I bet on you," Obama told an audience in Toledo, Ohio, an automotive manufacturing hub within sight of Michigan, on Labor Day.¶ These voters are a hodge-podge of union households and gun-rights advocates, often from rural areas and smaller cities. They are found in a handful of competitive states where neither candidate has an appreciable advantage, including northern Florida and northwest and southeast Ohio. They are also found in key counties in states that have voted Democratic in presidential elections since the 1980s but are seen as more competitive this year. Those include areas outside Madison and Milwaukee in southern Wisconsin, mixed-income suburbs outside Detroit and rural parts of western Pennsylvania.

### Natural Gas

#### Nuclear power is not used in the peak market

Jerry **Taylor**, Senior Fellow @ Cato Institute, **10/21/2008**

(“Reason Roundtable: Nuclear Power and Energy Independence”, http://www.reason.org/commentaries/taylor\_20081021.shtml)

This raises the opportunity and risk costs of nuclear, making it unattractive to investors. Capital-intensive power facilities take longer to build, which means that investors have to defer returns for longer than if they had invested elsewhere. What's more, electricity markets have a very peculiar pricing mechanism that makes it harder for nuclear to maximize returns compared to gas-powered or other plants. In essence, there are two electricity markets: a market for base-load power (electricity sold 24-hours a day) and a market for peak power (electricity sold as needed during peak demand periods like hot summer days). Much of the demand for new power—and thus much of the profit available to investors today—is found in the peak market. But nuclear power plant construction costs are so high that it would take a very, very long time for nuclear facilities to pay for themselves if they only operated during high demand periods. Hence, nuclear power plants are only profitable in base-load markets. Gas-fired power plants, on the other hand, can be profitable in either market because not only are their upfront costs low but it is much easier to turn them off or on unlike nuclear.

# Round 3 v. Dartmouth CL

## 2AC

### Solvency

#### The plan solves -- building new nuclear plants attracts labor.

Howard, ‘7

[Angie, Vice President -- Nuclear Energy Institute, 2-5, “Achieving Excellence in Human Performance: Nuclear Energy Training and Education”, <http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/speechesandtestimony/2007/americannuclearsocietyextended>]

Yes, we do have a looming workforce crisis. The average age of employees in the industry is 48 years—one of the oldest of any major industries in the country. Retirement and attrition will create the need to essentially re-staff the existing fleet over the next 10 years. We need to get the younger generation into the industry. But the industry is hiring, and we have employment opportunities that are attractive to talented young people, both in the craft and in the professional engineering and management fields. Research among college engineering students has shown that the prospect of building new plants is the single most important factor in attracting new talent to the nuclear energy industry. Social responsibility, creativity, learning opportunities, compensation—these are the other priorities when young people look for in a career today.

### Warming

#### Warming causes extinction – try or die for new nuclear construction

**Weart, 12** [March 26th, Spencer, After receiving a doctorate in physics and astrophysics, Spencer Weart worked on solar physics before he turned to the study of the history of science. From 1974 until his retirement in 2009, he was director of the Center for History of Physics at the American Institute of Physics. He has published numerous papers and books, including The Discovery of Global Warming and [The Rise of Nuclear Fear](http://www.amazon.com/Rise-Nuclear-Fear-Spencer-Weart/dp/0674052331/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1332339097&sr=1-2), which was published last year. “Shunning Nuclear Power”, <http://e360.yale.edu/feature/shunning_new_nuclear_power_plants_will_lead_to_warmer_world/2510/>]

Japan has shut down almost all its reactors, and it’s unclear how many will ever restart. Germany has [decided to phase out its nuclear power industry](http://e360.yale.edu/feature/germanys_unlikely_champion_of_a_radical_green_energy_path/2401/), and Italy and other nations are canceling ambitious plans for expansion. In the United States, prospects for additional reactors hang by a thread. Other nations, including India and China, [continue to press ahead with their nuclear programs](http://e360.yale.edu/feature/chinas_nuclear_power_plans_unfazed_by_fukushima_disaster/2432/), but there can be little doubt that the Fukushima crisis [has been a setback](http://e360.yale.edu/feature/japans_once-powerful_nuclear_industry_is_under_siege/2383/) to prospects for a nuclear renaissance. These blows to the world’s nuclear industry will have severe unintended consequences, most notably because they will inevitably lead to more burning of fossil fuels. Over the past half-century, wherever a nuclear reactor was not built, a coal-fired power plant usually was constructed to ¶ While nuclear reactors make me nervous, the consequences of fossil-fuel burning terrify me.¶ supply the necessary electricity. In future decades, the fewer nuclear reactors, the more coal, natural gas, and oil will be consumed. To be sure, there are promising alternatives like wind and solar, and increases in efficiency so that fewer power plants will be needed. Yet realistically these cannot meet the intense demand for rising economic prosperity, especially in China and other developing nations. And while nuclear reactors make me nervous, the consequences of fossil-fuel burning terrify me. The harm done to human health and the environment by all the nuclear accidents and nuclear waste releases in history is minor compared with the harm caused by the mining and burning of coal, with other fossil fuels not far behind. And there is worse: global warming, caused largely by the emission of heat-trapping gases from fossil fuels. If emissions continue to increase in a “business as usual” fashion — let alone if they increase even faster as reactors are phased out — future generations will suffer as we destabilize the climate system that has supported human civilization for thousands of years. Rising sea levels, droughts in key agricultural regions, and ever-worsening heat waves will threaten people just as the world’s population is [projected to expand from 7 billion today to 10 billion](http://e360.yale.edu/feature/the_world_at_7_billion_can_we_stop_growing_now/2426/) by 2100. We will see the impoverishment of some of the ecosystems on which our society depends. While nuclear power offers no magical solution, it could help us avoid the worst. But wasn’t Fukushima a health disaster? Not in the way you’d expect. Thanks to the openness of Japanese society and prompt evacuation, nobody received the kind of radiation that struck Soviet citizens after the 1986 Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine. So let’s look at Chernobyl as a baseline. The most visible harm there was due to ingestion of radioactive iodine, most commonly by children drinking milk from cows that had eaten radioactive grass in the contamination zone. Ingestion of radioactive iodine has caused nearly 5,000 children and young people to contract thyroid cancer in the ensuing 25 years, although most are doing well following surgery. The World Health Organization has projected that [as many as 50,000 new cases of thyroid cancer could occur](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2000/apr/26/internationalnews) among young people affected by Chernobyl in the coming decades. But the Japanese were protected from this large-scale contamination, and few if any excess thyroid abnormalities are expected. What about other health problems? Some scientists believe that radiation at the levels to which millions of people farther from Chernobyl were ¶ Feelings of deep horror and dread have become the normal response to radioactivity.¶ exposed — moderately above the level of normal background radiation that we all receive — brings an increase in the rate of cancer. However, the increase, if any, has been too minuscule to detect amid the enormous number of cancers that afflict people anyway. Other scientists cite a variety of reasons to argue that low levels of radiation are completely harmless. We just don’t know. It’s the uncertainty itself that has had the greatest impact on most of the Chernobyl survivors. Feeling themselves contaminated by mysterious and uncanny forces, millions became anxious and depressed. Many hesitated to have children, fearing their babies would be deformed. Adding to this were the dislocations of forced evacuation; no wonder psychosomatic illnesses proliferated. Overall, mental health problems caused far more harm for most Chernobyl survivors than the radioactivity. Even more after the Three Mile Island accident, it was not radioactivity but anxiety that caused health problems. The same problems are now being detected among the evacuees from Fukushima. Feelings of deep horror and dread have become the normal response to radioactivity. Of course it is natural to fear anything that might cause cancer and birth defects. But ordinary elements like arsenic also act in these ways, and many widely used chemicals are still more potent in causing all sorts of dangers, without evoking the same widespread fears. For example, a recent National Academy of Sciences study reported that [the smoke emitted by coal-fired power plants causes 10,000 premature deaths](http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php/?record_id=12794) among Americans every year — yet agitation against existing plants is slight. Nor has severe pollution of water supplies in some areas resulted in large-scale evacuations. Radioactivity gets special treatment for historical reasons. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings created a picture of horrid devastation. Then ¶ Oil spills and the daily contamination from coal and gas burning have not inspired such visceral fears.¶ opponents of nuclear weapons fastened on the radioactive fallout from bomb tests, spreading stories of an entire world contaminated, even in the absence of war. Wouldn’t we face radioactive horrors like the gigantic insects that filled popular movies in the 1950s? These mythical fears actually began well before Hiroshima: Mad scientists and their monstrous radiation creations already were featured in science-fiction movies and stories in the 1930s. The mythology did not go away when the Cold War ended. If you play a popular computer game like [Fallout](http://www.nma-fallout.com/fallout1/official_site/) you will battle shambling post-apocalyptic zombies. On top of this is a fear of terrorists with “dirty” bombs, who might use conventional explosives to disperse radioactive materials around a neighborhood, triggering panic, wholesale evacuation, and costly cleanup efforts. Because this imagery has piled on top of the genuine risks of nuclear radiation, the nuclear power industry has been far more closely scrutinized and tightly regulated than other energy source. Oil spills, with their widespread contamination, and the daily contamination from coal and gas burning, have not inspired such visceral fears. Nor has climate change, although it poses the gravest threat of all. Why doesn’t this prospect alarm the public more than the risk from nuclear reactors? One main reason is that there has been nothing like the same deployment of horrific imagery. Television features pictures of ice falling from glaciers, or worried Pacific Islanders and Alaskan natives. But such images — and threats — seem remote in space and time. Indeed the most common icon of global warming ¶ We must not let mythical exaggerations prevent us from staving off the all too real danger of a global climate disaster.¶ is the threatened polar bear — and not everyone cares deeply about this far-away predator. Other common images come from hurricanes battering shorelines and drought-parched farms. But such pictures are nowhere near as dreadful as a looming mushroom cloud. To date, nothing in popular culture has presented a true, vivid picture of what global warming will likely bring, including [the ruin of coral reefs](http://e360.yale.edu/feature/nancy_knowlton_finding_strategies_to_save_coral_reefs/2505/) and refugees fleeing low-lying coasts or drought-parched lands. For the time being, economics is doing as much as public fears to prevent widespread deployment of nuclear reactors. Only if the true costs of fossil fuel burning are taken into account would reactors look cheap. Nevertheless some nations, notably China, [are pushing ahead with nuclear reactor programs](http://e360.yale.edu/feature/chinas_nuclear_power_plans_unfazed_by_fukushima_disaster/2432/). The Chinese are literally choking on their smoke, and rightly worry that climate change can throw them back into abject poverty. Their reactors will not be prohibitively expensive. France, which gets most of its electricity from reactors, long since showed how to sustain an economically sound nuclear industry. But what about nuclear wastes? Certainly we need to guard them carefully. But the tremendous fear of these wastes comes only from the dread of radioactivity, nourished by myths, that puts nuclear reactions somehow on a plane separate from chemical reactions. All the harm ever done by the wastes from the nuclear power industry is tiny compared with the harm done by the wastes from coal, which are vastly more widespread and more difficult to contain. Just in terms of radioactive elements, coal burning releases more into the environment than the world’s nuclear industry.¶ Sometime in the next couple of decades the reality of global warming will become too obvious to ignore. At that point, people will demand a massive deployment of renewable energy sources, huge gains in efficiency... and nuclear power as well. We won’t solve our energy problem by picking and choosing solutions; we will need “[all of the above](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/07/fact-sheet-all-above-approach-american-energy).” But it takes decades to reconstruct an energy system. We do not want to rely in the future on the Chinese for reactors, especially given their record of indifference to safety. The United States and other developed nations need to immediately support the nuclear power industry at a reasonable level. Besides maintaining technical expertise, [we can experiment with new types of reactors](http://e360.yale.edu/feature/the_nuclear_power_resurgence_how_safe_are_the_new_reactors/2287/), which are inherently safer; today we know how to build reactors that are physically incapable of suffering the kind of accidents seen at Chernobyl and Fukushima. We must not let mythical exaggerations prevent us from staving off the all too real danger of a global climate disaster.

### Prolif

#### Cred is empirically disproven

**Ford 9** [“Nuclear Disarmament, ¶ Nonproliferation, ¶ and the “Credibility ¶ Thesis”, Christopher Ford, September 2009, senior fellow and director of the Center for Technology and ¶ Global Security at Hudson Institute¶ U.S. special representative for ¶ nuclear nonproliferation¶ principal deputy assistant ¶ secretary of state for verification, compliance]

Consequently, the usual argument in support of the credibility thesis is that third parties will become more willing to bear burdens in support of vigorous nonproliferation ¶ policies against countries such as Iran and North Korea if only we stop offending and ¶ alienating them by dragging our feet on disarmament. How plausible is this claim? ¶ The evidence in support of this “catalytic” prong of the credibility thesis is not ¶ encouraging. Does nuclear weapons possession impede nonproliferation, and do ¶ reductions increase multilateral support for vigorous nonproliferation policies? If this is ¶ so, it is a well-kept secret. The NPT itself was negotiated, opened for signature, and ¶ entered into force in a Cold War environment in which the nuclear arsenals of the United ¶ States and the USSR were staggeringly huge—indeed, in the Soviet case, still growing ¶ for years after the treaty entered into force—and in which there was no immediate ¶ prospect of this arms race ending, much less of massive numerical reductions taking ¶ place. During the nuclear standoff of the Cold War, moreover, multiple countries were ¶ persuaded by various means to abandon nuclear weapons development efforts. Whereas ¶ many analysts in the 1960s had projected a terrifying cascade of proliferation, by the end ¶ of the Cold War the most striking thing about the nonproliferation environment was not ¶ the proliferation that had occurred (for example, to India) but the proliferation that had ¶ not. Whatever alchemy lay behind this relative success, the nonproliferation regime ¶ performed with a degree of respectability—and against the backdrop of enormous ¶ superpower nuclear arsenals and a fierce numerical and technological nuclear arms race ¶ between Washington and Moscow.

### Death Cult

**We do not fear death, we discuss our impacts for the purpose of confronting death and engaging with its prospect it is only by discussing death that we can define its purpose and the true purpose and value of life**

**Gunaratna** Buddhist **1982** (V.F. “Buddhist Reflections on Death” http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/gunaratna/wheel102.html)

To the average man death is by no means a pleasant subject or talk for discussion. It is something dismal and oppressive — a veritable kill-joy, a fit topic for a funeral house only. The average man immersed as he is in the self, ever seeking after the pleasurable, ever pursuing that which excites and gratifies the senses, refuses to pause and ponder seriously that these very objects of pleasure and gratification will some day reach their end. If wise counsel does not prevail and urge the unthinking pleasure-seeking man to consider seriously that death can knock at his door also, it is only the shock of a bereavement under his own roof, the sudden and untimely death of a parent, wife or child that will rouse him up from his delirious round of sense-gratification and rudely awaken him to the hard facts of life. Then only will his eyes open, then only will he begin to ask himself why there is such a phenomenon as death. Why is it inevitable? Why are there these painful partings which rob life of its joys? To most of us, at some moment or another, the spectacle of death must have given rise to the deepest of thoughts and profoundest of questions. What is life worth, if able bodies that once performed great deeds now lie flat and cold, senseless and lifeless? What is life worth, if eyes that once sparkled with joy, eyes that once beamed with love are now closed forever, bereft of movement, bereft of life? Thoughts such as these are not to be repressed. It is just these inquiring thoughts, if wisely pursued, that will ultimately **unfold the potentialities inherent in the human mind to receive the highest truths.** According to the Buddhist way of thinking, death, far from being a subject to be shunned and avoided, is the key that **unlocks the seeming mystery of life**. It is by understanding death that we understand life; for death is part of the process of life in the larger sense. In another sense, life and death are two ends of the same process and if you understand one end of the process, you also understand the other end. Hence, by understanding the purpose of death we also understand the purpose of life. It is the contemplation of death, the intensive thought that it will some day come upon us, that softens the hardest of hearts, binds one to another with cords of love and compassion, and destroys the barriers of caste, creed and race among the peoples of this earth all of whom are subject to the common destiny of death. **Death is a great leveler**. Pride of birth, pride of position, pride of wealth, pride of power must give way to the all-consuming thought of inevitable death. It is this leveling aspect of death that made the poet say: "Scepter and crown Must tumble down And in the dust be equal made With the poor crooked scythe and spade." It is the contemplation of death that helps to destroy the infatuation of sense-pleasure. It is the contemplation of death that destroys vanity. It is the contemplation of death that gives balance and a healthy sense of proportion to our highly over-wrought minds with their misguided sense of values. It is the contemplation of death that gives strength and steadiness and direction to the erratic human mind, now wandering in one direction, now in another, without an aim, without a purpose. It is not for nothing that the Buddha has, in the very highest terms, commended to his disciples the practice of mindfulness regarding death. This is known as "marananussati bhavana." One who wants to practice it must at stated times, and also every now and then, revert to the thought maranam bhavissati — "death will take place." This contemplation of death is one of the classical meditation-subjects treated in the Visuddhi Magga which states that in order to obtain the fullest results, one should practice this meditation in the correct way, that is, with mindfulness (sati), with a sense of urgency (samvega) and with understanding (ñana). For example, suppose a young disciple fails to realize keenly that death can come upon him at any moment, and regards it as something that will occur in old age in the distant future; his contemplation of death will be lacking strength and clarity, so much so that it will run on lines which are not conducive to success. How great and useful is the contemplation of death can be seen from the following beneficial effects enumerated in the Visuddhi Magga: — "The disciple who devotes himself to this contemplation of death is always vigilant, takes no delight in any form of existence, gives up hankering after life, censures evil doing, is free from craving as regards the requisites of life, his perception of impermanence becomes established, he realizes the painful and soulless nature of existence and at the moment of death he is devoid of fear, and remains mindful and self-possessed. Finally, if in this present life he fails to attain to Nibbana, upon the dissolution of the body he is bound for a happy destiny." Thus it will be seen that mindfulness of death not only purifies and refines the mind but also **has the effect of robbing death of its fears and terrors,** and helps one at that solemn moment when he is gasping for his last breath, to face that situation with fortitude and calm. He is never unnerved at the thought of death but is always prepared for it. It is such a man that can truly exclaim, "O death, where is thy sting?" In the Anguttara Nikaya the Buddha has said, "Oh Monks, there are ten ideas, which if made to grow, made much of, are of great fruit, of great profit for plunging into Nibbana, for ending up in Nibbana." Of these ten, one is death. Contemplation on death and on other forms of sorrow such as old age, and disease, constitutes a convenient starting point for the long line of investigation and meditation that will ultimately lead to Reality. This is exactly what happened in the case of the Buddha. Was it not the sight of an old man followed by the sight of a sick man and thereafter the sight of a dead man that made Prince Siddhattha, living in the lap of luxury, to give up wife and child, home and the prospect of a kingdom, and to embark on a voyage of discovery of truth, a voyage that ended in the glory of Buddhahood and the bliss of Nibbana? The marked disinclination of the average man to advert to the problem of death, the distaste that arouses in him the desire to turn away from it whenever the subject is broached, are all due to the weakness of the human mind, sometimes occasioned by fear, sometimes by tanha or selfishness, but at all times supported by ignorance (avijja). The disinclination to understand death, is no different from the disinclination of a man to subject himself to a medical check-up although he feels that something is wrong with him. We must learn to value the necessity to face facts. Safety always lies in truth. The sooner we know our condition the safer are we, for we can then take the steps necessary for our betterment. The saying, "where ignorance is bliss it is folly to be wise" has no application here. **To live with no thought of death is to live in a fool's paradise**.

#### Everyone must confront death – key to solve suffering

**Manivaÿso, Buddhist studies @ Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University (yes, this is a real place) 2010** (Phramaha Pisit, “THE ANALYSTICAL STUDY OF MARA\_ASSATI IN THERAVADA BUDDHISM” <http://www.mcu.ac.th/userfiles/file/library1/Thesis/762.pdf>

According to the Buddhist way of thought, everyone has to confront death without any exemption, but if human beings know and understand the true meaning of death, death shall no more be threatening. “It is by understanding the death that we understand the life,” says V.F.Gunaratana. 3 He further points out that in another sense, life and death are two ends of the same process and if we understand one end of the process, we also understand the other. Therefore, in the Theravada Buddhist notion, death is just a natural phenomenon of life, which has the basic condition as a compounded thing that will be split off at the final stage. So, the meaning of death according to Theravada Buddhism is the state of not being able to be re-combined again of body and mind (Råpa and Nàma); indeed, the five aggregates (Pa¤cakhandha) 4 . In other words, it is the separation of the five aggregates or the cessation of life elements in this life span. However, the reason why death has become a problem or a cause of suffering is that the people do not understand the truth of life and its processes. Human beings fill up their lives with compounded things and cling tightly to the idea of the self (Attànudiññhi). However, the nature of compounded things does not give in to anybody’s desire; therefore whenever desire goes against the truth of nature, suffering occurs (Jàtipi dukkhà, maraõaÿpi dukkhaü).

#### Refusing to think about death causes us to be incapable of eventually confronting it – their deaths will be pitiful and sad – Michigan’s deaths will be joyous and awesome

**Manivaÿso 2010** (Phramaha Pisit, Buddhist studies @ Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University (yes, this is a real place) “THE ANALYSTICAL STUDY OF MARA\_ASSATI IN THERAVADA BUDDHISM” <http://www.mcu.ac.th/userfiles/file/library1/Thesis/762.pdf>

It is accepted as a general truth that everybody fears death. 91 We fear death because we crave for life with all our might. It is also a fact that we fear the unknown. We know least about death; therefore we fear death for a duality of reasons. It seems reasonable to conjecture that the fear of death, or the fear of harm to life, lurks at the root of all fear. Therefore each time we become frightened we either run away from the source of fear or fight against it, thus making every effort to preserve life. But we can do so only so long as our body is capable of either fighting or running away from danger. On the contrary, when at last we are on the deathbed face to face with approaching death, and the body is no longer strong enough for any protest, it is very unlikely that we will accept death with a mental attitude of resignation. We will mentally try hard to survive. As our yearning for life (tanhà 92 ) is so strong, we will mentally grasp (upàdàna 93 ) another viable place, as our body can no longer support life. Once such a place, for example the fertilized ovum in a mother's womb, has been grasped, the psychological process of life (bhàva 94 ) will continue with the newly found place as its basis. Birth (jàti 95 ) will take place in due course. This seems to be the process that is explained in the chain of causation as: craving conditions grasping, grasping conditions becoming or the process of growth, which in turn conditions birth. Thus the average man who fears death will necessarily take another birth as his ardent desire is to survive. And when the inevitable death comes to them, imagine how they, someone who never wanted to think about death, would deal with it. It would be very pathetic, very pitiful indeed. Their final moments could be best summarized as “Fearful, restless and not knowing what to do, what would happen next, where they would be going next.” On the other hand, the people who always reflect on death would be fully equipped to handle the final moment calmly and with a clear mind. They would not be shaken by fear of separation. Moreover, they are most likely guaranteed to go to a good place in their next reincarnation, because the Buddha himself has affirmed that, in our final moment, “If one’s mind is clear and calm, one can be assured of going to a good place.” 96

Fear is necessary to check extinction – provides an active consciousness which sustains peace

J.A.H. Futterman, Former US nuclear weapons scientist, 1994, “Obscenity and Peace: Meditation on the Bomb,” Virtual Church of the Blind Chihuahua, www.dogchurch.org/books/nuke.html

But the inhibitory effect of reliable nuclear weapons goes deeper than Shirer's deterrence of adventurer-conquerors. It changes the way we think individually and culturally, preparing us for a future we cannot now imagine. Jungian psychiatrist Anthony J. Stevens states, [15] "History would indicate that people cannot rise above their narrow sectarian concerns without some overwhelming paroxysm**.** It took the War of Independence and the Civil War to forge the United States, World War I to create the League of Nations, World War II to create the United Nations Organization and the European Economic Community. Only catastrophe, it seems, forces people to take the wider view. Or what about fear? Can the horror which we all experience when we contemplate the possibility of nuclear extinction mobilize in us sufficient libidinal energy to resist the archetypes of war? Certainly, the moment we become blasé about the possibilityof holocaust we are lost. As long as horror of nuclear exchange remains uppermost we can recognize that nothing is worth it. War becomes the impossible option. Perhaps horror, the experience of horror, the consciousness of horror, is our only hope. Perhaps horror alone will enable us to overcome the otherwise invincible attraction of war." Thus I also continue engaging in nuclear weapons work to help fire that world-historical warning shot I mentioned above, namely, that as our beneficial technologies become more powerful, so will our weapons technologies, unless genuine peace precludes it. We must build a future more peaceful than our past, if we are to have a future at all, with or without nuclear weapons — a fact we had better learn before worse things than nuclear weapons are invented. If you're a philosopher, this means that I regard the nature of humankind as mutable rather than fixed, but that I think most people welcome change in their personalities and cultures with all the enthusiasm that they welcome death — thus, the fear of nuclear annihilation of ourselves and all our values may be what we require in order to become peaceful enough to survive our future technological breakthroughs.[16]

#### Affirming survival doesn’t devalue life – life is complex and malleable and can be celebrated even when it seems oppressive

**Fassin, 10** - James D. Wolfensohn Professor in the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, as well as directeur d’études at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris. (Didier, Fall, “Ethics of Survival: A Democratic Approach to the Politics of Life” Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, Vol 1 No 1, Project Muse)

Conclusion

Survival, in the sense Jacques Derrida attributed to the concept in his last interview, not only shifts lines that are too often hardened between biological and political lives: it **opens an ethical space for** reflection **and** action. Critical thinking in the past decade has often taken biopolitics and the politics of life as its objects. It has thus unveiled the way in which individuals and groups, even entire nations, have been treated by powers, the market, or the state, during the colonial period as well as in the contemporary era.

However, through indiscriminate extension, this powerful instrument has lost some of its analytical sharpness and heuristic potentiality. On the one hand, the binary reduction of life to the opposition between nature and history, bare life and qualified life, when systematically applied from philosophical inquiry in sociological or anthropological study, erases much of the complexity and richness of life in society as it is in fact observed. On the other hand, the normative prejudices which underlie the evaluation of the forms of life and of the politics of life, when generalized to an undifferentiated collection of social facts, end up by depriving social agents of legitimacy, voice, and action. The risk is therefore both scholarly and political. It calls for ethical attention.

In fact, the genealogy of this intellectual lineage reminds us that the main founders of these theories expressed tensions and hesitations in their work, which was often more complex, if even sometimes more obscure, than in its reduced and translated form in the humanities and social sciences today. And also biographies, here limited to fragments from South African lives that I have described and analyzed in more detail elsewhere, suggest the necessity of complicating the dualistic models that oppose biological and political lives. Certainly, powers like the market and the state do act sometimes as if human beings could be reduced to “mere life,” but democratic forces, including from within the structure of power, tend to produce alternative strategies that escape this reduction. And people themselves, even under conditions of domination, [End Page 93] manage subtle tactics that transform their physical life into a political instrument or a moral resource or an affective expression.

But let us go one step further: ethnography invites us to reconsider what life is or rather what human beings make of their lives, and reciprocally how their lives permanently question what it is to be human. “The blurring between what is human and what is not human shades into the blurring over what is life and what is not life,” writes Veena Das. In the tracks of Wittgenstein and Cavell, she underscores that the usual manner in which we think of forms of life “not only obscures the mutual absorption of the natural and the social but also emphasizes form at the expense of life.”22 It should be the incessant effort of social scientists to return to this inquiry about life in its multiple forms but also in its everyday expression of the human.

### Coal

**Catastrophic consequences to CCP collapse are just fear-mongering – instability is key to ensure democracy and won’t cause chaos**

Bruce Gilley, 2004. PhD Candidate Politics @ Princeton U. and Adjunct Prof. Int’l. Affairs @ New School U. “China's Democratic Future: How it Will Happen and where it Will Lead,” p. 115-116, Google Print.

Would the entire PRC edifice simply collapse from the accumulated pressures of crisis and mass protest? In cross-countn' comparisons, "post-totalitarian" states like China are the most vulnerable to collapse because they are unable to respond creatively to protest and yet there is no organized opposition to assume control.' The East German regime was a perfect example. It simply collapsed when huge defections front the state occurred at fltl) level and there was no organized opposition ready to take over. In the C.cnnan case, there was a neighboring fraternal state whose arms provided some cushion for the collapse. China would not have the same support. For this reason, the CCP and many of its supporters have warned of the dangers of collapse in words designed to scare the regime's opponents into quiescence. Fear-mongering about the consequences of regime collapse in China has been a staple of PRC propaganda since reforms began. Deng said: if the political situation in China became unstable the trouble would spread to the rest of the world, with consequences that would be hard to imagine 7' Foreign scholars have taken up the histrionics with relish. One has worried about societal disintegration" and even "the fragmentation of China into several competing polities." Another warns: At worst the resulting chaos from a collapsing China would have a profound effect on the stability of Asia and on the US. policy to guarantee the security of its Asian allies, At the least, China could turn to the West for economic relief and reconstruction, the price tag of which would be overwhelming. Yet these fears appear overblown or misplaced. First, as we saw in the last pad, many of these dire descriptions are an accurate portrayal of China today. The problems of Party rule have created the very crisis that the fear-mongers allude to. China already has an AIDs crisis, an illegal emigration crisis, a pollution crisis, and an economic crisis. Given it’s well-established state and social cohesion, China has far more to gain than to lose from political liberalization. Second, there is a good argument that governance in China will not collapse further even with a top leadership in crisis. The country actually functioned quite normally during the Cultural Revolution, when there was often no rule at the top, as a result of strong local governments and a social fabric that held together. At this stage, with popular protests in full swing, a military on good behavior and a regime trying to confront the possibility of change, there is no reason to believe that the country will abruptly disintegrate. As in 1989. it, fact, there is even' reason to believe that people will act better toward each other and that local governments will look kindly upon the movement, an outpouring of civic behavior linked to the ideals of democracy. Finally, as above, if we are concerned with the creation of a more just system, then some degree of chaos**" relating to unstable government** may be a worthwhile **price to pay, including** for the world. Claims by some U.S. foreign policy analysts that "there is as great a 'threat' to US interests from a weak and unstable China as there is from a strong and antagonistic China" are based on a highly instrumental and even then flawed view of U.S., and world, interests. A world community committed to the principles of justice through democracy has an overriding interest in its realization in China. To the extent that instability in China worsens conditions for greater justice there or abroad, it would indeed "threaten" world interests. But if the instability, despite its costs, leads to greater gains through a more just order in China and, through it, abroad, then this is very much in the world's interest. Few Americans, French, Croats, Romanians, South Africans, Filipinos, South Koreans, or Indonesians would say the "chaos" of their democratic revolutions was not a price worth paying. China's people should be allowed to make the same choice. However, an alarmist view of growing popular mobilization against an authoritarian regime has too often landed the US. in particular on the wrong side of a democratic movement. During a visit to South Korea in 1986, then U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz voiced support for the military regime's rejection of opposition demands for a direct presidential election, calling such an arrangement "unusual" A year later, the regime conceded to the demands, The US., now portrayed as an enemy of democracy in South Korea, found its consulates and embasss the subject of popular protest A better policy from both normative and instrumental points of view, then, would be to call for a peaceful resolution of the protests and to lean on the Party to heed the voice of the people. This might require some quiet coalition building in the region to backstop the instability and fall-out. But again, from both normative and instrumental points of view, this is in the long-term in- terests of the world community. China will not collapse, even in the face of metastatic crisis and popular mobilization, But it will certainly face grave instability. The best policy for the world community in responding to this instability will be to ensure that the democratic breakthrough occurs as quickly as possible.

**They can’t win offense – the transition will be stable**

Bruce Gilley, January 2007. Assistant professor of political studies at Queen's University in Canada, and former contributing editor at the Far Eastern Economic Review. “Is China Stuck?” Journal of Democracy, 18.1, Project Muse.

Yet what if the CCP is actually quite responsive? What if it is in tune with popular demands, and finds ways to move and adapt as those demands change? In other words, what if the party stays or goes because of [End Page 173] popular pressures? Pei himself recognizes this possibility. He cites "rising public dissatisfaction" (p.14) as one thing that would prod the regime to change. "A democratic opening may emerge in the end, but not as a regime-initiated strategy undertaken at its own choosing, but more likely as the result of a sudden crisis" (p. 44). Perhaps the word crisis is being used in two different senses here. One crisis and another can, after all, vary in urgency: There are crises and there are crises. The crisis of which Pei speaks seems to be of the more benign sort, a mere shift in public preferences that prods the regime to change. Such a crisis will not require democracy to rise upon the ashes of a razed public square, but rather will stir the regime to recognize that its time has come, and to do the right thing by going fairly gentle into that good night. If so, then the prospects for a relatively smooth democratic transition in China are bright and no collapse is likely.

### Security

#### Epistemological debate is irrelevant - concrete action is inevitable - they fail to create useful knowledge

**Friedrichs, 09** [Jorg, University Lecturer in Politics at the Oxford Department of International Development, “From Positivist Pretense to Pragmatic Practice Varieties of Pragmatic Methodology in IR Scholarship” Pragmatism and International Relations]

As Friedrich Nietzsche ([1887] 1994:1; cf. Wilson 2002) knew, the knower isstrangely unknown to himself. In fact, it is much morehazardous to contemplate theway how we gain knowledge than to gain such knowledge in the ﬁrst place. This is not to deny that intellectuals are a narcissistic Kratochwil lot, with a penchant for omphaloskepsis. The typical result of their navel-gazing, however, is not increased self-awareness. Scholars are more likely to come up with ex-post-facto rationalizations of how they would like to see their activity than with accurate descriptions of how they go about business. As a result, in science there is a paradoxical divide between positivist pretenseand pragmatic practice. Many prominent scholars proceed pragmatically in gen-erating their knowledge, only to vest it all in a positivist cloak when it comes topresenting results. In the wake of Karl Popper (1963), fantasies about ingeniousconjectures and inexorable refutations continue to hold sway despite the muchmore prosaic way most scholars grope around in the formulation of their theo-ries, and the much less rigorous way they assess the value of their hypotheses. In proposing pragmatism as a more realistic alternative to positivist idealiza-tions, I am not concerned with the original intentions of Charles Peirce. Theseare discussed and enhanced by Ryto¨ vuori-Apunen (this forum). Instead, Ipresent various attempts to make pragmatism work as a methodology for IR scholarship. This includes my own preferred methodology, the pragmaticresearch strategy of abduction. As Fritz Kratochwil and I argue elsewhere, abduction should be at the center of our efforts, while deduction and induction areimportant but auxiliary tools (Friedrichs and 2009).Of course, one does not need to be a pragmatist to proceed in a pragmatic way. Precisely because it is derived from practice, pragmatic commonsense is a sold as the hills. For example, James Rosenau (1988:164) declared many yearsago that he coveted ‘‘a long-held conviction that one advances knowledge most effectively by continuously moving back and forth between very abstract and very empirical levels of inquiry, allowing the insights of the former to exert pressurefor the latter even as the ﬁndings of the latter, in turn, exert pressure for the for-mer, thus sustaining an endless cycle in which theory and research feed on eachother.’’ This was shortly before Rosenau’s turn to postmodernism, while he wasstill touting the virtues of behaviorism and standard scientiﬁc requisites, such asindependent and dependent variables and theory testing. But if we take his state-ment at face value, it appears that Rosenau-the-positivist was guided by a sort of pragmatism for all but the name. While such practical commonsense is certainly valuable, in and by itself, it does not qualify as scientiﬁc methodology. Science requires a higher degree of methodological awareness. For this reason, I am not interested here in pragma-tism as unspoken commonsense, or as a pretext for doing empirical researchunencumbered by theoretical and methodological considerations. Nor am I con-cerned with pragmatism as an excuse for staging yet another epistemological debate. Instead, I am interested in pragmatism as an instrument to go about research with an appropriate degree of epistemological and methodologicalawareness. Taking this criterion as my yardstick, the following three varieties of pragmatist methodology in recent IR scholarship are worth mentioning: theory synthesis, analytic eclecticism (AE), and abduction.Theory synthesis is proposed by Andrew Moravcsik (2003), who claims that theories can be combined as long as they are compatible at some unspeciﬁedfundamental level, and that data will help to identify the right combination of theories. He does not explicitly invoke pragmatism but vests his pleading in apositivist cloak by using the language of theory testing. When looking closer,however, it becomes apparent that his theoretical and methodological noncha-lance is far more pragmatic than what his positivist rhetoric suggests. Moravcsiksees himself in good company, dropping the following names: Robert Keohane,Stephen Walt, Jack Snyder, Stephen Van Evera, Bary Buzan, Bruce Russett, John O’Neal, Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink. With the partial excep-tion of Finnemore, however, none of these scholars explicitly links his or herscholarship to pragmatism. They employ pragmatic commonsense in theirresearch, but devoutly ignore pragmatism as a philosophical and methodologicalposition. As a result, it is fair to say that theory synthesis is only on a slightly higher level of intellectual awareness than Rosenau’s statement quoted above. Analytic eclecticism, as advertized by Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, links acommonsensical approach to empirical research with a more explicit commit-ment to pragmatism (Sil and Katzenstein 2005; Katzenstein and Sil 2008).The 7 Even the dean of critical rationalism, Karl Popper, is ‘‘guilty’’ of lapses into pragmatism, for example when hestates that scientists, like hungry animals, classify objects according to needs and interests, although with the impor-tant difference that they are guided in their quest for ﬁnding regularities not so much by the stomach but ratherby empirical problems and epistemic interests (Popper 1963:61–62). 646 Pragmatism and International Relations idea is to combine existing research traditions in a pragmatic fashion and thusto enable the formulation and exploration of novel and more complex sets of problems. The constituent elements of different research traditions are trans-lated into mutually compatible vocabularies and then recombined in novel ways.This implies that most scholars must continue the laborious process of formulat-ing parochial research traditions so that a few cosmopolitan colleagues will beenabled to draw upon their work and construct syncretistic collages. 8 In additionto themselves, Katzenstein and Sil cite a number of like-minded scholars such asCharles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Paul Pierson, and Robert Jervis. 9 The ascription isprobably correct given the highly analytical and eclectic approach of these schol-ars. Nevertheless, apart from Katzenstein and Sil themselves none of these schol-ars has explicitly avowed himself to AE.My preferred research strategy is abduction, which is epistemologically asself-aware as AE but minimizes the dependence on existing research traditions.The typical situation for abduction is when we, both in everyday life and as socialscientists, become aware of a certain class of phenomena that interests us for somereason, but for which we lack applicable theories. We simply trust, although we donot know for certain, that the observed class of phenomena is not random. Wetherefore start collecting pertinent observations and, at the same time, applyingconcepts from existing ﬁelds of our knowledge. Instead of trying to impose anabstract theoretical template (deduction) or ‘‘simply’’ inferring propositions fromfacts (induction), we start reasoning at an intermediate level (abduction). Abduction follows the predicament that science is, or should be, above all amore conscious and systematic version of the way by which humans have learnedto solve problems and generate knowledge in their everyday lives. As it iscurrently practiced, science is often a poor emulator of what we are able toachieve in practice. This is unfortunate because human practice is the ultimatemiracle. In our own practice, most of us manage to deal with many challenging situations. The way we accomplish this is completely different from**,** and far moreefﬁcient than, the way knowledge is generated according to standard scientiﬁc methods. If it is true that in our own practice we proceed not so much by induction or deduction but rather by abduction, then science would do well tomimic this at least in some respects. 10 Abduction has been invoked by numerous scholars, including Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie, Jeffrey Checkel, Martin Shapiro, Alec Stone Sweet, andMartha Finnemore. While they all use the term abduction, none has ever thor-oughly speciﬁed its meaning. To make up for this omission, I have developedabduction into an explicit methodology and applied it in my own research oninternational police cooperation (Friedrichs 2008). Unfortunately, it is impossi-ble to go into further detail here. Readers interested in abduction as a way toadvance international research and methodology can also be referred to my recent article with Fritz Kratochwil (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009).On a ﬁnal note, we should be careful not to erect pragmatism as the ultimateepistemological fantasy to caress the vanity of Nietzschean knowers unknown tothemselves, namely that they are ingeniously ‘‘sorting out’’ problematic situa-tions. Scientiﬁc inquiry is not simply an intimate encounter between a researchproblem and a problem solver. It is a social activity taking place in communitiesof practice (Wenger 1998). Pragmatism must be neither reduced to the utility of results regardless of their social presuppositions and meaning, nor to the 8 Pace Rudra Sil (this forum), the whole point about eclecticism is that you rely on existing traditions to blendthem into something new. There is no eclecticism without something to be eclectic about. 9 One may further expand the list by including the international society approach of the English school (Ma-kinda 2000), as well as the early Kenneth Waltz (1959). 10 Precisely for this reason, abduction understood as ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ plays a crucial role inthe ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence. 647 The Forum fabrication of consensus among scientists. Pragmatism as the practice of dis-cursive communities and pragmatism as a device for the generation of useful knowledge are two sides of the same coin

#### No risk of “endless warfare”- we should embrace pragmatism in security

Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is **not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic**.

#### Their alternative fails—security can’t be deconstructed. The ethical response is to engage in scenario planning to minimize violence

Weaver 2k - Ole International relations theory and the politics of European integration, p. 284-285

The other main possibility is to stress' responsibility. Particularly in a field like security one has to make choices a nd deal with the challenges and risks that one confronts – and not shy away into long-range or principled trans-formations. The meta political line risks (despite the theoretical commit­ment to the concrete other) implying that politics can be contained within large 'systemic questions. In line with the classical revolutionary tradition, after the change (now no longer the revolution but the meta-physical trans­formation), there will be no more problems whereas in our situation (until the change) we should not deal with the 'small questions' of politics, only with the large one (cf. Rorty 1996). However, the ethical demand in post-structuralism (e.g. Derrida's 'justice') is of a kind that can never be instan­tiated in any concrete political order – It is an experience of the undecidable that exceeds any concrete solution and reinserts politics. Therefore, politics can never be reduced to meta-questions there is no way to erase the small, particular, banal conflicts and controversies.  In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the 'opening' oriented version of deconstruction, we could with Derrida stress the singularity of the event. To take a position, take part, and 'produce events' (Derrida 1994: 89) means to get involved in specific struggles. Politics takes place 'in the singular event of engage­ment' (Derrida 1996: 83). Derrida's politics is focused on the calls that demand response/responsi­bility contained in words like justice, Europe and emancipation. Should we treat security in this manner? No, security is not that kind of call. 'Security' is not a way to open (or keep open) an ethical horizon. **Security is a** much **more situational concept oriented to the handling of specifics**. It belongs to the sphere of how to handle challenges – and avoid 'the worst' (Derrida 1991). Here enters again the possible pessimism which for the security analyst might be occupational or structural. The infinitude of responsibility (Derrida 1996: 86) or the tragic nature of politics (Morgenthau 1946, Chapter 7) means that one can never feel reassured that by some 'good deed', 'I have assumed my responsibilities ' (Derrida 1996: 86). If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone, I know that it is to the detriment of an other; of one nation to the detriment of my friends to the detriment of other friends or non-friends, etc. This is the infinitude that inscribes itself within responsibility; otherwise there would be no ethical problems or decisions. (ibid.; and parallel argumentation in Morgenthau 1946; Chapters 6 and 7) Because of this there will remain conflicts and risks - and the question of how to handle them. Should developments be securitized (and if so, in *what* terms)? Often, our reply will be to aim for de-securitization and then politics meet meta-politics; but occasionally the underlying pessimism regarding the prospects for orderliness and compatibility among human aspirations will point to scenarios sufficiently worrisome that **responsibility will entail securitization in order to block the worst**. As a security/securitization analyst, this means accepting the task of trying to manage and avoid spirals and accelerating security concerns, to try to assist in shaping the continent in a way that creates the least insecurity and violence - even if this occasionally means invoking/producing `structures' or even using the dubious instrument of securitization. In the case of the current European configuration, the above analysis suggests the use of securitization at the level of European scenarios with the aim of pre­empting and avoiding numerous instances of local securitization that could lead to security dilemmas and escalations, violence and mutual vilification.

#### Orientalism stuff

**Teitelbaum, 06** Senior Fellow, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle East and African Studies,Tel Aviv U. Adjunct Senior Lecturer, Middle Eastern History, Bar Ilan U. PhD, Tel Aviv U—AND—Meir Litvak—Senior Research Fellow, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. Associate Professor, Middle Eastern and African History, Tel Aviv U. PhD, Harvard (Joshua, Students, Teachers, and Edward Said: Taking Stock of Orientalism, March 2006, http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/2493)

IMPLICATIONS FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES Said's Orientalism did have a salubrious effect to the extent that it brought into greater relief the influence of discourse on academic writing, particularly with respect to the analysis of the "other." Many scholars did need to be reminded of the humanity of their subjects, and their empathy needed to be strengthened. Moreover, there is no doubt that much of Middle Eastern studies was outdated and in need of serious revision, particularly in view of new developments in historical research as well as in such social science fields as sociology and anthropology. That said, overall Said's book had a negative impact. It was gladly accepted by Islamist circles in the Middle East which saw it as a pro-Islamic, anti-Western document. The book provided a confirmation from the "inside" of their long-held suspicions toward Western researchers for being, so to speak, agents of their countries, as well as the view that Western research is part of a scheme to ruin Islam's reputation. Later, Said claimed that this factor was the aspect of the book's reception that he most regretted. He added that Orientalism could be understood as a defense of Islam only if half his argument were ignored. The answer to this self-justification is that if so many people "misinterpret" a certain essay, the misinterpretation is probably embedded in the contents and arguments made by it. Kramer argues that it was possible to ignore half of the argument since the book's tone carried the message that the Islamists understood. [65] Another problem, noticed mostly by Said's Arab critics, is that his arguments also served as ammunition for Islamists and Arab nationalists to counter any criticism of the status quo in the Arab world as Arab Orientalism. Kanan Makiya[66] wrote that the book "unwittingly deflected from the **real problems of the** Middle East at the same time as it contributed more bitterness to the armory" of young Arabs.[67] Whether or not Said so intended, according to Sivan, he provided major assistance to intellectual trends of apologetics in the Arab world which blamed all its problems on outsiders.[68] This factor **made it harder to improve politics** and life **in the Arab world and thus damaged the interests of the Arabs** themselves. Said attacked Fouad Ajami and Kanan Makiya as writers who do not sympathize with the Arabs. He described Makiya--who exposed the oppression of Arabs and Muslims by Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq--with contempt as a "native informant" who serves the interests of American policymakers.[69] For Said, Fouad Ajami is "a second-rate scholar who has written one collection of essays...and a very bad history of Musa Sadr."[70] There is a paradox in the fact that a large part of Said's supporters joined with the Islamists or with supporters of the status quo by rejecting any criticism of the Arab world as "Orientalism." It is equally ironic that it is Arab leftists who often criticize their society and raise arguments similar to those of Elie Kedourie, who is denigrated as an "Orientalist" by Said and his supporters. This kind of agreement, of a conservative intellectual like Kedourie and radical Arab critics attacked by Said raise the question of who is helping the Arabs in the long run--those willing to sincerely engage with crises plaguing Arab society, or those who whitewash them by saying that criticism represents a distorted Western approach?[71] Said's criticism contributed to the further politicization of Middle Eastern studies, which was already quite politicized by the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nikki Keddie noted that in the field the word "Orientalist" is thrown around in a general derogatory sense, directed against those who adopt "the wrong" approach on the conflict or who are perceived as too conservative. She stated that for many people the word substitutes for thought and enables people to dismiss certain scholars and their works. "I think that is too bad," she said. "It may not have been what Edward Said meant at all, but the term has become kind of a slogan."[72] No less severe is the contribution of Orientalism to creating an almost McCarthyist atmosphere in the American academy, one that chokes debates and arguments. Haideh Moghissi, an Iranian scholar, feminist and activist, complained that "fear of Orientalism is haunting studies of the Middle East, and particularly the study of women's experience in various Middle Eastern and Islamic societies. It is used to discourage critical thinking and self-criticism…."[73]

#### Gusterson’s views on politics culture and society are wrong

Stone Et al 2005 (Elizabeth, “Globalization and WMD Proliferation Networks: Challenges to U.S. Security” <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/Conferences/recent/ComparativeStrategicCultureSep05_rpt.html>)

¶ Gusterson’s take on culture and politics is all wrong ¶ Is culture static? Is it malleable? How permeable are cultural boundaries and influences? These questions pervaded the conference’s discussions on strategic culture. Among the participants of the conference, there was disagreement as to whether or not strategic culture was a static and continuous concept, or a constantly evolving, permeable variable.¶ During a panel highlighting the academic implications and multidisciplinary perspectives of strategic culture, Dr. Hugh Gusterson of MIT highlighted the Achilles heel of both attempting to define strategic culture, as well as attempting to use strategic cultural analysis in defense and security studies. He claimed that issues that depend on or are influence by culture cannot be predictive. He reminded the audience that, “As you write about the culture of a people and as they read your writings, their cultures change; human sciences can never be predictive because they investigate entities with consciousness.”¶ Gusterson went on to remind the audience that culture is complex, descriptions are partial and subjective, and descriptions change what it is they are trying to describe once they describe it. In his opinion, not only can a definition of strategic culture never be widely agreed upon by scholars, but strategic culture may, in fact, not be definable at all. Indeed he noted that the mainstream work in anthropology had moved away from attempting to define or measure culture at a societal level.¶ Attempting to move beyond the pessimism implied by Gusterson’s comments and as a way to integrate across the different levels of strategic cultures discussed in the conference, Professor Jeannie Johnson of Utah State University laid out one view of how analysts might think about strategic culture .¶ Her graphic depicted the many inputs and outputs that could influence a state’s overall strategic thinking. Her perception centered on a systems level approach, and emphasized how permeable all levels of strategic culture can be. Johnson emphasized the need to view strategic culture as an ever-changing and evolving system.¶ Johnson reiterated that broad theories of human nature do not, by themselves, allow us to make short-term predictions about country-by country-foreign policy behavior, and scholars need to keep in mind that definitions of strategic culture must be dynamic and will contain embedded contradictions. ¶ Dr. Lantis rejoined the discussion to emphasize that culture is an evolving system of shared meaning that governs perceptions, communications, and actions, and offers little in the way of testable hypotheses. While asking whether or not strategic cultures can evolve, he emphasized that strategic culture possessed a strong degree of continuity, and highlighted that more often than not past learning becomes sedimented into the collective consciousness of a population or group. Lantis also raised the important concept of external shocks to a culture group, which sometimes drastically alter and force a reconsideration of historical norms. This implies that strategic culture must be thought of and analyzed as a fluid, continuously evolving concept.¶ Dr. Theo Farrell of King’s College, London, echoed this notion when he concluded that strategic culture must always be viewed and analyzed as an open system. However, Farrell argued that culture itself is more or less consistent. He admitted that both internal and external shocks occur—and the impact of such shocks are hugely important—but that culture more often than not settles and continues on as a constant norm. Farrell emphasized that if we are ever to attempt to use strategic culture as an analytical independent variable, we must view it as a fixed, continuous concept.¶ In juxtaposition—but not in opposition—to examples of how strategic culture must be thought of as constantly evolving and always changing, Dr. Robert Hickson raised the important examples of the continuity and coherency of both Jewish and Chinese cultures. Both of these cultures, and subsequently the strategic cultures of the states most influence by these traditions, possess an enduring longevity—even with the enormous numbers of external and internal shocks the cultures have undergone. He asked whether or not we can learn more about the debate between continuity and change in strategic culture from societies and groups such as these? Although such a continuity would certainly ease the task of using strategic culture, it is notable that most other participants in the conference saw a much more fluid form of culture in the cases they knew best.

#### Discussion of technical nuclear strategy is inevitable - their attempts to silence nuclear discourse doesn't solve the problem, it just makes it invisible - this prevents critical response

Chaloupka '92 William Chaloupka, Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University, Knowing Nukes: The Politics and Culture of the Atom, 1992, p. 9-10

Both Derrida’s insight and Schwenger’s anecdote invite the opening of a whole realm of oppositional activity, of which only a few examples now exist. The premise of this genre (“speaking unspeakables”), as Derrida claims, may have been best realized before the nuclear era, in the literary texts of Mallarmé, Kafka, or Joyce. But there have been contemporary attempts that nuclear criticism could address.26 One could imagine a comparison, for example, of two highly publicized television films of the Reagan era, “The Day After” and the right-wing response to it, “Amer¬ika.” The level and ferocity of the response suggest that “The Day After” broke a taboo. “Amerika” charges weakness, appeasement, and even col¬laboration, but these charges so completely miss their target that we search for a better interpretation. Perhaps “The Day After” transgressed in a special way, and the only available way of responding was the arcane code of anticommunism. The actual taboo it broke, it broke by speaking at all. At the same time, the activity of finding new ways to read (literary or cinematic) texts about nukes must relate to the broader project of empowering responses if such activity is to fit within the antinuclear schema I am discussing. Leaping over hypothetical psychological diagnoses to speak politically, such a development is not so hard to imagine. “Speaking the unspeakable” has never been a happy entry into activism. Nuclear opponents have adopted any number of rhetorical strategies for overcoming this obstacle. They argue that this “unspeakability” denotes an importance so huge that we must dissolve the reticence and disgust that is our “first reaction.” Or, alternatively, they dissolve their political position into a therapeutic one, implying that the contemporary citizen would be healthier and less conflicted if she would admit and confront the nuclear demon. In either case, the political use of unspeakability produces a paradoxical stance at odds with the naturalism of the survivalist, species-interest position. This unacknowledged (unacknowledgeable) taste for paradox goes even a step further. Having bound themselves in multiple, endlessly and effortlessly proliferating dilemmas, nuclear opponents then announce that it is their goal to impose the condition of “unspeakability” on nuclear managers. The solution to the paradox of nuclear strategy is to silence strategists, such as Caspar Weinberger, who dare to speak of limited nuclear war. This enforced silence has long since ceased to be uncomfortable for nuclear managers, who now clearly understand that their control will proceed more satisfactorily when it is invisible. Opponents, then, have undertaken the odd project of enforcing unspeakability, on the one hand, while also seeking to make nukes visible, thus making them controversial—a topic of conversation.27 Such strategies have a validity, as I will discuss in a later chapter, but it is not necessarily the validity the opponents promote. Just making the artifacts of nuclearism visible isn’t enough; they don’t speak for themselves. These artifacts—whether warheads or power plants—surely offer little help out of the paradox of unspeakability that both veils and unveils them, and all the while also seems to expect a solution. Finding nukes not only “speakable” but “fabulously textual,” nuclear criticism can respond to this odd political situation in part because many more strategic approaches become possible once we move the response to paradox out of an ‘‘unspeakable discourse’’ and into a textual or literary context.

#### Democracy checks their K impact

**O’Kane 97 –** Prof Comparative Political Theory, U Keele (Rosemary, “Modernity, the Holocaust and politics,” Economy and Society 26:1, p 58-9, AG)

Modern bureaucracy is not 'intrinsically capable of genocidal action' (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalin's USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method. By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very 'ordinary and common' attributes of truly modern societies. It is these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which **stand in the way of modern genocides.**

## 1AR

### Death Cult

#### Death imagery affirms life

Michael Allen Fox, Assoc. Prof Phil. @ Queens, 1985, “Nuclear War: Philosophical Perspectives,” ed. Fox and Groarke, p. 127

There remains but one choice: we must seek a reduction of world tensions, mutual trust, disarmament, and peace.35 Security is not the absence of fear and anxiety, but a degree of stress and uncertainty with which we can cope and remain mentally healthy. For security, understood in this way, to become a feature of our lives, we must admit our nuclear fear and anxiety and identify the mechanisms that dull or mask our emotional and other responses. It is necessary to realist that we cannot entrust security to ourselves, but, strange as it seems and however difficult to accept, must entrust it to our adversary Just as the safety and security of each of us, as individuals, depends upon the good will of every other, any one of whom could harm us at any moment, so the security of nations finally depends upon the good will of other nations, whether or not we willingly accept this fact. The disease for which we must find the cure also requires that we continually come face to face with the unthinkable in image and thought and recoil from it. 36 In this manner we can break its hold over us and free ourselves to begin new initiatives. As Robert J. Lifton points out, “confronting massive death helps us bring ourselves more in touch with what we care most about in life. We [will then] find ourselves in no way on a death trip, but rather responding to a call for personal and professional actions and commitments on behalf of that wondrous and fragile entity we know as human life.

### State K

#### State-centric discourse doesn’t legitimize the state

**Frost 96** – IR Professor, King’s College (Mervyn, Ethics in International Relations, p 89-90, AG)

We are not condemned to critical impotence if we accept that the answer to the pressing normative issues in international relations must necessarily be found within the modern state domain of discourse. Neither does it commit us to the maintenance of the status quo. Accepting the centrality of this domain of discourse does not imply that there can be no non native political theory of world politics. That there has been little normative theorizing in international relations is true enough, but the reasons for this lack are not because working out the "implications of the theory of the state" is a trivial thing to do. The reasons for the lack of normative theorizing have already been covered in chapters 1 and 2. In this section I want to argue that seeking answers within the state centric domain of discourse to the list of pressing questions is a worth-while activity and that far from being a trivial residue of state theory it is of primary importance. What I take to be involved in this endeavour will be elucidated in some detail in the following two chapters. It involves constructing a coherent back- ground theory justifying the settled norms in the modern state domain of discourse. It is necessary to be quite clear about what is, and what is not involved in having recourse to the modern state domain of discourse. The language of this domain is the ordinary language of international relations. This language is a functioning whole - not a completely coherent one - which includes within it a mix of the following terms: state, sovereignty, self-determination, citizen, democracy, human rights (individual rights and group rights), and a set of terms connected to the notion of modernization. Asserting the primacy of the modern state domain of discourse for my purposes does not commit me to holding that people will always live in states as we know them or that life in states, as we know them, is the only proper life for human beings, or that the way states are organized at present is the best way of organizing them. I simply contend that any discussion about what ought to be done in world politics (be the proposed action a small one or a large one such as, for example, the wholesale reor- ganization of the global political system) must be conducted in the language of the modern state system. No other suitable language is available. Viewed in this way, it will become clear that the various objections against the modern state domain of discourse as the ground of normative theory in international relations fall away as misconceived. There are several such objections which must be confronted.

# Round 5 v. Mary Washington MM

## 2AC

### Licensing 2AC

#### Vogtle licensing provides a stable and predictable investment climate for the nuclear power industry.

**Gray, ‘12**

[Chuck, Executive Director -- National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, “A Strong Step, but Hurdles Remain,” http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/02/is-america-poised-for-nuclear.php]

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s approval of the new units at Plant Vogtle is an important development for both the nuclear industry and our country. With the issuances of these licenses, the industry knows what to expect moving forward, sending a strong signal to the critical stakeholders, including both the investment community and, significantly, the State regulators that NARUC represents. A predictable investment climate can lead to stable rates. At the end of the day, we hope the big winners are the consumers who pay for the bulk of building these plants.

### Nanotech

#### Demonstration projects are key to motivate scientist recruitment – salaries can be adjusted regardless of funding

**National Acadamies Press 12** [2012, Improving the Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers: A Report to the Carnegie Commision on Science, Technology and Government, <http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=2102&page=37>]

There have been no significant changes in NIST's workforce quality indicators—undergraduate grade-point averages, quality of graduate schools, and performance appraisal ratings—which traditionally have been high. Turnover rates, already very low, have not changed,¶ although surveys of leavers indicate that salary has become a less important reason for leaving. Department of Agriculture Demonstration The committee also heard presentations by officials from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and its Agricultural Research Service (ARS) about a personnel demonstration project begun in mid-1990 in 140 experimental and 70 comparison sites of the Forest Service and the ARS. The project is largely a testing of a comprehensive simplification and decentralization of the hiring system, but it does include recruitment bonuses and relocation expenses and use of an extended probationary period for scientists in research positions.14 The committee heard that the recruitment incentives have been rarely used, although they were important in attracting a microbiologist and a plant physiologist. It is too early to evaluate the results of the longer probationary period on the retention and productivity of research scientists. Lessons While they are only quasi-experiments, and they do not measure the effects of the interventions on organizational effectiveness, other effects of the various interventions have been measured, the Navy and NIST demonstration projects are consistent with the proposition that a more flexible pay and position structure improves the ability of federal agencies to recruit more qualified scientists and engineers and to reward and motivate good performers and thus retain them. They also show that the direct cost of such efforts is modest, in part because the agencies can (and do, because of budget constraints) tailor the compensation package to each case rather than increase salaries across the board. In addition, the differences among the demonstrations designed by each agency to 14 The extended probationary period does not apply to foresters and other scientists not in research positions.¶ OCR for page 56¶ Improving the Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers: A Report to the Carnegie Commision on Science, Technology and Government meet its needs show that the various mechanisms can and should be adapted to the particular conditions facing each agency. Thus the agencies faced with implementing FEPCA should consider it an opportunity to design their own recruitment and retention programs. Unfortunately, FEPCA does not include all the devices and flexibilities being used by the demonstration projects. Additional steps needed beyond FEPCA to improve the federal government's capacity to recruit well-qualified scientific and technological personnel are recommended in the last chapter. First, the next chapter discusses the flexibilities offered under FEPCA to agencies faced with attracting and keeping well-qualified scientists and engineers and identifies potential obstacles to effective implementation of FEPCA.

### Prolif

#### The credibility thesis is completely false

**Ford 9** [“Nuclear Disarmament, ¶ Nonproliferation, ¶ and the “Credibility ¶ Thesis”, Christopher Ford, September 2009, senior fellow and director of the Center for Technology and ¶ Global Security at Hudson Institute¶ U.S. special representative for ¶ nuclear nonproliferation¶ principal deputy assistant ¶ secretary of state for verification, compliance]

Strikingly, these various proliferation challenges—and the sad and all-too-often ¶ willful limpness of the international community’s response—all took place during a ¶ period of extraordinary nuclear weapons reductions by the United States and Russia. ¶ These reductions have already been described, but the point bears re-emphasizing: These ¶ problems with proliferation, and an international community unwilling to address them ¶ effectively, occurred when the nuclear superpowers were making massive and ¶ unprecedented reductions in their nuclear weapons holdings. What does this tell us about ¶ the purported link between disarmament credibility and the international community’s ¶ willingness to bear burdens in support of nonproliferation? ¶ To put it gently, the historical record offers little support for the credibility thesis. ¶ (If anything, it could be said to point in the opposite direction. While one should certainly ¶ always be careful about asserting a causal connection between succeeding events, it is ¶ certainly possible to imagine skeptics advancing a counter-argument—with at least as ¶ much facial plausibility—that this history suggests that the interests of nonproliferation ¶ might be better served by the maintenance of robust superpower arsenals!) Under the ¶ circumstances, what is perhaps most remarkable about the credibility thesis is that anyone ¶ dares to advance it at all. ¶ A

### Coercion

**Taxes aren’t theft and they are ethical– social contract proves big government is good.**

Kangas 99 Graduate student in Political Science, 99 (Steve, “Myth: Taxes are theft,” 3/19, <http://www.huppi.com/kangaroo/L-taxestheft.htm>, date accessed: 7/11/08)

Many conservatives and libertarians make the following populist argument: "If you don't pay your taxes, men with guns will come to your house, arrest you, and seize your property." The implication here is that you are being extorted to pay taxes, and this theft amounts to a violation of your rights. Although the events described are technically correct -- you should expect such a response from any crime you commit -- the implication that the government is aggressing against you is false, and not a little demagogic. Taxes are part of a social contract, an agreement between voters and government to exchange money for the government's goods and services. Even libertarians agree that breach of contract legitimates a police response. So the real question is not whether a crime should be met with "men with guns," but whether or not the social contract is valid, especially to those who don't agree with it or devote their allegiance to it. Liberals have two lines of argument against those who reject the idea of the social contract. The first is that if they reject it, they should not consume the government's goods and services. How they can avoid this when the very dollar bills that the economy runs on are printed by the government is a good question. Try to imagine participating in the economy without using public roads, publicly funded communication infrastructure, publicly educated employees, publicly funded electricity, water, gas, and other utilities, publicly funded information, technology, research and development -- it's absolutely impossible. The only way to avoid public goods and services is to move out of the country entirely, or at least become such a hermit, living off the fruits of your own labor, that you reduce your consumption of public goods and services to as little as possible. Although these alternatives may seem unpalatable, they are the only consistent ones in a person who truly wishes to reject the social contract. Any consumption of public goods, no matter how begrudgingly, is implicit agreement of the social contract, just as any consumption of food in a restaurant is implicit agreement to pay the bill. Many conservatives and libertarians concede the logic of this argument, but point out that taxes do not go exclusively to public goods and services. They also go for welfare payments to the poor who are allegedly doing nothing and getting a free ride from the system. That, they claim, is theft. But this argument fails too. Welfare is a form of social insurance. In the private sector we freely accept the validity of life and property insurance. Obviously, the same validity goes for social insurance like unemployment and welfare. The tax money that goes to social insurance buys each one of us a private good: namely, the comfort of being protected in times of adversity. And it buys us a public good as well (although tax critics are loathe to admit this). If workers were allowed to unnecessarily starve or die in otherwise temporary setbacks, then our economy would be frequently disrupted. Social insurance allows workers to tide over the rough times, and this establishes a smooth-running economy that benefits us all.

#### Utilitarianism is the only successful method for weighing debate impacts- all other theoretical frameworks fail

Robert E. Goodin, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Australia, “Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy”, pg 26 1995

The greatest advantage of utilitarianism as a guide to public conduct is that it avoids gratuitous sacrifices, it ensures as best we are able to ensure in the uncertain world of public policy-making that policies are sensitive to people’s interests or desires or preferences. The great failing of more deontological theories, applied to those realms, is that they fixate upon duties done for the sake of duty rather than for the sake of any good that is done by doing one’s duty. Perhaps it is permissible (perhaps it is even proper) for private individuals in the course of their personal affairs to fetishize duties done for their own sake. It would be a mistake for public officials to do likewise, not least because it is impossible. The fixation on motives makes absolutely no sense in the public realm, and might make precious little sense in the private one even, as Chapter 3 proves.

### Solar Tradeoff 2AC

#### No tradeoff – abundance and France prove

**Tindale, 11** [Stephen Tindale is an associate fellow at the CER, June 2011, Center for European Reform, <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/pb_thorium_june11-153.pdf>]

The money to support research and development of molten salt reactors need not be taken from renewables or other low-carbon energy supply options. There is more than enough money available in the existing subsidies for nuclear fusion. And the argument that governments which support any form of nuclear power overlook or downplay renewables is disproved by the example of France. France gets over three-quarters of its electricity from nuclear power stations. Yet the French government has supported onshore wind farms and is now giving subsides to offshore wind. It is also subsidising an expansion of the district heating system in Paris, to distribute heat from power stations burning energy crops and waste wood which would otherwise be wasted.

#### And, expansion can occur without a tradeoff – their ev relies on an incomplete model

Farrell, 12 [February 29th, “We need a 21st century electricity system to enable local clean energy”, http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/02/29/434440/clean-energy-trade-off-trade-in-obsolete-electric-grid/?mobile=nc

In a New York Times SundayReview piece last week – [Drawing the Line at Power Lines](https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/sunday-review/drawing-the-line-at-power-lines.html?_r=2&hp) – Elisabeth Rosenthal suggested that our desire for clean energy will require significant tradeoffs:¶ There are pipelines, trains, trucks and high-voltage transmission lines. None of them are pretty, and all have environmental drawbacks. But if you want to drive your cars, heat your homes and watch TV, you will have to choose among these unpalatable options…¶ Perhaps the answer is simply that in an increasingly crowded powered-on world, we’re all going to have to accept that Governor Cuomo’s so-called energy highway is likely to traverse our backyard.¶ I disagree.¶ The future of American electricity policy is not about tradeoffs, but rather a chance to trade-in an obsolete, centralized paradigm for a local, clean energy future. Utilities would have us believe that new high-voltage transmission lines are necessary to get more wind and solar power. But the truth is that the American electricity industry refuses to embrace the fundamentally different nature of renewable energy: its ubiquity means that Americans can produce energy near where they use it, in an economically competitive manner, and at a community scale.¶ The 20th century electricity system was centrally controlled and centrally-owned, a necessary evil when coal, gas, and nuclear power plants had significant economies of scale and required enormous capital investments. The supply lines for these power plants were equally large, connecting far-off mines, oil and gas fields via rail and pipeline to these remote power plants, and big transmission lines in turn carried the electricity from these power plants to big urban centers.¶ An electricity system primarily powered by wind and solar is fundamentally different. Turbines and panels are always right at the fuel source, whether on a rural farm or an urban rooftop. And because their scale is substantially more amenable to community ownership, renewable energy can be built near to and provide economic benefits to the communities it powers.¶ The fundamental shift means Americans should trade-in an obsolete model of centralized energy generation for one that matches and builds support for the local energy opportunity.¶ Local ownership and its economic benefits should play a significant role. For example, researchers in Germany recently surveyed [local support for expanding wind energy production](http://energyselfreliantstates.org/content/community-ownership-boosts-support-renewables), comparing two towns with nearby wind farms. When the local turbines were absentee-owned, 60 percent of residents were opposed to more local wind power. Opposition dropped by 45 percentage points when the wind farm was locally owned. It’s no different from the fight over the Badger-Coulee transmission line in Western Wisconsin, where locals have raised hell knowing that they will be asked to pay as much as $5 billion for new transmission lines that will earn utilities an 11% (or greater) return with questionable local economic benefit.¶ Locally owned wind power is in short supply, however, because federal and state energy policy make it extremely difficult. Community ownership could be best achieved through cooperatives, schools, or cities, but federal wind incentives are for taxable entities, not these rooted community organizations. Furthermore, federal tax credits require wind power project participants to have “passive income” from investments, ruling out the vast majority of Americans. When community wind projects succeed, like the [South Dakota Wind Partners](http://energyselfreliantstates.org/content/change-federal-incentive-enables-cooperative-own-wind-project), organizers admit that repeated the success is unlikely in light of the legal and financial complexities.¶ Community-scaled wind and solar projects also struggle against an electricity system stacked against small-scale or “distributed” generation. A recent study in Minnesota, for example, suggested that [the state could meet its entire 25% by 2025 renewable energy standard with distributed renewable energy projects](http://www.newrules.org/energy/publications/meeting-minnesotas-renewable-energy-standard-using-existing-transmission-system) connected to existing electric grid infrastructure. Incumbent utilities have focused on transmission instead, likely because new power lines (and not maximizing existing infrastructure) earns them a statutory 11-13% rate of return.¶ This myopic focus on big infrastructure may prove doubly expensive as the cost of solar power falls rapidly. Within 10 years, one-third of Americans could install solar on their own rooftop and get electricity for less than their utility charges, without any additional power lines. But under the current electricity policy, these same Americans will likely be paying a few dollars each month for new utility-conceived high-voltage transmission lines even as they increasingly produce their own local, clean energy.¶ The future of American energy policy is not a tradeoff between new clean energy and new transmission. Rather, it’s an opportunity to trade-in an obsolete, centralized model of development for the alternative – a democratized energy system where Americans can be producers and owners of their energy future.

#### Renewables dead

**Burgess 11** [“How Will Renewable Energy Fare in 2012?”, James Burgess, 20 December 2011, Oil Price analyst, Business Management, University of Nottingham]

Renewable energy is considered the future. The best way for us to combat climate change, survive the decline of oil and generally provide cheap, safer, secure energy. However the industry is still in its infancy and relies heavily on government subsidies and tax incentives. Every year or two the renewable energy companies experience a few tense months as the subsidies and incentives approach their expiration date. Invariably Congress comes to the rescue at the 11th hour and extends them for another year or two, the companies can breathe a sigh of relief and everyone can enjoy the holidays relatively stress free. However this year could prove to be different. We are in the midst of a presidential election year where the Republicans are using the bankruptcy of Solyndra to slam the Obama administration’s green energy policies. As a result Congress may well let the tax breaks die.¶ During the depths of the recession in 2009 the Obama administration gave renewable energy developers the option of taking a 30% tax credit as there weren’t many project financiers left with sufficient profits. Congress at the end of 2010 extended the program for another year, and now time’s up.¶ According to Joe Desmond, senior vice president of communications and government affairs for BrightSource Energy, fears that the solar industry would just be back in 12 months time asking for another extension are erroneous. The extension is only needed to bridge the gap until the economy improves sufficiently and a permanent financing program can be created. “As soon as the economy recovers, it takes the burden off of having to request an extension.” he said. He makes the point that, “the problem remains … there are tax equity investors out there. But it remains insufficient to serve the anticipated demand moving forward until the economy recovers.” Or, to put it another way, there are too many projects, such as the multibillion-dollar solar thermal power stations BrightSource builds or the residential rooftop photovoltaic systems SolarCity leases, and too few investors.¶ The Solar Energy Industries Association conducted a survey that found that nearly 37,000 jobs would not be created in 2012 if the cash grant program expires at the end of 2011, and that would be on top of the jobs lost due to renewable energy companies going bankrupt without the federal support. “More than 100,000 Americans work in the solar industry, double the number in 2009,” Rhone Resch, the chief executive of the solar trade group, said in a statement. “Solar is a proven job creator at a time when the unemployment rate for the country remains stubbornly high.”¶ Desmond also noted that two of BrightSource’s solar power plants set for production will create $800 million in wages, with each employing more than a thousand workers. Meanwhile, The American Wind Energy Association has released a study that predicted an extension of the production tax credit would create 54,000 jobs over the next four years.¶ Without the grants all renewable energy projects would rely on pre-grant incentives, such as tax equity markets, but the tax equity market still hasn’t recovered since the 2008 crash. According to Jeff Davis, a partner and co-head of the renewable energy practice at Mayer Brown, “we are still in a situation that we've been in since 2008 where the tax capacity or the ability to monetize those production tax credits and investment tax credits hasn't really recovered."¶ Jonathan Postal, senior vice president at Main Street Power, thinks we'll see more innovation in deal financing, similar to before the grant was passed. "You're going to need multiple partners, different ownership structures. Banks aren't going to just do the financing,” he said, "it's going to make things significantly more challenging.”¶ Financiers in the renewable energy market have all agreed that 2012 will be tough, no matter how you look at it. That, whilst the beginning of the year should be fine due to the completion of projects that began under the grant, the second half could well be very difficult.

#### Solar can't solve – A. Operates at 20%; one coal plant beats all the solar in the world

Savinar, 08. Esq. of LATOC. ( Matthew David, Life After the Oil Crash, <http://www.lifeaftertheoilcrash.net/secondpage.html>, accessed July 9, 2008)

In the real world, the average solar cell operates at about 20% of its maximum capacity. This means the combined output of all the solar cells in the world is equal to less than 40% of the output of a single coal fired power plant. UPDATE:By end of last year, there was just over 5,000 megawatts of solar pv cells installed worldwide. Operating at average efficiency of 20%, the combined output of all the pv cells in the world is now equal to the output of a single coal fired power-planet.

#### B. Not enough land

McCluney 2K3 [Ross, June 14, 2003, "Renewable Energy Limits", Page 4, <http://www.fsec.ucf.edu/en/publications/pdf/FSEC-GP-216-03.PDF>]

There are physical limits to the production of energy from direct solar radiation. In the absurd limit, we clearly could not cover all available land area with solar collectors. A more reasonable limit would be to fill existing future rooftops with solar collectors. From data provided by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, I estimated the total combined commercial and residential building roof area in the United States in the year 2000 at 18 billion square meters. From a National Renewable Energy Laboratory web site, I found that the approximate annual average quantity of solar energy falling on a square meter of land area in the United States is about 4.5 kWh of energy per square meter of area per day. Multiplying this by 365 days in a year and by the 18 billion square meter roof area figure, yields the total energy received by rooftop solar systems in this scenario: 2.46 x 10 ^ 13 kWh per year, or 84 Quads per year. This is just a bit below the 102 Quads per year U.S primary energy consumption figure. Not all roof areas is usable, however. Roofs sloped away from the sun's strongest radiation, shaded by trees and other buildings, having interfering equipment, or insufficiently strong to support solar equipment, are either not practical or not possible for this utilization.

#### C. Intermittency and requires fossil fuels

Choi 08. (Charles, February 27, Livescience.com, "Solar Power's Greenhouse Emissions Measured," <http://www.livescience.com/environment/080227-solar-power-green.html>)

"One of the most promising photovoltaic technologies is based on cadmium telluride, but cadmium is one of the worst heavy metals. Still, if we compare direct emissions from production of cadmium telluride cells with coal power plants, toxic emissions would up 300 times lower," said researcher Vasilis Fthenakis, an environmental engineer at Brookhaven National Laboratory in Upton, N.Y. In fact, most of the toxic emissions from making solar cells come indirectly from fossil fuel-burning power plants, which provide the electricity needed for manufacture. Ironically, the solar cell factories will likely need to rely on fossil fuels for power for a while, since solar power is too intermittent to use, Fthenakis explained, shutting down as it does when sun goes down.

#### D. Can’t solve – silver

Matt Savinar, Poly Sci UCDavis, J.D. @ UC Hastings 2004, <http://www.unicamp.br/fea/ortega/eco/traducao-DieOff.pdf>, p. 58

The geographic areas most suited for large solar farms are typically very warm areas, such as deserts. This requires the energy collected by the panels to be converted to electricity and then transmitted over large distances to power more densely populated regions. Unfortunately, heat makes electricity extremely difficult to transmit. The benefits of setting up solar farms in sun-drenched areas like the desert are largely offset by the additional costs of transmitting the electricity. The only way to overcome this problem is through the use of superconducting wires, which require copious quantities of silver, a precious metal already in short supply.

#### Not a bridge fuel – can’t solve and turns their renewables stuff

**Jones 12** [Christopher F. Jones, C, Wantrup Fellow, University of California-Berkeley, “Natural Gas: Bridge or Dead End?”, Huffington Post, 08/29/2012]

Natural gas is often touted as a bridge fuel: an interim step between the heavily polluting fossil fuels we depend on today and the clean renewable energy systems we hope for tomorrow. But the infrastructure we deploy to increase natural gas may actually inhibit the transition to solar and wind power. Rather than a bridge, natural gas may be a dead end.¶ The idea of natural gas as a bridge draws on three main points. First, natural gas produces significantly less carbon dioxide than coal or oil. Second, it releases fewer impurities like sulfur and mercury compared with other fossil fuels. Third, many experts anticipate that obtaining even 20 percent of our energy from renewables in the next couple decades will be difficult. Natural gas, advocates argue, offers a more realistic large-scale carbon reduction strategy in the short-term because we have already addressed many of the technical challenges of producing, transporting, and consuming it.¶ These considerations merit attention from the pragmatic environmentalist. Greatly reducing carbon emissions without lowering overall energy consumption is a laudable goal if it can be done in an environmentally responsible manner. Yet in addition to thinking about how we build a natural gas bridge, it is imperative that we devote equal attention to how we get off. A good bridge requires off-ramps. If we consider the role of infrastructure in energy transitions, this might be harder than we think.¶ Critics of natural gas have typically focused on issues of pollution rather than infrastructure. First, there has been widespread opposition to 'fracking' shale gas reserves, a process that may contaminate drinking water, trigger minor earthquakes, and produce many other environmental consequences. Second, there are debates over whether natural gas really has a beneficial impact on climate. It may produce less greenhouse gas, but leaks of methane might more than offset these gains. These are important issues, but it is also worth examining the impact that expanding natural gas infrastructure will have on renewable energy systems.¶ Building a natural gas bridge will require a significant expansion of infrastructure: drilling wells for production, pipelines for distribution, and a range of devices for consumption including power plants, home furnaces, and industrial ovens. Investing in these systems will increase the supply of natural gas and lower its costs through economies of scale. As a result, consumers will find it cheaper and easier to use natural gas. This is a straightforward account of what infrastructure does -- it facilitates certain types of behaviors.¶ What is less appreciated is the fact that infrastructure cuts two ways. These systems will not simply provide an advantage for natural gas; they will make it progressively harder and more expensive to transition to renewables. We can examine this point by thinking about relative prices and sunk costs.¶ Relative prices often matter more than absolute prices for energy transitions. For consumers, it is not simply the price of an energy source that matters; it is how much more or less that energy source costs than other options. Right now, natural gas is already cheaper than solar and wind for electricity production in most analyses. With significant investments in natural gas infrastructure, this price gap is only likely to grow. Therefore, even though the absolute price of renewable energy will not change, wind and solar will become less attractive to consumers because they will cost relatively more.¶ What's more, these inequalities are likely to become more extreme over time due to sunk costs. Most of the systems designed to burn natural gas, like furnaces and electrical generating equipment, are expensive and designed to last for decades. Once large sums have been paid to purchase such systems, short-term price changes matter far less to consumers. Even if natural gas triples in price, prior investments in these systems will still act as a disincentive for switching to renewables. The sunk costs in infrastructure, therefore, further suggest that once we get on the bridge, it will be hard to get off.

#### No econ impact

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

### Accidents/Meltdowns 2AC

NU

**Ferguson 12** [“Nuclear Power's Uncertain Future”, Charles D. Ferguson, President of the Federation of American Scientists, March 15, 2012, khirn]

On the opposite side of the world, China has about two dozen reactors under construction and many more planned. After the Fukushima accident, Beijing temporarily halted construction and said the right words about making sure safety is a top priority. But the real test will be its follow-through in training the legions of people who can safely operate and inspect these reactors. **The toughest challenge will be instilling a safety culture in which everyone at a nuclear plant can report safety violations** without fear of retribution. Although China’s rate of nuclear construction is impressive, the pace of its building coal plants as well as installing wind turbines and solar power is even more brisk. India also has grand nuclear-expansion plans, but antinuclear protesters have stymied completion of a Russian-built plant at Kandukulam as well as startup of new projects. In December 2004, the great tsunami that swept through the Indian Ocean raised concerns about the vulnerability of some Indian nuclear plants. In response to Fukushima, South Korea gave its regulatory agency more authority. While also vulnerable to earthquakes and tsunamis, the country has a severe shortage of indigenous sources of fuels, so its national policy has emphasized expanding nuclear power’s capacity to generate more than half of its electricity by 2030. Seoul has also developed a successful model for building nuclear plants, paying close attention to costs and project management. Its most recent plant was reportedly built within budget and on time. The Koreans are determined to demonstrate this model in the United Arab Emirates, which in December 2009 ordered four large reactors from South Korea at the price of about $20 billion. If successful, the UAE project could set the stage for competitive nuclear power. Jordan and Vietnam are already taking note of this model, but because they are much poorer countries than the UAE, they have been shopping around for massive loans to support their nuclear plans. It remains to be seen whether Jordan and Vietnam and other potential new nuclear entrants will end up like the Philippines, which recently turned its completed but nonoperational Bataan Nuclear Power Plant into a tourist destination. At least this plant is earning revenue.

#### Chernobyl proves there’s no permanent impact on the environment.

Bosselman, ‘7

[Fred, Professor of Law Emeritus, Chicago-Kent College of Law, “THE NEW POWER GENERATION: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ELECTRICITY INNOVATION: COLLOQUIUM ARTICLE: THE ECOLOGICAL ADVANTAGES OF NUCLEAR POWER,” 15 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 1, Lexis]

C. "But What About Chernobyl?" In 1986, an explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Ukraine caused the release of large amounts of radiation into the atmosphere. [247](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=49&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n247) Initially, the Soviet government released little information about the explosion and tried to play down its seriousness, but this secrecy caused great nervousness throughout Europe, and fed the public's fears of nuclear power all over the [\*46] world. [248](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=49&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n248) Now a comprehensive analysis of the event and its aftermath has been made: In 2005, a consortium of United Nations agencies called the Chernobyl Forum released its analysis of the long-term effects of the Chernobyl explosion. [249](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=49&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n249) The U.N. agencies' study found that the explosion caused fewer deaths than had been expected. [250](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=49&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n250) Although the Chernobyl reactor was poorly designed and badly operated [251](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=49&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n251) and lacked the basic safety protections found outside the Soviet Union, [252](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=49&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n252) fewer than seventy deaths so far have been attributed to the explosion, mostly plant employees and firefighters who suffered acute radiation sickness. [253](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=49&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n253) The Chernobyl reactor, like many Soviet reactors, was in the open rather than in an American type of pressurizable containment structure, which would have prevented the release of radiation to the environment if a similar accident had occurred. [254](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=49&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n254) [\*47] Perhaps the most surprising finding of the U.N. agencies' study was that "the ecosystems around the Chernobyl site are now flourishing.The [Chernobyl exclusion zone] has become a wildlife sanctuary, and it looks like the nature park it has become." [255](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=49&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n255) Jeffrey McNeely, the chief scientist of the World Conservation Union, has made similar observations: Chernobyl has now become the world's first radioactive nature reserve... . 200 wolves are now living in the nature reserve, which has also begun to support populations of reindeer, lynx and European bison, species that previously were not found in the region. While the impact on humans was strongly negative, the wildlife is adapting and even thriving on the site of one of the 20th century's worst environmental disasters. [256](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=49&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n256) Mary Mycio, the Kiev correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, has written a fascinating book based on her many visits to the exclusion zone and interviews with people in the area. [257](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=49&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n257) She notes that the fear that radiation would produce permanent deformities in animal species has not been borne out after twenty years; the population and diversity of animals in even some of the most heavily radiated parts of the exclusion zone is similar to comparable places that are less radioactive. [258](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=49&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n258)

#### Nuclear power is safe -- no meltdowns and no impact.

**Svoboda, ‘10**

[Elizabeth, Popular Mechanics, “Debunking the Top 10 Energy Myths”, 7-7, http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/debunking-myths-about-nuclear-fuel-coal-wind-solar]

Myth No. 1 Nuclear Power Isn't a Safe Solution In a recent national poll, 72 percent of respondents expressed concern about potential accidents at nuclear power plants. Some opinion-makers have encouraged this trepidation: Steven Cohen, executive director of Columbia University's Earth Institute, has called nuclear power "dangerous, complicated and politically controversial." During the first six decades of the nuclear age, however, fewer than 100 people have died as a result of nuclear power plant accidents. And comparing modern nuclear plants to Chernobyl—the Ukrainian reactor that directly caused 56 deaths after a 1986 meltdown—is like comparing World War I fighter planes to the F/A-18. Newer nuclear plants, including the fast reactor now being developed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), contain multiple auto-shutoff mechanisms that reduce the odds of a meltdown exponentially—even in a worst-case scenario, like an industrial accident or a terrorist attack. And some also have the ability to burn spent fuel rods, a convenient way to reuse nuclear waste instead of burying it for thousands of years. Power sources such as coal and petroleum might seem safer than nuclear, but statistically they're a lot deadlier. Coal mining kills several hundred people annually—mainly from heart damage and black lung disease, but also through devastating accidents like the April mine explosion in West Virginia. The sublethal effects of coal-power generation are also greater. "The amount of radiation put out by a coal plant far exceeds that of a nuclear power plant, even if you use scrubbers," says Gerald E. Marsh, a retired nuclear physicist who worked at Argonne National Laboratory. Particulate pollution from coal plants causes nearly 24,000 people a year to die prematurely from diseases such as lung cancer. Petroleum production also has safety and environmental risks, as demonstrated by the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. INL nuclear lab's deputy associate director, Kathryn McCarthy, thinks the industry can overcome its stigma. "It's been a long time since Chernobyl and Three Mile Island," McCarthy says, "and people are willing to reconsider the benefits of nuclear energy." Nuclear plants emit only a tiny fraction of the carbon dioxide that coal plants do, and a few hundred nuclear facilities could potentially supply nearly all the energy the United States needs, reducing our dependence on fossil fuels.

#### IFR’s are really safe

**Brook 9** [“Response to an Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) critique”, 21 February 2009 by Barry Brook, professor in the School of Earth and Environmental Sciences at the University of Adelaide, where he holds the Sir Hubert Wilkins Chair of Climate Change]

¶ 8. Brook says IFR reactors would be “safe from melt down” which is nonsense because technologies fail, well-intentioned humans err, and because the best laid plans can go awry if reactors are subject to sabotage or outside attack…¶ [BWB] The laws of physics say that this is not nonsense. For instance, the metal fuel pins’ composition is such that if they begin to overheat, the resulting expansion decreases their density to the point where the fission reaction simply shuts down. This is not speculation — it’s been tested and verified. I quote:¶ “The IFR gains safety advantages through a combination of metal fuel (an alloy of uranium, plutonium, and zirconium), and sodium cooling. By providing a fuel which readily conducts heat from the fuel to the coolant, and which operates at relatively low temperatures, the IFR takes maximum advantage of expansion of the coolant, fuel, and structure during off-normal events which increase temperatures. The expansion of the fuel and structure in an off-normal situation causes the system to shut down even without human operator intervention. In April of 1986, two special tests were performed on the Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II), in which the main primary cooling pumps were shut off with the reactor at full power (62.5 Megawatts, thermal) – By not allowing the normal shutdown systems to interfere, the reactor power dropped to near zero within about 300 seconds. No damage to the fuel or the reactor resulted. This test demonstrated that even with a loss of all electrical power and the capability to shut down the reactor using the normal systems, the reactor will simply shut down without danger or damage. The same day, this demonstration was followed by another important test. With the reactor again at full power, flow in the secondary cooling system was stopped. This test caused the temperature to increase, since there was nowhere for the reactor heat to go. As the primary (reactor) cooling system became hotter, the fuel, sodium coolant, and structure expanded, and the reactor shut down. This test showed that an IFR type reactor will shut down using inherent features such as thermal expansion, even if the ability to remove heat from the primary cooling system is lost. Events such as the loss of water to the steam system would cause a condition such as the test demonstrated. Another major feature of the IFR concept is that the reactor uses a coolant, sodium, which does not boil during normal operation nor even in overpower transients such as described above. This means that the coolant is not under significant pressure. When coolant is not under pressure, the reactor can be placed in a “pool” of coolant, contained in a double tank, so that there is no real possibility for a loss of coolant. Even if the normal pumps are lost, some coolant flow through the reactor occurs due to natural convection. The features described above allow for greater simplification of a nuclear plant, resulting in cost savings, greater ease in operation, and a safety system that relies on natural phenomenon that cannot be defeated by human error. “

### Adv CP 2AC

#### Natural gas is a dirty bridge – it bought us time, but failure to transition ensures worse warming

**Nordhause 12** [Ted Nordhaus, Chairman of the Breakthrough Institute, and Michael Shellenberger, President of the Breakthrough Institute, 2-27-2012, "Beyond Cap and Trade, A New Path to Clean Energy," Yale Environment 360]

A funny thing happened while environmentalists were trying and failing to cap carbon emissions in the U.S. Congress. U.S. carbon emissions started going down. The decline began in 2005 and accelerated after the financial crisis. The latest estimates from the U.S. Energy Information Administration now suggest that U.S. emissions will continue to decline for the next few years and remain flat for a decade or more after that.¶ The proximate cause of the decline in recent years has been the recession and slow economic recovery. But the reason that EIA is projecting a long-term decline over the next decade or more is the glut of cheap natural gas, mostly from unconventional sources like shale, that has profoundly changed America’s energy outlook over the next several decades.¶ Gas is no panacea. It still puts a lot of carbon into the atmosphere and has¶ created a range of new pollution problems at the local level. Methane leakage resulting from the extraction and burning of natural gas threatens to undo much of the carbon benefit that gas holds over coal. And even were we to make a full transition from coal to gas, we would then need to transition from gas to renewables and nuclear in order to reduce U.S. emissions deeply enough to achieve the reductions that climate scientists believe will be necessary to avoid dangerous global warming.

**US leadership in reprocessing supercharges conversion of HEU**

**Timbers 3** William Timbers president and CEO of the USEC, explains in 2k3: Timbers, President and Chief Executive Officer USEC Inc, 9-19-2k3

(William, "Nuclear Power & Global Security: Mutual Interest, Mutual Opportunities, Delivered at the Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace Second International Non-Proliferation Conference Moscow, Russia. P. <http://www.usec.com/v2001_02/Content/News/Speeches/09-19-03-CEIPMoscowRe>marks.pdf )

While significant steps have been taken by Russia and the United States to strengthen the security of stored fissionable nuclear materials, a different approach goes right to the heart of the matter—the very elimination of nuclear warhead materials.

After several years of consultations, in 1993 Russia and the United States formally agreed to a 20-year, $12 billion program to eliminate 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) taken from dismantled Russian warheads. To put this in perspective, 500 metric tons of HEU is the equivalent of more than 20,000 nuclear warheads. This U.S.-Russian agreement is often referred to it as the “HEU-LEU” agreement or “the Russian HEU Agreement.” We, who are responsible for commercially implementing this agreement, call it the “Megatons to Megawatts” program. I want to take a moment to acknowledge that, over the years, many of you—both Russians and Americans—have played a vital role in making this HEU to LEU program possible and in helping to ensure its continuity. You can be justifiably proud of your role in making this remarkable effort a success. For those of you who are not familiar with Megatons to Megawatts, you may be wondering why a private sector company is involved. That is because the 1993 U.S.-Russian Agreement requires that it be implemented strictly on commercial terms. Simply put, the strategy of the two governments was to ensure that a substantial amount of excess weapons material was irreversibly converted to peaceful uses as quickly as possible and to utilize the dynamics of the commercial market for nuclear fuel to pay for this effort. Their accurate assessment was that the program could commercially sustain itself over the 20-year period through the sale and purchase of fuel derived from warhead materials. Accordingly, in 1994 executive agents appointed by both governments signed a commercial implementing contract—Techsnabexport (TENEX) acting for the Russian government and the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) acting for the United States government. The value of this program also extends beyond its basic mission of eliminating nuclear warhead materials. There is also a human dimension. Proceeds from this program support thousands of Russian workers who take part in the process of transforming HEU into reactor fuel, who work on environmental cleanup and restoration and who enhance the safeguards for these materials. This underscores the importance of addressing issues concerning highly talented people who were previously involved in weapons programs. The talents of these dedicated scientists and engineers, representing a broad range of technical capabilities, can and should be utilized for non-weapons related work. Companies such as USEC stand ready to work with their Russian partners to facilitate and accelerate such endeavors. 2 When you consider the achievements of the Nunn-Lugar and Megatons to Megawatts programs and the human resources implications, it is clear that they have made a definite contribution to reducing the threat of nuclear weapons. But, what about the future? I believe that we can substantially increase the amount of nuclear warhead material that is eliminated by burning it as fuel in a new generation of commercial nuclear power stations. Regardless of where this bomb-grade material may come from, **its conversion into fuel will end its military value.** And last, but not least, the private sector can play a financial and facilitating role in making this happen. Today, the nuclear fuel market is in balance—supply is matching demand. A rapid increase in the number of nuclear power plants would increase the demand for nuclear fuel. While we would meet long-term demand primarily with expanded enrichment capacity, this new demand would also enable accommodation of additional fuel derived from nuclear warhead material. The good news is that we are at an intersection of mutual interests. It is increasingly evident that a global expansion of commercial nuclear power operations is being actively considered—especially in Russia, Asia and the United States. Several events are driving this trend. Events, such as increasing worldwide demand for electricity, power shortages, and global climate change, air pollution and growing dependency upon long, fragile lifelines of energy resources, are increasing the appeal of nuclear power. These factors present us with a unique opportunity. I believe there is a mutual interest among those who advocate the expansion of commercial nuclear power plants and those who seek to eliminate nuclear weapons materials. Advocates of nuclear nonproliferation can accelerate the increased elimination of nuclear bomb-grade materials and secure the dynamics of the marketplace to facilitate these activities Concerns about proliferation are often raised by those opposed to the further development of nuclear power. At the same time, it is widely recognized that there are numerous technical routes to produce nuclear warhead materials and that commercial nuclear power operations, with appropriate and rigorous fuel safeguards, is not the route of choice for those intent on securing weapons materials.

**That solves accidental Russian launch**

**Hecker 1** “Thoughts about an Integrated Strategy for Nuclear Cooperation with Russia”, The NonProliferation Review, Volume 8, Number 2, Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker is a Senior Fellow at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. He was Director of the laboratory from 1986 through 1997. Dr. Hecker has interacted closely with the Russian nuclear weapons complex since the exchange visit of Russian and U.S. nuclear weapons laboratory directors in February 1992.

Although the breakup of the Soviet Union has dramatically reduced the probability of a nuclear exchange, we must remain ever vigilant against the possibility of accidental or unauthorized launches. In the longer term, it will be important to develop a new strategy for strategic stability. The end of the Cold War and the U.S. move toward a national missile defense (NMD) clearly challenge the traditional strategies. A new strategy for strategic stability will evolve slowly and only after the role of traditional arms control, nuclear force structure balance, second-rank nuclear powers, and proliferation issues are reexamined.[14] Observations The cooperative and reciprocal measures taken to date by the United States and Russia to avoid accidental or unauthorized launches are not sufficient to guard against a potential nuclear catastrophe. The **deterioration in Russian military infrastructure and the abysmal economic conditions of its military servicemen have exacerbated the risk dramatically.**

**Global nuclear war**

**Forrow**, MD, **98**

(Lachlan, MD, et al, "Accidental Nuclear War – A Post-Cold War Assessment", New England Journal of Medicine)

Public health professionals now recognize that many, if not most, injuries and deaths from violence and accidents result from a predictable series of events that are, at least in principle, preventable.44,45 The direct toll that would result from an accidental nuclear attack of the type described above would dwarf all prior accidents in history. Furthermore, such an attack, even if accidental, might prompt a retaliatory response resulting in an all-out nuclear exchange. The World Health Organization has estimated that this would result in billions of direct and indirect casualties worldwide.4

**Nuclear power solves water wars**

**Beller 2004** - Dr., Department of Mechanical Engineering at UNLV, Chair of the Public Information Committee of the American Nuclear Society (Denis E., Journal of Land, Resources, & Environmental Law, "Atomic time machines: back to the nuclear future", 24 J. Land Resources & Envtl. L. 41, Lexis, WEA)

Our global neighbors need much more energy to achieve the standards of living of the developed world. One-third of the six billion people on Earth today lack access to electricity. n3 Another two billion use just 1000 kilowatt hours (kWh) per year, which is barely enough to keep a single 100-watt light bulb lit. n4 In addition, one billion people have no sanitary water, n5 which could [\*43] be provided easily and inexpensively if energy were available to operate desalination and/or purification plants. Energy is needed for development, prosperity, health, and international security. The alternative to development, which is easily sustained with ample energy, is suffering in the form of poverty, disease, and death. This suffering creates instability and the potential for widespread violence, such that national security requires developed nations to help increase energy production in their more populous developing counterparts.¶ The relationship between energy use and human well being is demonstrated by correlating the United Nations' Human Development Index (HDI) with the annual per capita use of electricity. The UN compiles the HDI for almost every nation annually. It is a composite of average education level, health and well being (average life expectancy), and per capita income or gross domestic product. One such correlation that was done a few years ago showed that electric consumption first increases human well being, then people who are well off increase their electric consumption. n6 Figure 1 illustrates this for almost every nation on Earth (the data includes more than 90 percent of the Earth's population). Note there is a threshold at about 4000 kWh per capita. Below this threshold, human development increases rapidly with increases in available electricity (there are, of course, exceptions to every rule). Above this threshold, use of electricity increases rapidly as people become more healthy, wealthy, and educated. A deeper investigation into the data underlying the HDI reveals the effects of what Dr. Eric Loewen, a delegate to the United Nations 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa, now calls "energy apartheid." n7 People in the Western world, who have and use large amounts of energy, have a life expectancy of about eighty years, while those on the lower left side of this graph, undeveloped nations where most people have no access to electricity, will die decades earlier. Thus, billions of our global neighbors without sufficient electricity die decades before they should. Those who live in poverty live in the most dangerous of conditions.¶ Without substantial increases in electricity generation, the proportion of the Earth's population without sufficient electricity will increase in the next fifty years as it grows by 50 percent to near 9 billion people. n8 Preventing global conflict will require even more addition of electricity. The product of increased population and increased per capita energy usage by people who today have access to nearly none is a great growth in global electricity usage. Estimates [\*44] for future increases in energy and electricity use, even with substantial efficiency improvements and conservation efforts, range between doubling and tripling in the next fifty years. n9 Even with conservation, "energy star" appliances and homes, mandated fuel economy, massive government purchases of "renewables," and energy saving and efficiency measures, our use of electrical energy has been growing faster than total energy usage; electricity use in the United States increased 57 percent between 1980 and 2000, while total energy use increased just 27 percent. n10

**Water wars go nuclear**

**Weiner in ’90** (Jonathan, Pulitzer Prize winning author, “The Next One Hundred Years”, p. 270)

If we do not destroy ourselves with the A-bomb and the H-bomb, then we may destroy ourselves with the C-bomb, the Change Bomb. And in a world as interlinked as ours, one explosion may lead to the other. Already in the Middle East, from North Africa to the Persian Gulf and from the Nile to the Euphrates, tensions over dwindling water supplies and rising populations are reaching what many experts describe as a flashpoint. A climate shift in that single battle-scarred nexus might trigger international tensions that will unleash some of the 60,000 nuclear warheads the world has stockpiled since Trinity.

### States 2AC

#### Can’t solve nuclear leadership – not perceived

Fertel, 05 - Senior Vice President And Chief Nuclear Officer Nuclear Energy Institute (Marvin, CQ Congressional Testimony, “NUCLEAR POWER'S PLACE IN A NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY,” 4/28, lexis) //DH

Industry and government will be prepared to meet the demand for new emission-free baseload nuclear plants in the 2010 to 2020 time frame only through a sustained focus on the necessary programs and policies between now and then. As it has in the past, strong Congressional oversight will be necessary to ensure effective and efficient implementation of the federal government's nuclear energy programs, and to maintain America's leadership in nuclear technology development and its influence over important diplomatic initiatives like nonproliferation. Such efforts have provided a dramatic contribution to global security, as evidenced by the U.S.-Russian nonproliferation agreement to recycle weapons-grade material from Russia for use in American reactors. Currently, more than 50 percent of U.S. nuclear power plant fuel depends on converted Russian warhead material. Nowhere is continued congressional oversight more important than with DOE's program to manage the used nuclear fuel from our nuclear power plants. Continued progress toward a federal used nuclear fuel repository is necessary to support nuclear energy's vital role in a comprehensive national energy policy and to support the remediation of DOE defense sites. Since enactment of the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, DOE's federal repository program has repeatedly overcome challenges, and challenges remain before the Yucca Mountain facility can begin operation. But as we address these issues, it is important to keep the overall progress of the program in context. There is international scientific consensus that a deep geologic repository is the best solution for long-term disposition of used military and commercial nuclear power plant fuel and high-level radioactive byproducts. The Bush administration and Congress, with bipartisan support, affirmed the suitability of Yucca Mountain for a repository in 2002. Over the past three years, the Energy Department and its contractors have made considerable progress providing yet greater confirmation that this is the correct course of action and that Yucca Mountain is an appropriate site for a national repository. --During the past year, federal courts have rejected significant legal challenges by the state of Nevada and others to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the 2002 Yucca Mountain site suitability determination. These challenges questioned the constitutionality of the Yucca Mountain Development Act and DOE's repository system, which incorporates both natural and engineered barriers to contain radioactive material safely. In the coming year, Congress will play an essential role in keeping this program on schedule, by taking the steps necessary to provide increased funding for the project in fiscal 2006 and in future years. Meeting DOE's schedule for initial repository operation requires certainty in funding for the program. This is particularly critical in view of projected annual expenditures that will exceed $1 billion beginning in fiscal 2007. Meeting these budget requirements calls for a change in how Congress provides funds to the project from monies collected for the Nuclear Waste Fund. The history of Yucca Mountain funding is evidence that the current funding approach must be modified. Consumer fees (including interest) committed to the Nuclear Waste Fund since its f6rmation in 1983 total more than $24 billion. Consumers are projected to pay between $750 million to $800 million to the fund each year, based on electricity generated at the nation's 103 reactors. This is more than $2 million per day. Although about $8 billion has been used for the program, the balance in the fund is nearly $17 billion. In each of the past several years, there has been a gap between the annual fees paid by consumers of electricity from nuclear power plants and disbursements from the fund for use by DOE at Yucca Mountain. Since the fund was first established, billions of dollars paid by consumers of electricity from nuclear power plants to the Nuclear Waste Fund-intended solely for the federal government's used fuel program-in effect have been used to decrease budget deficits or increase surpluses. The industry believes that Congress should change the funding mechanism for Yucca Mountain so that payments to the Nuclear Waste Fund can be used only for the project and be excluded from traditional congressional budget caps. Although the program should remain subject to congressional oversight, Yucca Mountain appropriations should not compete each year for funding with unrelated programs when Congress directed a dedicated funding stream for the project.¶ The industry also believes that it is appropriate and necessary to consider an alternative perspective on the Yucca Mountain project. This alternative would include an extended period for monitoring operation of the repository for up to 300 years after spent fuel is first placed underground. The industry believes that this approach would provide ongoing assurance and greater confidence that the repository is performing as designed, that public safety is assured, and that the environment is protected. It would also permit DOE to apply evolving innovative technologies at the repository. Through this approach, a scientific monitoring program would identify additional scientific information that can be used in repository performance models. The project then could update the models, and make modifications in design and operations as appropriate.¶ Congressional committees like this one can help ensure that DOE does not lose sight of its responsibility for used nuclear fuel management and disposal, as stated by Congress in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. The industry fully supports the fundamental need for a repository so that used nuclear fuel and the byproducts of the nation's nuclear weapons program are securely managed in an underground, specially designed facility. World-class science has demonstrated that Yucca Mountain is the best site for that facility. A public works project of this magnitude will inevitably face challenges. Yet, none is insurmountable. DOE and its contractors have made significant progress on the project and will continue to do so as the project enters the licensing phase. Congressional oversight also can play a key role in maintaining and encouraging the stability of the NRC's regulatory process. Such stability is essential for our 103 operating nuclear plants and equally critical in licensing new nuclear power plants. Congress played a key role several years ago in encouraging the NRC to move toward a new oversight process for the nation's nuclear plants, based on quantitative performance indicators and safety significance. Today's reactor oversight process is designed to focus industry and NRC resources on equipment, components and operational issues that have the greatest importance to, and impact on, safety. The NRC and the industry have worked hard to identify and implement realistic security requirements at nuclear power plants. In the three-and-a-half years since 9/11, the NRC has issued a series of requirements to increase security and enhance training for security programs. The industry complied-fully and rapidly.¶ In the days and months following Sept. 11, quick action was required. Orders that implemented needed changes quickly were necessary. Now, we should return to the orderly process of regulating through regulations.¶ The industry has spent more than $1 billion enhancing security since September 2001. We've identified and fixed vulnerabilities. Today, the industry is at the practical limit of what private industry can do to secure our facilities against the terrorist threat. NRC Chairman Nils Diaz and other commissioners have said that the industry has achieved just about everything that can be reasonably achieved by a civilian force.¶ The industry now needs a transition period to stabilize the new security requirements. We need time to incorporate these dramatic changes into our operations and emergency planning programs and to train our employees to the high standards of our industry-and to the appropriately high expectations of the NRC.¶ Both industry and the NRC need congressional oversight to support and encourage this kind of stability.¶ CONCLUSION¶ Electricity generated by America's nuclear power plants over the past half-century has played a key part in our nation's growth and prosperity. Nuclear power produces over 20 percent of the electricity used in the United States today without producing air pollution. As our energy demands continue to grow in years to come, nuclear power should play an even greater role in meeting our energy and environmental needs.¶ The nuclear energy industry is operating its reactors safely and efficiently. The industry is striving to produce more electricity from existing plants. The industry is also developing more efficient, next-generation reactors and exploring ways to build them more cost-effectively.¶ The public sector, including the oversight committees of the U.S. Congress, can help maintain the conditions that ensure Americans will continue to reap the benefits of our operating plants, and create the conditions that will spur investment in America's energy infrastructure, including new nuclear power plants.¶ One important step is passage of comprehensive energy legislation that recognizes nuclear energy's contributions to meeting our growing energy demands, ensuring our nation's energy security and protecting our environment. Equally important, however, is the need to ensure effective and efficient implementation of existing laws, like the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and to provide federal agencies with the resources and oversight necessary to discharge their statutory responsibilities in the most efficient way possible. The commercial nuclear power sector was born in the United States, and nations around the world continue to look to this nation for leadership in this technology and in the issues associated with nuclear power. Our ability to influence critical international policies in areas like nuclear nonproliferation, for example, depends on our ability to maintain a leadership role in prudent deployment, use and regulation of nuclear energy technologies here at home, in the United States, and on our ability to manage the technological and policy challenges-like waste management-that arise with all advanced technologies.

#### Uncertainty means no nuke power

**Ragheb, 12** [March, RESTARTING THE STALLED USA NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE, Ph.D., Nuclear Engineering/Computer Sciences, Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison, 1978 M.Sc., Nuclear Engineering, Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison, 1974 M.Sc., Nuclear Engineering, Science Centre for Postgraduate Studies, Univ. of Alexandria, Undp-Unesco, 1973 B.Sc., Nuclear Engineering, Univ. of Alexandria, 1970 Associate Professor, 1986 - present Faculty Visitor, Interdisciplinary Research Center, National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA), Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1985 -1987 Assistant Professor, 1979-1986

<https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/mragheb/www/NPRE%20402%20ME%20405%20Nuclear%20Power%20Engineering/Restarting%20the%20USA%20Stalled%20Nuclear%20Renaissance.pdf>]

The status of the Nuclear Renaissance worldwide and in the USA is discussed. The March 11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami Station Blackout accident at the Fukushima Daiichi site caused an unprecedented cascading multiple failures event including fuel damage in both reactor cores and spent fuel storage pools, and ensuing hydrogen explosions and fires associated with fission products releases. This induced a global review of nuclear safety practices worldwide and ongoing projects. This is compounded by low natural gas prices. In addition, uncertainty about federal loan guarantees for the project suggests a delay and even a cancellation, plunging the nascent nuclear renaissance back into the dark ages. A glimmer of hope appeared in February 2012. For the first time since the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the USA Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) approved the construction of two new Toshiba-Westinghouse 1,000 MWe plants at accost of $14 billion which are scheduled to go online in 2016. The new reactors are part of an expansion of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant operated by the energy supplier Southern Company near the city of Augusta, Georgia. If the USA nuclear industry is to continue supplying 20 percent of its electrical energy supply, there is no way to avoid building new plants. The fact is that many of the 104 nuclear reactors currently in service in the USA are extremely old, and most of them have already been operating for over 30 years. To buy time, since 2000, the USNRC has extended the operational life span of 71 reactors to 60 years. The main concern are 23 aged BWRs, constructed by the General Electric (GE) Company which are of the same design as the Fukushima reactors.

**Doesn’t solve economy**

**ENR 9** [7/22/2009, <http://enr.construction.com/opinions/editorials/2009/0722-StifleTheEconomy.asp>, [[Engineering News-Record, Taxing the Wealthy Even More Will Stifle the Economy”] //khirn

As America digs itself deeper into a financial hole, Congress and states are using a venerable political ploy to justify even more spending: increasing taxes on the wealthy and big companies ostensibly to help those with less. That ploy may have worked in the early 1900s when big bosses often were so-called robber barons. Today, however, even people at the bottom of the economic ladder realize wealthy individuals help fuel the nation’s economic development in important ways. The U.S. is a democracy, but wealthy individuals faced with confiscatory taxes can easily vote with their feet by moving their operations and themselves to other states or countries. It is easier than most people think, as demonstrated by the recent trend of corporations moving headquarters to Switzerland to avoid multiple taxation on income. Many construction executives participating in ENR’s construction confidence survey complain about President Obama’s proposed plan to increase taxes on the wealthy and companies to pay for the economic stimulus, health-care reform and pet projects. Enough is enough, they say. “Obama wants to cut open the golden goose to see if there are any more eggs left,” one says. The federal debt now has ballooned past $11.6 trillion, and nations with dollar reserves and investments are nervous. In addition, the federal economic-stimulus program, company bailouts and other guarantees potentially could cost taxpayers up to $23.7 trillion, according to an estimate delivered to the House by the inspector general of the Troubled Asset Relief Program. That does not sit well with people who are used to balancing their books. They also are unhappy about the resurrection of the so-called death tax. Buried in President Obama’s federal budget is an item that keeps the federal estate tax at 2009 levels instead of letting the tax lapse in 2010, as called for in current legislation. This amounts to one of the largest tax hikes in history. Estates of people who already have paid taxes on their earnings can be taxed up to 45%. The fact that the tax applies only to a limited number of people because of exemptions does not help a family that is trying to preserve a construction firm, farm or other business. In the end, what does “wealthy” really mean? When income and other assets are taxed over and over by multiple jurisdictions, wealth evaporates quickly, as does the motivation to accumulate and invest it. When you have to give most of it to the government, it is easier to join the less fortunate. That does nothing for the economy.

### Elections 2AC

#### Romney’s impact on Russian relations is unclear

The Economist 9/1 (9/1/12, Romney Could Screw Up US Relations With Russia, <http://www.businessinsider.com/mitt-romneys-foreign-policy-chops-come-into-light-2012-9>, RBatra)

At the same time, the potential impact of a Romney presidency should not be exaggerated. Mr Romney is not an ideological politician, and he will have solid reasons to maintain a working relationship with Russia. These include reliance on Russian transit corridors to support US forces in Afghanistan to 2015 and beyond, Russia's veto in the UN Security Council, and its potential to act as interlocutor between the US and rogue states. Finally, there is a significant element of uncertainty that stems from the lack of clarity about what Mr Romney, who has often changed his position, actually stands for. In particular, the extent of the influence on him of several competing Republican foreign policy schools (neo-conservativism, populist isolationism, realism, liberal internationalism) is unclear.

#### Putin a/c

**Weiss 6-19** – Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Weiss Asset Management, a Boston-based investment firm,[[2]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrew_Weiss_%28economist%29#cite_note-time-1) and Professor Emeritus [Boston University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boston_University) (Andrew, 2012, “[Putin's Waiting Game](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/19/waiting_game)” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/19/waiting_game?page=full>) Jacome

The most important yet overlooked aspect of the current situation, however, may be the cynicism and casual indifference that Putin has displayed toward the U.S.-Russian relationship in the face of his much bigger problems at home. At the moment, Putin appears to be preoccupied by the political mess created by his decision to [switch jobs with Medvedev](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/09/world/europe/slight-hiccup-as-putin-and-medvedev-switch-jobs-in-russia.html) and the [badly flawed Duma elections](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16042797) last December. He also must contend with the ripple effects of the eurozone drama and global economic slowdown, which together have contributed to a [20 percent decline](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303734204577467893480636270.html?mod=ITP_moneyandinvesting_3) in global oil prices over the past two months alone.

Against this backdrop, the ups and downs of relations with Washington may be little more than a distraction from the more urgent challenge of restoring the aura of invulnerability and bezal'ternativnost' (the lack of any alternative) that bolstered Putin's authority during his first 12 years in power. Already, he seems to have fallen back on the tried-and-true formula of portraying himself as the protector of a Fortress Russia beset by imaginary foreign enemies and spies.  This gambit has long helped the Kremlin cultivate support from average citizens and build up the regime's legitimacy.

The chief beneficiaries of Putin's rule -- the increasingly affluent and middle-class residents of places like Moscow -- show no signs of muffling their anger about his return to the Kremlin despite an ongoing crackdown on political dissent. Still, Putin knows how to cater to the two-thirds of the Russian electorate that voted for him in March and reside primarily in Russia's smaller cities and countryside. He may find it hard to resist the temptation to play upon their worst fears and anti-Western stereotypes. **Sacrificing the past several years of dramatic improvement in the U.S.-Russian relationship may seem like a small price to pay if it breathes new life and legitimacy into his rule.**

**Relations are impossible and won’t result in cooperation**

**LaFranchi, 3/3/12** [Christian Science Monitor, “A cold-war chill US-Russia relations falter over Libya and Syria”, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2012/0303/A-cold-war-chill-US-Russia-relations-falter-over-Libya-and-Syria/%28page%29/2]

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton doffed her diplomatic gloves after Russia vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution on Syria. Calling the February veto "despicable," she laid at Moscow's feet the "murders" of Syrian "women, children, [and] brave young men."

Not to be outdone, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin railed against the United States for indulging its "bellicose itch" to get involved in other countries' internal affairs. And he vowed that Russia will thwart American designs in the Middle East.

Whatever happened to the "reset," President Obama's ballyhooed reorientation of US-Russia relations to a more cooperative path focused on common interests?

Russia would say Libya happened – the conflict where the West and the US in particular demonstrated a zeal for intervention that struck at Russia's sense of sovereignty and of what the UN should and shouldn't do. The US would say Syria happened – revealing Russia's revived obstructionist tendencies on the Security Council and demonstrating Russia's determination to protect an old ally at the expense of the Syrian people.

Both countries might say that what happened is this: The common interests that the "reset" was meant to emphasize – arms control, counterterrorism, the global economy – have taken a back seat to awakened geopolitical rivalries and **diverging** international **visions**.

Add to this the fact that Mr. Putin is expected to return to Russia's presidency in elections Sunday, bringing with him a blame-the-west perspective for explaining many of Russia's ills.

The result is that stormy days lie ahead for US-Russia relations, many say. Progress on issues like missile defense and NATO-Russia relations is likely to remain stalled – and could suffer serious setbacks if the Syria and Iran crises deteriorate further.

"I foresee a tough year for US-Russia relations," says Andrew Weiss, a former director for Russian affairs on the National Security Council under President Clinton who is now a Russia analyst at the RAND Corp. in Arlington, Va. With little prospect for advances, he adds, the Obama administration is likely to focus on preventing backsliding. "The emphasis will be on ensuring that these fast-moving conflicts don't put the remaining areas of cooperation at risk," he says.

Others say the current frictions demonstrate how relations, despite the efforts of three administrations, have never overcome cold-war mistrusts to progress to a deeper level.

"Under both Clinton and Bush, the US made it look like things were moving forward with Russia by focusing on things that were easier to do and that didn't require sacrifice from either side," says Paul Saunders, executive director of the Center for the National Interest in Washington.

Three years ago this month, President Obama said he **hoped to promote** more **cooperation** between the U.S. and Russia. It would be hard to see how that may happen as Vladimir Putin approaches power once again. Host Scott Simon speaks with the U.S. ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, about Sunday's elections in Russia.

#### Romney will win – independent voters will decide the outcome for him

**Ferrechio, 9/11**/12 – Chief Congressional Correspondent for the Washington Examiner (Susan, The Washington Examiner, “Polls show Romney soars with independent voters”, <http://washingtonexaminer.com/polls-show-romney-soars-with-independent-voters/article/2507679#.UFKaqo1mR9s>)

Recent polls show President Obama enjoying a bounce in the polls following last week's Democratic convention in Charlotte, N.C., but buried in those data is good news for Mitt Romney about voter enthusiasm and the preferences of independents, who could decide the election.¶ The CNN/ORC International poll of registered and likely voters released Tuesday shows likely voters favoring Obama by 52 percent to 46 percent over Romney -- evidence, pundits said, of a post-convention bump for the president.¶ But a figure buried in the report shows Romney leading Obama among likely independent voters, 54 percent to 40 percent.¶ Both Democrats and Republicans believe independents will be critical to deciding the outcome of the election, in part because they make up a growing part of the electorate and are considered up for grabs because they fluctuate in their political preferences from one election to the next.¶ "That's a significant lead," said pollster Ron Faucheux.¶ It was the independent vote that helped Obama win the 2008 election. He won 52 percent of independents, compared with 44 percent for McCain. Independents comprised about 33 percent of the overall vote in 2008.¶ "If Romney can beat Obama among independents this time, he can win the election."¶ A poll conducted two weeks ago by Democracy Corps showed Romney with a 15-point lead among independents, 53 percent to 38 percent.¶

#### Alt-causes – debates and labor statistics

**Lombardo, 9/12**/12 - Global CEO, StrategyOne (Steve, “Why This Election Comes Down to Two Days in October,” Huffington Post, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-lombardo/election-monitor-why-this_b_1877815.html>)

Several national polls released this week show that President Obama received a small but meaningful bounce after the conventions. The bounce -- in the 3-5 point range -- is within the median for convention bounces since 1964. The problem for Republicans is that Romney got no bounce from his convention. In fact, his vote share likely shrunk a point or two in the last two weeks. While the Republican convention may have strengthened Romney's position with the base, it did little to expand his coalition. The momentum from "You didn't build that" has been halted. ¶ However, we see nothing in the data yet to suggest this is anything but a dead heat. For all the hand wringing over the GOP convention and the Romney campaign they are in a dead heat with an incumbent President with 55 days to go. When you look at likely voters in key swing states, this thing is truly 50/50. ¶ Here is our take as of 12 a.m. EST: ¶ The murder of Ambassador Stevens and the unrest in Libya will thrust both candidates into the foreign policy fray. It will be very interesting to see how each handles the coming hours and days and how much the media -- and ultimately voters -- focuses on the issue.¶ Look for a higher level of advertising spend from the Romney campaign in key battleground states over the next two weeks. History has shown that the candidate who is clearly in the lead by mid to late September will likely be the winner in November. That doesn't mean things can't change in October -- they can. But sentiment will start to firm up in the next two weeks. The Romney campaign has a $60 million cash-on-hand advantage, and they should use it now. Team Obama defined Romney in the spring using their cash advantage; the Romney campaign should not wait until October. They need to change the dynamic before October 1.¶ The two biggest dates of the campaign are October 3rd and October 5th. The first debate will be held on Wednesday, October 3rd at the University of Denver at 9 p.m. EST. For three reasons this will be far and away the most important debate:¶ It is the first and therefore, unless there is a major blunder, is likely to be the one that sets the image of Romney in stone.¶ We really do not believe that the other two will matter if Romney has a poor debate performance here. Romney has to win this debate pure and simple.¶ This one is purely on domestic policy, i.e. the economy. If Romney can't win this one, he is unlikely to win the other two, barring a miscue by the President.¶ On October 5th at 8:30 a.m. EST the Bureau of Labor Statistics will release the September unemployment numbers. This will be the most impactful announcement of the campaign. If the unemployment rate goes up it could be devastating for the president's reelection chances. Similarly, if it goes down -- especially if it goes below 8 percent -- it may pretty much secure an Obama victory in November.

#### Gridlock inevitable – means no impact

**Curry, 9/11**/12 - NBC News national affairs writer (Tom, NBC Politics, “Romney election could create new scenario for EPA and coal,” <http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/11/13807749-romney-election-could-create-new-scenario-for-epa-and-coal?lite>)

Whether Mitt Romney or Barack Obama wins the presidential election, a congressional impasse in 2013 seems likely. That’s because under most conceivable election scenarios – with Romney or Obama in the White House, and with either Democrats maintaining their Senate majority, or the Republicans taking it – the minority party could use the filibuster threat to block proposals it opposed.

#### Nuclear power doesn’t swing the election

**Wood, 9-13-12**

[Elisa, AOL, “What Obama and Romney Don't Say About Energy,” http://energy.aol.com/2012/09/13/what-obama-and-romney-dont-say-about-energy/]

Fossil fuels and renewable energy have become touchy topics in this election, with challenger Mitt Romney painting President Barack Obama as too hard on the first and too fanciful about the second – and Obama saying Romney is out of touch with energy's future. But two other significant resources, nuclear power and energy efficiency, are evoking scant debate. What gives? Nuclear energy supplies about 20 percent of US electricity, and just 18 months ago dominated the news because of Japan's Fukushima Daiichi disaster – yet neither candidate has said much about it so far on the campaign trail. Romney mentioned nuclear power only seven times in his recently released white paper, while he brought up oil 150 times. Even wind power did better with 10 mentions. He pushes for less regulatory obstruction of new nuclear plants, but says the same about other forms of energy. Obama's campaign website highlights the grants made by his administration to 70 universities for research into nuclear reactor design and safety. But while it is easy to find his ideas on wind, solar, coal, natural gas and oil, it takes a few more clicks to get to nuclear energy. The Nuclear Energy Institute declined to discuss the candidates' positions pre-election. However, NEI's summer newsletter said that both "Obama and Romney support the use of nuclear energy and the development of new reactors."

#### Plan popular with public

Bowman, 4-18-12

[Karlyn, American Enterprise Institute, “Polls on the environment, energy, global warming and nuclear power,” http://www.aei.org/papers/politics-and-public-opinion/polls/polls-on-the-environment-energy-global-warming-and-nuclear-power-april-2012/]

\* President Obama is getting low marks on his handling of gas prices. In a February 2012 AP/GfK-Roper poll, 39 percent approved of the job he is doing in this area. Significant majorities say rising gas prices have caused difficulties in their households. \* The majority of Americans still think nuclear power is safe. In a March 2012 Gallup poll, 57 percent favored using nuclear energy as one way to provide electricity for the United States. But people still wouldn’t want to build a nuclear plant in their backyard. Only 35 percent told CBS pollsters in March 2011 that they would approve of a nuclear power plant in their community, and 62 percent disapproved. \* Americans like an “all-of-the-above” energy strategy that includes more energy production, developing alternative energy sources, more conservation and nuclear power.

#### Plan creates jobs in swing states like Ohio – popular

Korte, 4-27-12

[Gregory, USA Today, “Politics stands in the way of nuclear plant's future,” http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/story/2012-04-13/usec-centrifuges-loan-guarantees/54560118/1]

The stakes are high: It's an election year, and Ohio is a swing state. USEC estimates the project at its peak will generate 3,158 jobs in Ohio, and 4,284 elsewhere. Pike County, home to the centrifuges, has a 13% unemployment rate — the highest in Ohio. The median household income is about $40,000. The average job at USEC pays $77,316. Centrifuge parts are stacked up in Piketon. "It's as shovel-ready as they come," says spokeswoman Angela Duduit. Indeed, the project has enjoyed bipartisan support. A USA TODAY review of DOE records shows that no fewer than 46 members of Congress — 32 Republicans and 14 Democrats — have pressured the Obama administration to approve the loan guarantee for USEC. "Quick action is paramount," said one bipartisan letter. "It is imperative that this application move forward now," said another. The congressional support comes from states such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Kentucky, West Virginia, Missouri, Alabama, Indiana, Maryland, North Carolina and South Carolina— an almost exact overlay of the states that would benefit from the 7,442 jobs the company says would be created.

**Ohio key**

**Sowinski 12** [Greg Sowinski, Lima News, “Senator tells Husky workers he’s got their backs”, Aug 15, 2012]

Brown said Ohio is key for President Barack Obama’s re-election.¶ “Ohio is still the most important state in this election,” he said.¶ But the biggest issue is the economy, he said.¶ “The economy always is,” he said. “We’re going in the right direction but we need to do better.”¶ Brown said the state has reduced unemployment from 10.5 percent to less than 7.5 percent under Obama, and the country has added 500,000 manufacturing jobs after losing 5 million of those jobs.

## 1AR

### States

#### Continued funding and support is key

**NEI, ‘8**

[“Building Confidence in Licensing New U.S. Nuclear Plants,” Jan/Feb,

<http://nei.org/resourcesandstats/publicationsandmedia/newslettersandreports/nuclearpolicyoutlook/>]  
Addressing Investors’ Concerns Maintaining investor confidence in a new-plant project that will span many years is another concern. Companies have responded to this by allocating funds and other resources to projects on a step-by-step basis. Duke Energy, for example, has filed applications in North Carolina and South Carolina for approval to incur project costs through 2009. Still, constraints on supply have prompted some companies to order major components now regardless of their future decisions. One of the difficulties that companies face in financing major nuclear plant projects is this: The cost of the projects is large relative to the market capitalization of the companies planning to build them. The financial community understands that challenge and is supportive of the way companies are structuring their investment. “Companies have made prudent decisions about how to stage their investments in ways that are appropriate to the risk they are assuming,” said Jeffrey Holzschuh, vice chairman at Morgan Stanley. The federal loan guarantee program, which provides government backing for the financing of clean-energy projects, including new nuclear, is critical for new projects. The loan guarantee program was authorized in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The legislation also included a form of insurance that will compensate companies if projects are delayed by the licensing process or litigation. In reality, the number of years before an investment in a new nuclear facility will show returns is one of the major concerns for investors. “The biggest risk in licensing is time,” Holzschuh said. The industry is working to reduce the length of time between the decision to pursue licensing a new plant and when operations begin from 10 years to seven years, according to NEI’s Heymer. Finding efficiencies and addressing shortcomings in the licensing process is one way to shrink the time required. Aggressive project management—pre-ordering components, increasing staff and detailed planning—is another way. But the key, say some industry executives, is that the earlier you begin work on a project, the sooner you see results. “Given the time required to build a new plant and complete it by 2014, we were prompt in beginning to address these challenges in 2004,” said Marilyn Kray, president of NuStart Energy Development, which, in partnership with the Tennessee Valley Authority, submitted a license application in October for a new reactor at TVA’s Bellefonte site in Alabama. “Now we have to address work force issues to ensure we have the trained staff to build and operate the new plants,” Kray said. “We also need to ensure that we will have the components and commodities necessary to build new reactors.” More than any other factor, say industry leaders, it is important that companies cooperate to increase stakeholders’ confidence in the new-plant licensing process. The NRC also must look for ways to streamline the licensing process without reducing its effectiveness. Companies need to share their experience with others that are using the same reactor design. Cooperation also is necessary in financing new plants. Ultimately, this cooperation will minimize the challenges that individual projects encounter as they become part of the expansion of the U.S. nuclear power sector.

#### States can’t provide that – they’re broke

The Hill 6/12 (“Report: Medicaid costs squeezing state budgets” June 12th, 2012, http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/medicaid/232283-report-medicaid-costs-squeezing-state-budgets%20-)

The poor economy and rising healthcare costs are driving up states' expenditures on Medicaid, according to a new report from the bipartisan National Governors Association (NGA).¶ The analysis comes as the Supreme Court prepares to rule on the 2010 healthcare reform law, which included a massive Medicaid expansion, and as cash-strapped states make cuts to the program. ¶ In its report, the NGA found that Medicaid accounted for the largest share of state spending in 2011 — 24 percent overall — and that this figure represented a steep rise that continued this year, even as federal Medicaid spending declined. ¶ Medicaid uses state and federal dollars to provide healthcare for low-income patients, and is administered by the states. ¶ State spending on the program increased 20 percent in FY2012 after rising 23 percent in FY2011, the NGA report stated. ¶ Authors attributed the sharp increases to declining incomes and job losses, leading to the loss of employer-based healthcare coverage. These developments came as federal aid to Medicaid under the stimulus bill expired, the report stated. ¶ In response to the squeeze, states' tactics for reducing Medicaid expenditures have included "reducing provider payments, cutting prescription drug benefits, limiting benefits, reforming delivery systems, expanding managed care and enhancing program integrity efforts," according to the NGA's executive director, Dan Crippen. ¶ The report estimated that by 2013, Medicaid enrollment will have risen 12.5 percent over three years, and that the recession's original surge — a 7.2-percent increase in enrollment between 2009 and 2010 — approached the peak enrollment increase during the last economic downturn in 2002 (9.5 percent). ¶ Crippen warned in a statement that states alone cannot control rising Medicaid costs.¶ "With the growth of Medicaid expenditures, spending priorities will again face competition for state budget dollars this fiscal year," he said. ¶ "States have undertaken numerous actions to contain Medicaid costs. ... These efforts alone, however, cannot stop the growth of Medicaid." ¶ The National Association of State Budget Officers, which co-authored the report, cautioned that states are seeing low budget growth as Medicaid expenditures rise. ¶ "Despite some improvement in state budgets since the depths of the recession, state budget growth is still significantly below average — growing at less than half the average growth of the past few decades,” said Scott Pattison, the group's executive director. ¶

#### Uncertainty destroys investment

**Whitefield, 11** [5/4/11, STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ED WHITFIELD CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND POWER, “The Role of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in America’s Energy Future, http://republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/Media/file/Hearings/Energy/050411/Whitfield.pdf

While the NRC may not be the direct cause of this uncertainty – the Obama Administration’s policy is - the NRC’s actions will contribute to the uncertainty one way or another. Beyond open adjudicatory issues, the NRC has recently taken administrative action to close down its review of Yucca Mountain, which will deprive the public of the first independent government assessment of the merits of Yucca Mountain’s construction. That doesn’t bode well for a nuclear renaissance. On the front end of nuclear power development, I’m very interested to hear about whether the NRC can develop and provide more regulatory certainty in its licensing and re-licensing programs. As in other energy sectors, regulatory certainty, such as keeping to decision schedules, is essential for ensuring the investments necessary to develop nuclear energy. Additionally, I think it is worth reviewing the Commission’s organizational structure, and whether an agency rightly focused on safety is suitably structured to also facilitate the advancement of new nuclear generation. And connected with regulatory certainty, are clear and well developed safety engineering evaluations. As mentioned, the safety record of NRC is unparalleled. But recent events in Japan have raised questions in the public’s mind about how well the NRC does its job. We need to be confident the NRC is up to the task. I believe the agency is, but scrutiny is helpful to maintain the public trust. We do not want to overreact to events based on poor and faulty information or other political agendas. Nuclear power is critical to this nation. We should recognize its importance for a growing economy and not lose sight of the tremendous value a reliable, affordable power supply will mean for the future health and wealth of the United States.

### Accidents

#### Fukushima proves one meltdown won’t prevent nuclear expansion.

Silverstein, 5-7-12

[Ken, Forbes, “Nuclear Energy Won't Die,” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2012/05/07/nuclear-energy-wont-die/>]

Some thought that nuclear energy may get buried after the Japanese Fukushima deluge. But the rumblings in this country are suggesting that it won’t die.¶ Several issues are creeping back into the American consciousness at once: The revival of Yucca Mountain, the safety measures enacted and the possibilities of surviving a nuclear accident here and finally, the licensing of two new nuclear sites after 33 years. The message that is radiating from those seemingly disparate events is that the nuclear resurgence is gathering more steam.¶ “The United States is building new nuclear energy facilities under an improved licensing process that exhaustively addresses safety considerations,” says Marvin Fertel, chief executive officer of the [Nuclear](http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/newsreleases/nrc-approval-of-plant-vogtles-construction-operating-license-opens-new-nuclear-energy-era/) [Energy](http://www.forbes.com/energy/) Institute. “It also assures that the lessons learned from the industry’s licensing and construction experience are properly applied to future projects.”¶ The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) granted two separate licenses to build nuclear reactors this year: One went to Southern Company and the other to [Scana](http://www.forbes.com/companies/scana/) Corp. so that both companies could build two reactors on existing sites. Now, if those utilities can stay on time and on budget, the consensus among energy insiders here is that it would lead to more such construction.¶ But according to Fertel, the nuclear revolution — to this point — has been a quiet one: U.S. electricity demand has risen more than 80 percent since the NRC last approved a construction permit in 1979. Unbeknownst to most people is that at least half of that demand has been met by nuclear facilities that have increased their rate of production by 40 percent during much of that time.¶ Still, several lingering questions remain. And the one that is now resurfacing is the resurrection of the once-pronounced-dead [Yucca Mountain](http://energybiz.com/article/12/05/yucca-mountain-may-get-second-life), which was to be the central repository where all civilian and military nuclear waste would be buried. While Congress had authorized the location — and allocated billions to study its possibilities — the Obama administration killed it.¶ But now the matter is getting its day in court. Advocates of the location are saying that U.S. officials have a legal obligation to create the burial site whereas the opponents are saying that there were too many pitfalls associated with the location. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of [Columbia](http://www.forbes.com/places/sc/columbia/) could decide in a few months whether to force the NRC to re-open a licensing case.¶ Refresher: Congress voted to approve in 1987 the repository that is about 90 miles from [Las Vegas](http://www.forbes.com/places/nv/las-vegas/). But then-candidate [Barack Obama](http://www.forbes.com/profile/barack-obama/) vowed to eschew the location, in a move that many believe was meant to placate the democratic Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid of Nevada.¶ Reid, meantime, has been able to withhold the necessary funds to move forward. And in a separate move, the NRC Chair Gregory Jaczko, who once served as a senior staffer to Reid, nullified any further consideration as a result. Then the U.S. Department of Energy withdrew its application. Now, the utilities that have poured in $29 billion for the permanent storage site are suing to get the project restarted, saying that they can prove it is scientifically and technically viable.¶ “The closeout of the Yucca Mountain license review has been a complicated issue,” says [Chairman Jaczko](http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2011/11-099.pdf), with dedicated and experienced people holding different viewpoints.” He is insisting his move to pull out was not political — something for which the NRC’s own inspector general is skeptical.¶ page 2¶ Page 2 of 2¶ Another imminent issue that nuclear regulators must tackle is the safety of the domestic reactors here. To that end, the NRC has released its [State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequences Analysis](http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/research/soar/soarca-related-info.html), which looks at two plants owned by Exelon Corp. and Dominion Resources that it says are representative of U.S. designs. The analysis concludes that even if a huge disaster hit this country, the risks to the general public would be minimal.¶ That’s because [plants here are “redundant,”](http://energybiz.com/article/12/02/nuclear-can-take-toughest-blows-regulators-say) which means that they have back-up power systems to keep radiated fuel rods cool. That prevents a meltdown and the escape of radiation. Meantime, the NRC is requiring nuclear operators to re-evaluate their risks under new scenarios using current seismic and flooding data, all of which were tested during an earthquake that hit the east coast last fall.¶ Concerns over radiation leaks nonetheless are persisting. The [San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station](http://www.energybiz.com/article/12/04/californias-nuclear-freeze-may-lead-brownouts-during-summer-heat) in Southern California has been shut down since early this year because of some deteriorating tubes. But Edison International says that it expects the units there to start up again in June or July when demand for power is highest, although this would require federal approval and the NRC just said that there are no time pressures.¶ “Successful implementation of existing mitigation measures can prevent reactor core damage or delay or reduce offsite releases of radioactive material,” the NRC says of this country’s nuclear energy fleet. “As a result, the calculated risks of public health consequences from severe accidents are very small.”¶ The stars have not exactly aligned for a nuclear energy resurgence. But they have not fallen out of place either. The demand for carbon free power is one reason. And so is a powerful lobby, which is keeping nuclear power off the obituaries and in the headlines.

### Politics

**Bostrom changed his mind**

**Bostrom, 07** [Future of Humanity Institute, Faculty of Philosophy & James Martin 21st Century School, Oxford University, 2009 Gannon Award Recipient, The Future of Humanity, 2007, [www.nickbostrom.com/papers/future.pdf](http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/future.pdf)]

Extinction risks constitute an especially severe subset of what could go badly wrong for humanity. There are many possible global catastrophes that would cause immense worldwide damage, maybe even the collapse of modern civilization, yet fall short of terminating the human species. An all-out nuclear war between Russia and the United States might be an example of a global catastrophe that would be unlikely to result in extinction. A terrible pandemic with high virulence and 100% mortality rate among infected individuals might be another example: if some groups of humans could successfully quarantine themselves before being exposed, human extinction could be avoided even if, say, 95% or more of the world’s population succumbed. What distinguishes extinction and other existential catastrophes is that a comeback is impossible. A non-existential disaster causing the breakdown of global civilization is, from the perspective of humanity as a whole, a potentially recoverable setback: a giant massacre for man, a small misstep for mankind.

**Relations are impossible and won’t result in cooperation**

**LaFranchi, 3/3/12** [Christian Science Monitor, “A cold-war chill US-Russia relations falter over Libya and Syria”, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2012/0303/A-cold-war-chill-US-Russia-relations-falter-over-Libya-and-Syria/%28page%29/2]

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton doffed her diplomatic gloves after Russia vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution on Syria. Calling the February veto "despicable," she laid at Moscow's feet the "murders" of Syrian "women, children, [and] brave young men."

Not to be outdone, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin railed against the United States for indulging its "bellicose itch" to get involved in other countries' internal affairs. And he vowed that Russia will thwart American designs in the Middle East.

Whatever happened to the "reset," President Obama's ballyhooed reorientation of US-Russia relations to a more cooperative path focused on common interests?

Russia would say Libya happened – the conflict where the West and the US in particular demonstrated a zeal for intervention that struck at Russia's sense of sovereignty and of what the UN should and shouldn't do. The US would say Syria happened – revealing Russia's revived obstructionist tendencies on the Security Council and demonstrating Russia's determination to protect an old ally at the expense of the Syrian people.

Both countries might say that what happened is this: The common interests that the "reset" was meant to emphasize – arms control, counterterrorism, the global economy – have taken a back seat to awakened geopolitical rivalries and **diverging** international **visions**.

Add to this the fact that Mr. Putin is expected to return to Russia's presidency in elections Sunday, bringing with him a blame-the-west perspective for explaining many of Russia's ills.

The result is that stormy days lie ahead for US-Russia relations, many say. Progress on issues like missile defense and NATO-Russia relations is likely to remain stalled – and could suffer serious setbacks if the Syria and Iran crises deteriorate further.

"I foresee a tough year for US-Russia relations," says Andrew Weiss, a former director for Russian affairs on the National Security Council under President Clinton who is now a Russia analyst at the RAND Corp. in Arlington, Va. With little prospect for advances, he adds, the Obama administration is likely to focus on preventing backsliding. "The emphasis will be on ensuring that these fast-moving conflicts don't put the remaining areas of cooperation at risk," he says.

Others say the current frictions demonstrate how relations, despite the efforts of three administrations, have never overcome cold-war mistrusts to progress to a deeper level.

"Under both Clinton and Bush, the US made it look like things were moving forward with Russia by focusing on things that were easier to do and that didn't require sacrifice from either side," says Paul Saunders, executive director of the Center for the National Interest in Washington.

Three years ago this month, President Obama said he **hoped to promote** more **cooperation** between the U.S. and Russia. It would be hard to see how that may happen as Vladimir Putin approaches power once again. Host Scott Simon speaks with the U.S. ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, about Sunday's elections in Russia.

#### Never gonna give him up, never gonna let him down

Neil Munro 8-30-2011; Daily Caller “Obama still has green energy vote for 2012” <http://dailycaller.com/2011/08/30/obama-still-has-green-energy-vote-for-2012/>

Environmentalists are staging a two-week oil-pipeline protest outside the White House to boost their importance to President Barack Obama’s political calculations in the 2012 election season. But there’s little evidence so far that progressives’ disappointment with Obama’s environmental policies threatens to reduce their turnout on election day, or that it pressures White House officials to make additional concessions to environmentalists during a political season dominated by the public’s demand for additional jobs. Monday’s colorful, TV-ready protests against the Keystone XL pipeline from Canada’s oil fields to U.S consumers took place in Lafayette Park, in front of the White House. The day’s events included 100 peaceful arrests of environmentalists and celebrities, a multi-faith spiritual event in Lafayette Park, press club speeches by environmental leaders, and numerous suggestions that approval of the pipeline by Obama will cost his campaign votes, volunteers and donations. Hundreds of others have already been arrested, and numerous environmental groups have contributed to two weeks of protest. If Obama approves the pipeline, environmental activist Andrew Driscoll predicted he would not vote to re-elect him. “He hasn’t done anything to earn our vote yet,” said the Massachusetts activist. “The fate of humanity, the fate of the planet” will be determined by Obama’s pipeline decision, he said. “If he approves it, it will be a huge blow, not only for our future, but also for this administration,” said Elijah Zarlin, a campaign manager at CREDO Action, an Atlanta-based progressive group. The protesters “are the people who are maybe going to vote for Obama, and are the people Barack will lose” if he approves the pipeline, he added. However, the leadership of the green movement isn’t threatening to break with Obama over this one decision. (RELATED: Gore: Global warming skeptics are this generation’s racists)

# Round 8 v. West Georgia DF

## 2AC

### Coal

**Plan solves this**

Dean, 06 [Tim Dean is a science and technology journalist in Sydney, edite section of COSMOS, and a former editor of the computer magazine, PC Authority, “New age nuclear”, Issue 8 *Cosmos*, <http://www.cosmosmagazine.com/features/print/348/new-age-nuclear?page=0%2C3>]

BY THE END OF this century, the average surface temperature across the globe will have risen by at lst 1.4˚C, and perhaps as much as 5.8˚C, according to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. That may not sound like much, but small changes in the global average can mask more dramatic localised disruptions in climate. Some changes will be global: we can expect sea levels to rise by as much as 0.9 metres, effectively rendering a huge proportion of what is now fertile coastal land uninhabitable, flooding low-lying cities and wiping out a swathe of shallow islands worldwide. The principal culprit is carbon dioxide, a gas that even in quite small quantities can have a dramatic impact on climate, and has historically been present in the Earth's atmosphere at relatively low concentrations. That was until human activity, including burning fossil fuels, began raising background levels substantially. Yet while we're bracing ourselves to deal with climate change, we also face soaring demand for more energy - which means burning more fossil fuels and generating more greenhouse gases. That demand is forecast to boom this century. Energy consumption worldwide is rising fast, partly because we're using much more of it - for air conditioning and computers, for example. In Australia alone, energy consumption jumped by 46 per cent between the mid-1970s and the mid- 1990s where our population grew by just 30 per cent. And energy use is expected to increase another 14 per cent by the end of this decade, according to the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Then there's China, which, along with other fast-growing nations, is developing a rapacious appetite for power to feed its booming economy. And fossil fuels won't last forever. Current predictions are that we may reach the point of peak production for oil and natural gas within the next decade - after which production levels will continually decline worldwide. That's if we haven't hit the 'peak oil' mark already. That means prices will rise, as they have already started to do: cheap oil has become as much a part of history as bell-bottomed trousers and the Concorde. Even coal, currently the world's favourite source of electricity generation, is in limited supply. The U.S. Department of Energy suggests that at current levels of consumption, the world's coal reserves could last around 285 years. That sounds like breathing room: but it doesn't take into account increased usage resulting from the lack of other fossil fuels, or from an increase in population and energy consumption worldwide. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, as of 2003, coal provided about 40 per cent of the world's electricity - compared to about 20 per cent for natural gas, nuclear power and renewable sources respectively. In Australia, coal contributes even more: around 83 per cent of electricity. This is because coal is abundant and cheap, especially in Australia. And although a coal-fired power plant can cost as much as A$1 billion (US$744 million) to build, coal has a long history of use in Australia. Coal is also readily portable, much more so than natural gas, for example - which makes it an excellent export product for countries rich in coal, and an economical import for coal-barren lands. But the official figures on the cost of coal don't tell the whole story. Coal is a killer: a more profligate one than you would expect. And it maintains a lethal efficacy across its entire lifecycle. One of the main objections held against nuclear power is its potential to take lives in the event of a reactor meltdown, such as occurred at Chernobyl in 1986. While such threats are real for conventional reactors, the fact remains that nuclear power - over the 55 years since it first generated electricity in 1951 - has caused only a fraction of the deaths coal causes every week. Take coal mining, which kills more than 10,000 people a year. Admittedly, a startling proportion of these deaths occur in mines in China and the developing world, where safety conditions are reminiscent of the preunionised days of the early 20th century in the United States. But it still kills in wealthy countries; witness the death of 18 miners in West Virginia, USA, earlier this year. But coal deaths don't just come from mining; they come from burning it. The Earth Policy Institute in Washington DC - a nonprofit research group founded by influential environmental analyst Lester R. Brown - estimates that air pollution from coal-fired power plants causes 23,600 U.S. deaths per year. It's also responsible for 554,000 asthma attacks, 16,200 cases of chronic bronchitis, and 38,200 non-fatal heart attacks annually. The U.S. health bill from coal use could be up to US$160 billion annually, says the institute. Coal is also radioactive: most coal is laced with traces of a wide range of other elements, including radioactive isotopes such as uranium and thorium, and their decay products, radium and radon. Some of the lighter radioactive particles, such as radon gas, are shed into the atmosphere during combustion, but the majority remain in the waste product - coal ash. People can be exposed to its radiation when coal ash is stored or transported from the power plant or used in manufacture of concrete. And there are far less precautions taken to prevent radiation escaping from coal ash than from even low-level nuclear waste. In fact, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the U.S. estimates the amount of exposure to radiation from living near a coal-fired power plant could be several times higher than living a comparable distance from a nuclear reactor. Then there are the deaths that are likely to occur from falling crop yields, more intense flooding and the displacement of coastal communities which are all predicted to ensue from global warming and rising oceans. There's so much heat already trapped in the atmosphere from a century of greenhouse gases that some of these effects are likely to occur even if all coal-fired power plants were closed tomorrow. Whichever way you look at it, coal is not the smartest form of energy. THERE ARE MANY REASONS to move away from coal as our primary source of electricity generation, but it's not an easy task. The list of required attributes for an ideal power generation technology looks intimidating. First of all, it should offer abundant power. It also needs to be clean, safe and renewable as well as consistent. And ultimately, it needs to be economical. Solar power contains much promise as a clean and practically infinite renewable power source. But photovoltaics, the most common form of solar electricity generation, are still a very expensive form of electricity, and lack the consistency to be suitable as a primary source of power - to provide the 'baseload' that is, the kind of power you can rely on to be there to keep everyone's refrigerators humming all day and night. Wind has seen application in specialised wind farms, both onshore and offshore, especially in Europe where solar power is less efficient than in sunnier climes such as Australia's. Germany alone accounts for around 40 per cent of the total wind power generated worldwide. Wind is an effective and clean form of power, but it too has its drawbacks. First, it is uncommon for a wind generator to be operating at more than 35 per cent of capacity, and 25 per cent is more common. This means it's idle and not generating power for 65 to 75 per cent of the time. Wind power is relatively cheap, with a cost per kilowatt-hour similar to that of coal in some places, although the volume of wind power is limited and often the best locations for wind turbines are far from the populous areas where electricity is needed. Environmentally, wind power poses a minor threat to birdlife, as well as being considered an eyesore in some communities. While solar power is relatively expensive, and wind is limited in its implementation, both have a highly important role in renewable electricity generation. Unfortunately, even granting considerable advances in technology and efficiency of both technologies, neither has the potential to become a primary source of electricity because of their intermittent nature: neither could ever be relied upon to meet baseload supply. IN THE 1950s, nuclear power generation, or the so-called 'peaceful atom', promised to unshackle us from fossil fuels and provide our society with limitless clean power that was going to be "too cheap to meter". Like many utopian visions, the truth was considerably less appealing. While nuclear power has for the most part provided bountiful energy without significant environmental impact, what everyone remembers are the accidents: the Windscale fire at Sellafield in 1957, the meltdowns at Three Mile Island in 1979 and Chernobyl in 1986. At a time when the public psyche was reeling from the fear of global nuclear war, the threats from nuclear power plants were suddenly seen in a similar light. Another issue that caused growing public concern was the disposal of high-level nuclear waste. Some of the by-products of nuclear power include spent fuel rods: mostly byproducts of nuclear fission, including some highly radioactive actinides with half-lives of many thousands of years - which means they remain lethally toxic for millennia. They have to be housed in waste dumps isolated from all possible contact with the environment for up to 10,000 years. This means building a structure that will survive for twice as long as the Great Pyramid of Egypt has to date. Needless to say, the engineering difficulties involved in building facilities that can safely contain such waste for 100 centuries, are immense - as are the costs. Then there are nuclear weapons. Some waste can be reprocessed into weapons-grade plutonium. In particular, the processing of plutonium for re-use as fuel for reactors is difficult and, as such, much of the waste is left to build in weapons-grade stockpiles that could pose a serious security threat were some to fall into the wrong hands. All three of these issues result from the nuclear fuel cycle in conventional reactors. The typical nuclear fuel cycle kicks off with a quantity of refined uranium ore. This ore is primarily composed of uranium-238 (U-238), the most common, weakly radioactive isotope that has a very long half-life and is not fissile. This means U-238 doesn't easily undergo fission, the process in which the nucleus of the atom splits, releasing tremendous quantities of energy. Usually, a very small percentage of the ore will be U-235. Unlike U-238, U-235 is fissile, and makes up the primary fuel for most nuclear reactors. It is also, incidentally, the uranium isotope that can be used to make nuclear weapons. This is because when a U-235 atom splits, it releases a spread of high-energy neutrons. If one of these neutrons then collides with another U-235 atom, it can cause the atom to split, releasing more neutrons in the process. This runaway chain reaction is responsible for the fantastic explosive power of an atom bomb - and for the meltdowns at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island. However, there is too little U-235 in mined uranium ore to maintain enough fission for a nuclear reactor or a bomb. The ore needs to be 'enriched', boosting the proportion of U-235 in the ore. Nuclear reactors require around 3 per cent to 5 per cent of U-235, while nuclear weapons often require 85 per cent or more. One of the most popular methods of enriching uranium is a gas centrifuge, where the uranium in the ore is converted into uranium hexafluoride gas and rapidly spun, forcing the heavier U-238 gas to the extremities for separation. Once a sufficient proportion of U-235 is achieved, the ore can be made into fuel suitable for a reactor. Also, while U-235 is busily destroying itself in the reactor, the U-238 in the fuel is not sitting idly by. This is because U-238 is 'fertile', which means it can transmute into other, fissile elements in a process called 'breeding'. In this process, if an atom of U-238 absorbs a neutron, such as one thrown out by a nearby splitting U-235 atom, it can transmute into the short-lived U-239. This then rapidly decays into neptunium-239, which itself quickly decays into plutonium-239 (Pu-239). Pu-239 is another possible fuel for nuclear reactors because, like U-235, it is actively fissile and can maintain a chain reaction. The problem is that many reactors are not optimised for burning plutonium, and as a consequence large quantities of Pu-239 remain as a waste by-product in spent fuel rods. Pu-239 can be reprocessed from spent fuel rods and turned into a compound called MOX (Mixed Oxide) fuel. This can then be reused in some nuclear reactors in the place of conventional enriched uranium. However, it is Pu-239 that also represents the greatest weapons proliferation threat. So reprocessing plutonium becomes a very costly and a politically sensitive business. This means it is less likely to be used as a nuclear fuel for a civilian power plant and is less likely to be reprocessed. Nuclear physics is a complex and messy business, especially when dealing with large unstable elements such as uranium. When the U-235 in nuclear fuel burns down to around 0.3 per cent concentration, it's no longer of use in a reactor. At this point, the proportion of U-238, along with other fission by-products, including some very radioactive isotopes of americium, technetium and iodine, is too high. Many of these elements are called 'neutron poisons' because they absorb neutrons that would otherwise be happily colliding with other U-235 nuclei to spark off more fission. This spent fuel can be reprocessed - but this is a much more difficult job than basic enrichment because of the high number of fission by-products in the spent fuel. This means that a great deal of spent fuel - highly radioactive as it is - becomes waste that needs to be stored. For a very long time. THIS IS WHERE THORIUM steps in. Thorium itself is a metal in the actinide series, which is a run of 15 heavy radioactive elements that occupy their own period in the periodic table between actinium and lawrencium. Thorium sits on the periodic table two spots to the left (making it lighter) of the only other naturally occurring actinide, uranium (which is two spots to the left of synthetic plutonium). This means thorium and uranium share several characteristics. According to Reza Hashemi-Nezhad, a nuclear physicist at the University of Sydney who has been studying the thorium fuel cycle, the most important point is that they both can absorb neutrons and transmute into fissile elements. "From the neutron-absorption point of view, U-238 is very similar to Th-232", he said. It's these similarities that make thorium a potential alternative fuel for nuclear reactors. But it's the unique differences between thorium and uranium that make it a potentially superior fuel. First of all, unlike U-235 and Pu-239, thorium is not fissile, so no matter how much thorium you pack together, it will not start splitting atoms and blow up. This is because it cannot undergo nuclear fission by itself and it cannot sustain a nuclear chain reaction once one starts. It's a wannabe atom splitter incapable of taking the grand title. What makes thorium suitable as a nuclear fuel is that it is fertile, much like U-238. Natural thorium (Th-232) absorbs a neutron and quickly transmutes into unstable Th-233 and then into protactinium Pa-233, before quickly decaying into U-233, says Hashemi- Nezhad. The beauty of this complicated process is that the U-233 that's produced at the end of this breeding process is similar to U-235 and is fissile, making it suitable as a nuclear fuel. In this way, it talks like uranium and walks like uranium, but it ain't your common-or-garden variety uranium. And this is where it gets interesting: thorium has a very different fuel cycle to uranium. The most significant benefit of thorium's journey comes from the fact that it is a lighter element than uranium. While it's fertile, it doesn't produce as many heavy and as many highly radioactive by-products. The absence of U-238 in the process also means that no plutonium is bred in the reactor. As a result, the waste produced from burning thorium in a reactor is dramatically less radioactive than conventional nuclear waste. Where a uranium-fuelled reactor like many of those operating today might generate a tonne of high-level waste that stays toxic for tens of thousands of years, a reactor fuelled only by thorium will generate a fraction of this amount. And it would stay radioactive for only 500 years - after which it would be as manageable as coal ash. So not only would there be less waste, the waste generated would need to be locked up for only five per cent of the time compared to most nuclear waste. Not surprisingly, the technical challenges in storing a smaller amount for 500 years are much lower than engineering something to be solid, secure and discreet for 10,000 years. But wait, there's more: thorium has another remarkable property. Add plutonium to the mix - or any other radioactive actinide - and the thorium fuel process will actually incinerate these elements. That's right: it will chew up old nuclear waste as part of the power-generation process. It could not only generate power, but also act as a waste disposal plant for some of humanity's most heinous toxic waste. This is especially significant when it comes to plutonium, which has proven very hard to dispose of using conventional means. Current programs used for the disposal of plutonium reactor by-products and weapons-grade material using the MOX process are both expensive and complex. Furthermore, thorium proponents say that in conventional reactors, MOX fuel doesn't use plutonium as efficiently nor in the same volumes as thorium fuel would at lower cost. So thorium might just be able to kill two birds with one stone. Not only does a thorium-fuelled reactor produce significantly less high-level waste, but it can also dispose of the decommissioned nuclear weapons and highly radioactive waste from nuclear reactors using more conventional fuels. Oh yes, it can also generate electricity. SO WHY ISN'T EVERYONE using thorium reactors? The main drawback to thorium is that it's not vigorously fissile, and it needs a source of neutrons to kick off the reaction. Unlike enriched uranium, which can be left to its own devices to start producing power, thorium needs a bit of coaxing. Thorium also cannot maintain criticality on its own; that is, it can't sustain a nuclear reaction once it has been started. This means the U-233 produced at the end of the thorium fuel cycle doesn't pump out enough neutrons when it splits to keep the reaction self-sustaining: eventually the reaction fizzles out. It's why a reactor using thorium fuel is often called a 'sub-critical' reactor. The main stumbling block until now has been how to provide thorium fuel with enough neutrons to keep the reaction going, and do so in an efficient and economical way. In recent years two new technologies have been developed to do just this. One company that has already begun developing thorium-fuelled nuclear power is the aptly named Thorium Power, based just outside Washington DC. The way Thorium Power gets around the sub-criticality of thorium is to create mixed fuels using a combination of enriched uranium, plutonium and thorium. At the centre of the fuel rod is the 'seed' for the reaction, which contains plutonium. Wrapped around the core is the 'blanket', which is made from a mixture of uranium and thorium. The seed then provides the necessary neutrons to the blanket to kick-start the thorium fuel cycle. Meanwhile, the plutonium and uranium are also undergoing fission. The primary benefit of Thorium Power's system is that it can be used in existing nuclear plants with slight modification, such as Russian VVER-1000 reactors. Seth Grae, president and chief executive of Thorium Power, and his team are actively working with the Russians to develop a commercial product by the end of this decade. They already have thorium fuel running in the IR-8 research reactor at the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow. "In the first quarter of 2008, we expect to have lead test assemblies in a full-size commercial nuclear power plant in Russia," said Grae. He believes mixed thorium fuels can not only dispose of weapons-grade plutonium, but also be developed into a fuel for many conventional reactors to prevent production of any further plutonium as a by-product. Thorium Power believes there is a market for about four thorium-powered reactors each in Russia and United States just for plutonium disposal. It's also aiming for reactors dealing with commercial plutonium by-products in Europe, Japan, Russia and the USA. Grae is also enthusiastic about the benefits thorium fuels offer the environment. "All nuclear compares well to coal, in terms of no emissions into the atmosphere, including no carbon dioxide," he said. The environmental credentials of his company are also boosted by the presence of environmental lawyer and former member of the Centre for International Environmental Law, David MacGraw, he added. Grae muses that Thorium Power may be the "only nuclear company in the world with an environmentalist on the board". AN ALTERNATIVE DESIGN does away with the requirements for uranium or plutonium altogether, and relies on thorium as its primary fuel source. This design, which was originally dubbed an Energy Amplifier but has more recently been named an Accelerator Driven System (ADS), was proposed by Italian Nobel physics laureate Carlos Rubbia, a former director of one of the world's leading nuclear physics labs, CERN, the European Organisation for Nuclear Research. An ADS reactor is sub-critical, which means it needs help to get the thorium to react. To do this, a particle accelerator fires protons at a lead target. When struck by high-energy protons the lead, called a spallation target, releases neutrons that collide with nuclei in the thorium fuel, which begins the fuel cycle that ends in the fission of U-233. A nuclear reactor that requires a particle beam to keep it running might seem a bit strange. But on the contrary, this is one of the ADS design's most attractive features. If the particle beam is switched off, it is impossible for the fuel to enter a chain reaction and cause a meltdown. Instead, the rate of fission will immediately begin to slow and the fuel will eventually cool down and die out. According to Sydney's Hashemi-Nezhad, a sub-critical reactor such as this has clear safety benefits over uranium reactors. "It has zero chance of a Chernobyl-type accident," he said. Another major advantage of this design is that it only requires thorium as fuel. Hashemi-Nezhad also says thorium is a highly abundant resource "550 times more abundant in nature than uranium-235". It's also an element in which Australia is well blessed - we have the largest known thorium reserves in the world. Thorium mining is also less complex than uranium mining; and the ore doesn't even require enrichment before use in an ADS reactor. In a non-proliferation sense, there are also good reasons to prefer a sub-critical thorium reactor, as it is impossible to make weapons-grade materials from thorium. Even traces of unburnt U-233 in thorium reactor waste products are more difficult to convert into a usable nuclear weapon than U-235 or Pu-239. Imagine the West offering thorium-fuelled ADS reactors to countries such as Iran or North Korea: this would satisfy their demands for cheap nuclear power, but entirely avert the risk of the civil nuclear program leading to the development of nuclear weapons. The other key advantage of the ADS design is that it can be used to dispose of dangerous weapons-grade material and commercial reactor by-products in a similar way to mixed thorium fuel. While the ADS design has promise, it presents challenges. First, there's the design itself: while lab tests have proven the concept of using a particle beam to start the thorium fuel cycle, the physics of scaling it up to the size of a commercial reactor are unproven and could be more complex. Then there's the way the particle beam interacts with the spallation target and the fuel in order to operate efficiently. Also, while there are plenty of existing conventional nuclear reactors that can be fairly inexpensively converted to mixed thorium fuel, an ADS reactor would have to be designed, built and paid for from scratch. Retrofitting old reactors is not an option. Does this make a large-scale ADS reactor viable? CERN thinks so. It recently released a detailed report covering the financial viability of the ADS design for power generation, and found it to be at least three times cheaper than coal and 4.8 times cheaper than natural gas. Any nuclear reactor will have a high establishment cost, but CERN stresses that a long-life reactor will be highly competitive compared to fossil and renewable energy fuels. Hashemi-Nezhad has been working on the ADS reactor concept with colleagues in Germany, Russia, India and Eastern Europe, and is enthusiastic about it. "The future of nuclear reactors is in ADS because it operates in a sub-critical condition. Only under this condition it is possible to transmute waste isotopes while gaining energy and producing fuel at low cost. And it's safe," he said. He also thinks Australia could play a leading role in the development and promotion of thorium-fuelled reactors. "It is up to the Australian government to make an investment in this research. Huge thorium resources in Australia can provide green energy at low cost for several centuries." An enticing prospect, to say the least. CAN ATOMIC POWER be green? Physics suggests it can. And our consumption of energy is accelerating at the same time the climate is being affected by power generation. Unless we start seriously exploring energy alternatives to burning fossil fuels, erratic and destructive weather conditions could be with us for generations to come. Renewable energy such as wind and solar have bright futures, and will play a large role in any future energy program - but they can never hope to satisfy baseload requirements of a city. Hydroelectric power is an option - but most of the economical sites have been exploited, and biodiversity suffers when valleys are flooded to create dams. So, unless some groundbreaking discovery in nuclear fusion is made, making it not only possible but efficient and economical - then nuclear fission will remain on the agenda for promising baseload energy alternatives. Despite its drawbacks, conventional uranium-fuelled nuclear power is a realistic option that is likely to be continued worldwide. But it is thorium reactors that present a real quantum leap forward. Humble thorium could potentially alleviate three of the most pressing issues facing modern civilisation in the 21st century: the hunger for energy, the spectre of climate change and the need to eliminate nuclear weapons.

#### Wilderson

**Moten '7** Fred, Professor of English and African American Studies, Duke University "black optimism/black operation", Chicago -- working text for "Black Op" Source: [PMLA](http://www.mlajournals.org/loi/pmla), Volume 123, Number 5, October 2008, pp. 1743–1747 (5)

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&ved=0CDQQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Flucian.uchicago.edu%2Fblogs%2Fpoliticalfeeling%2Ffiles%2F2007%2F12%2Fmoten-black-optimism.doc&ei=1fE2UO65KuG8yAHpiIHYCg&usg=AFQjCNE8N66fQjQ7TP0PkJ0eYZDI6cNLvA&sig2=BUrcwC5Cfz5Ero2I14PBsg

My field is black studies. In that field, I’m trying to hoe the hard row of beautiful things. I try to study them and I also try to make them. Elizabeth Alexander says “look for color everywhere.” For me, **color + beauty = blackness which is not but nothing other than who, and deeper still, where I am.** **This shell, this inhabitation, this space, this garment—that I carry with me on the various stages of my flight from the conditions of its making—is a zone of chromatic saturation troubling any ascription of impoverishment** of any kind however much it is of, which is to say in emergence from, poverty (which is, in turn, to say in emergence from or as an aesthetics or a poetics of poverty). The highly cultivated nature of this situated volatility, this emergent poetics of the emergency, is the open secret that has been the preoccupation of black studies. But it must be said now—and I’ll do so by way of a cool kind of accident that has been afforded us by the danger and saving power that is power point—that **there is a strain of black studies that strains against black studies and its object, the critique of western civilization, precisely insofar as it disavows its aim (blackness or the thinking of blackness, which must be understood in what some not so strange combination of Nahum Chandler and Martin Heidegger might call its paraontological distinction from black people).** There was a moment in Rebecca’s presentation when the image of a black saxophonist (I think, but am not sure, that it was the great Chicago musician Fred Anderson) is given to us as a representative, or better yet a denizen (as opposed to citizen), of the “space of the imagination.” What’s cool here, and what is also precisely the kind of thing that makes practitioners of what might be called the new ~~black~~ studies really mad, is this racialization of the imagination which only comes fully into its own when it is seen in opposition, say, to that set of faces or folks who constituted what I know is just a part of Lauren’s tradition of Marxist historiographical critique. That racialization has a long history and begins to get codified in a certain Kantian discourse, one in which the imagination is understood to “produce nothing but nonsense,” a condition that requires that “its wings be severely clipped by the imagination.” What I’m interested in, but which I can only give a bare outline of, is a two-fold black operation—one in which Kant moves toward something like a thinking of the imagination as blackness that fully recognizes the irreducible desire for this formative and deformative, necessarily supplemental necessity; one in which black studies ends up being unable to avoid a certain sense of itself as a Kantian, which is to say anti-Kantian and ante-Kantian, endeavor. The new black studies, or to be more precise, the old-new black studies, since every iteration has had this ambivalence at its heart, can’t help but get pissed at the terrible irony of its irreducible Kantianness precisely because it works so justifiably hard at critiquing that racialization of the imagination and the racialized opposition of imagination (in its lawless, nonsense producing freedom) and critique that turns out to be the condition of possibility of the critical philosophical project. **There is a voraciously instrumental anti-essentialism, powered in an intense and terrible way by good intentions, that is the intellectual platform from which black studies’ disavowal of its object and aim is launched, even when that disavowal comes in something which also thinks itself to be moving in the direction of that object and aim. I’m trying to move by way of a kind of resistance to that anti-essentialism, one that requires a paleonymic relation to blackness; I’m trying to own a certain dispossession, the underprivilege of being-sentenced to this gift of constantly escaping** and to standing in for the fugitivity (to echo Natahaniel Mackey, Daphne Brooks and Michel Foucault) (of the imagination) that is an irreducible property of life, persisting in and against every disciplinary technique while constituting and instantiating not just the thought but that actuality of the outside that is what/where blackness is—as space or spacing of the imagination, as condition of possibility and constant troubling of critique. **It’s annoying to perform what you oppose, but I just want you to know that I ain’t mad. I loved these presentations, partly because I think they loved me or at least my space, but mostly because they were beautiful. I love Kant, too, by the way, though he doesn’t love me, because I think he’s beautiful too and, as you know, a thing of beauty is a joy forever**. But even though I’m not mad, I’m not disavowing that strain of black studies that strains against the weight or burden, the refrain, the strain of being-imaginative and not-being-critical that is called blackness and that black people have had to carry. Black Studies strains against a burden that, even when it is thought musically, is inseparable from constraint. But my optimism, **black optimism, is bound up with what it is to claim blackness and the appositional, runaway black operations that have been thrust upon it. The burden, the constraint, is the aim, the paradoxically aleatory goal that animates escape in and the possibility of escape from. Here is one such black op—a specific, a capella instantiation of strain, of resistance to constraint and instrumentalization, of the propelling and constraining force of the refrain, that will allow me to get to a little something concerning the temporal paradox of, and the irruption of ecstatic temporality in, optimism, which is to say black optimism, which is to say blackness**. I play this in appreciation for being in Chicago, which is everybody’s sweet home, everybody’s land of California, as Robert Johnson puts it. This is music from a Head Start program in Mississippi in the mid-sixties and as you all know Chicago is a city in Mississippi, Mississippi a (fugue) state of mind in Chicago. “Da Da Da Da,” The Child Development Group of Mississippi, Smithsonian Folkways Records, FW02690 1967 **The temporal paradox of optimism—that it is, on the one hand, necessarily futurial so that optimism is an attitude we take towards that which is to come; but that it is, on the other hand, in its proper Leibnizian formulation, an assertion not only of the necessity but also of the rightness and the essential timelessness of the always already existing, resonates in this recording. It is infused with that same impetus that drives a certain movement, in Monadology, from the immutability of monads to that enveloping of the moral world in the natural world that Leibniz calls, in Augustinian echo/revision, “the City of God.”** With respect to C. L. R. James and José (Muñoz), and a little respectful disrespect to Lee Edelman, these children are the voices of the future in the past, the voices of the future in our present. In this recording, **this remainder, their fugitivity, remains, for me, in the intensity of their refrain, of their straining against constraint, cause for the optimism they perform. That optimism always lives, which is to say escapes, in the assertion of a right to refuse**, which is, as Gayatri Spivak says, **the first right: an instantiation of a collective negative tendency to differ, to resist the regulative powers that resistance, that differing, call into being. To think resistance as originary is to say, in a sense, that we have what we need, that we can get there from here, that there’s nothing wrong with us or even, in this regard, with here, even as it requires us still to think about why it is that difference calls the same, that resistance calls regulative power, into existence, thereby securing the vast, empty brutality that characterizes here and now.** Nevertheless, however much I keep trouble in mind, and therefore, in the interest of making as much trouble as possible, I remain hopeful insofar as I will have been in this very collective negative tendency, this little school within and beneath school that we gather together to be. For a bunch of little whiles, this is our field (i.e., black studies), our commons or undercommons or underground or outskirts and it will remain so as long as it claims **its fugitive proximity to blackness**, which I will claim, with ridiculousness boldness, **is the condition of possibility of politics.**

Bâ'11  (teaches film at Portsmouth University (UK). He researches ‘race’, the ‘postcolonial’,  diaspora,  the  transnational  and  film  ‘genre’,  African  and  Caribbean cinemas  and film festivals)

(Saër Maty, The US Decentred, Cultural Studies Review, volume 17 number 2 September 2011)

A few pages into Red, White and Black, I feared that it would just be a matter of time before Wilderson’s black‐as‐social‐death idea and multiple attacks on issues and scholars he disagrees with run (him) into (theoretical) trouble. This happens in chapter two, ‘The Narcissistic Slave’, where he critiques black film theorists and books. For example, Wilderson declares that Gladstone Yearwood’s Black Film as Signifying Practice (2000) ‘betrays a kind of conceptual anxiety with respect to the historical object of study— ... it clings, anxiously, to the film‐as‐text‐as‐legitimate‐ object of Black cinema.’ (62) He then quotes from Yearwood’s book to highlight ‘just how vague the aesthetic foundation of Yearwood’s attempt to construct a canon can be’. (63) And yet Wilderson’s highlighting is problematic because it overlooks the ‘Diaspora’ or ‘African Diaspora’, a key component in Yearwood’s thesis that, crucially, neither navel‐gazes (that is, at the US or black America) nor pretends to properly engage with black film. Furthermore, Wilderson separates the different waves of black film theory and approaches them, only, in terms of how a most recent one might challenge its precedent. Again, his approach is problematic because it does not mention or emphasise the inter‐connectivity of/in black film theory. As a case in point, Wilderson does not link Tommy Lott’s mobilisation of Third Cinema for black film theory to Yearwood’s idea of African Diaspora. (64) Additionally, of course, Wilderson seems unaware that Third Cinema itself has been fundamentally questioned since Lott’s 1990s’ theory of black film was formulated. Yet another consequence of ignoring the African Diaspora is that it exposes Wilderson’s corpus of films as unable to carry the **weight of the transnational argument he attempts to advance**. Here, beyond the US‐centricity or ‘social and political specificity of [his] filmography’, (95) I am talking about Wilderson’s choice of films. For example, Antwone Fisher (dir. Denzel Washington, 2002) is attacked unfairly for failing to acknowledge ‘a grid of captivity across spatial dimensions of the Black “body”, the Black “home”, and the Black “community”’ (111) while films like Alan and Albert Hughes’s Menace II Society (1993), overlooked, do acknowledge the same grid and, additionally, problematise Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP) policing. The above examples expose the fact of Wilderson’s dubious and questionable conclusions on black film. Red, White and Black is particularly undermined by Wilderson’s propensity for exaggeration and blinkeredness. In chapter nine, ‘“Savage” Negrophobia’, **he writes: The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture became Black ‘style’ ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process** ... Anyone can say ‘nigger’ because anyone can be a ‘nigger’. (235)7 Similarly, in chapter ten, ‘A Crisis in the Commons’, Wilderson addresses the issue of ‘Black time’. Black is irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are ‘the ship hold of the Middle Passage’: ‘the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time’ but also ‘the “moment” of no time at all on the map of no place at all’. (279) Not only does **Pinho’s more mature analysis expose this point as preposterous** (see below), **I also wonder what Wilderson makes of the countless historians’ and sociologists’ works on slave ships, shipboard insurrections and/during the Middle Passage,8 or of groundbreaking jazz‐studies books on cross‐cultural dialogue** like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but once Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while dismissing jazz as ‘belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking’, (225) there seems to be no way back. **It is therefore hardly surprising that Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his sustained bashing of blacks and anti‐ Blackness**.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood film’s badly planned sequel: ‘How does one deconstruct life? Who would benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow.’ (340)

### 2AC Kritik

#### State-centric discourse doesn’t legitimize the state

**Frost 96** – IR Professor, King’s College (Mervyn, Ethics in International Relations, p 89-90, AG)

We are not condemned to critical impotence if we accept that the answer to the pressing normative issues in international relations must necessarily be found within the modern state domain of discourse. Neither does it commit us to the maintenance of the status quo. Accepting the centrality of this domain of discourse does not imply that there can be no non native political theory of world politics. That there has been little normative theorizing in international relations is true enough, but the reasons for this lack are not because working out the "implications of the theory of the state" is a trivial thing to do. The reasons for the lack of normative theorizing have already been covered in chapters 1 and 2. In this section I want to argue that seeking answers within the state centric domain of discourse to the list of pressing questions is a worth-while activity and that far from being a trivial residue of state theory it is of primary importance. What I take to be involved in this endeavour will be elucidated in some detail in the following two chapters. It involves constructing a coherent back- ground theory justifying the settled norms in the modern state domain of discourse. It is necessary to be quite clear about what is, and what is not involved in having recourse to the modern state domain of discourse. The language of this domain is the ordinary language of international relations. This language is a functioning whole - not a completely coherent one - which includes within it a mix of the following terms: state, sovereignty, self-determination, citizen, democracy, human rights (individual rights and group rights), and a set of terms connected to the notion of modernization. Asserting the primacy of the modern state domain of discourse for my purposes does not commit me to holding that people will always live in states as we know them or that life in states, as we know them, is the only proper life for human beings, or that the way states are organized at present is the best way of organizing them. I simply contend that any discussion about what ought to be done in world politics (be the proposed action a small one or a large one such as, for example, the wholesale reor- ganization of the global political system) must be conducted in the language of the modern state system. No other suitable language is available. Viewed in this way, it will become clear that the various objections against the modern state domain of discourse as the ground of normative theory in international relations fall away as misconceived. There are several such objections which must be confronted.

#### Reinforcing the state is strategic—your alternative will either get violently crushed or cause private tyranny

**Chomsky 98** – Prof Linguistics, MIT (Noam, The Common Good, p 84-5, AG)

So Argentina is "minimizing the state"—cutting down public expenditures, the way our government is doing, but much more extremely. Of course, when you minimize the state, you maximize something else—and it isn't popular control. What gets maximized is private power, domestic and foreign. I met with a very lively anarchist movement in Buenos Aires, and with other anarchist groups as far away as northeast Brazil, where nobody even knew they existed. We had a lot of discussions about these matters. They recognize that they have to try to use the state—even though they regard it as totally illegitimate. The reason is perfectly obvious: When you eliminate the one institutional structure in which people can participate to some extent—namely the government—you're simply handing over power to unaccountable private tyrannies that are much worse. So you have to make use of the state, all the time recognizing that you ultimately want to eliminate it. Some of the rural workers in Brazil have an interesting slogan. They say their immediate task is "expanding the floor of the cage." They understand that they're trapped inside a cage, but realize that protecting it when it's under attack from even worse predators on the outside, and extending the limits of what the cage will allow, are both essential preliminaries to dismantling it. If they attack the cage directly when they're so vulnerable, they'll get murdered. That's something anyone ought to be able to understand who can keep two ideas in their head at once, but some people here in the US tend to be so rigid and doctrinaire that they don't understand the point. But unless the left here is willing to tolerate that level of complexity, we're not going to be of any use to people who are suffering and need our help—or, for that matter, to ourselves.

#### We are not passive onlookers we can directly shape the world around us – that is the pivot point of politics

**Bleiker ‘3** Roland, Professor of International Relations, University of Queensland “Discourse and Human Agency” Contemporary Political Theory. Avenel: Mar 2003.Vol. 2, Iss. 1;  pg. 25

For de Certeau, **the search for human agency in everyday life starts by refuting the widespread assumption that common people are passive onlookers, guided by the disciplinary force of established rules.** For him, **they are not simply faceless consumers, but active producers, 'poets of their own affairs, pathfinders in jungles of functionalist rationality'** (de Certeau, 1990, 57). De Certeau does, however, remain anchored in the Nietzschean tradition. He makes use of Foucault's research by turning it upside down. He opposes Foucault's notion of a panoptical discourse, one that sees and controls everything. He considers unwisely spending one's entire energy analysing the multitude of minuscule techniques that discipline the subject and paralyse her/him in a web of microlevel power relations. Such an approach, de Certeau argues, unduly privileges the productive apparatus. Instead, he suggests that **if the grid of 'discipline' is becoming increasingly extensive, it is all the more important to search for reasons why a society is not totally subordinated to this form of suffocation and concealment. One must pay attention to popular procedures -- equally minuscule and quotidien -- that manipulate and evade the mechanism of discipline** (de Certeau, 1990, xxxix-xxxxl). **These various procedures are the practices by which people can reappropriate the space controlled through the existing discursive order.** The question now is how to locate, theorize and explore these 'networks of anti-discipline,' as de Certeau (1990, xi) calls them. De Certeau focuses primarily on the uses of space in Western consumer societies, on how **everyday practices like walking, shopping, dwelling or cooking become arts of manipulation that intervene with the prevalent discursive order.** Other authors locate daily practices of subversion in different spheres of life. James Scott has dealt in detail with everyday forms of peasant resistance. For him too, the big events are not peasant rebellions or revolutions. They occur rarely anyway. What deserves our attention, he argues, is the constant everyday struggle between the peasantry and those who seek to extract labour, taxes, rents and the like from them (Scott, 1985, xv-xvi). Through extensive, detailed and highly compelling research, Scott demonstrates the prevalence of low-profile forms of resistance. These are the critiques spoken behind the back of power. Although such utterances are very rarely expressed openly, they are nevertheless in the open. Indeed, this form of critique is almost omnipresent in folk culture, disguised in such practices as rumours, gossip, jokes, tales or songs. They are the vehicles of the powerless by which they 'insinuate a critique of power while hiding behind anonymity or behind innocuous understandings of their conduct' (Scott, 1990, xiii, 19, 136-182). We find a perfect example of such a practice in Margaret Atwood's fictional but all too real authoritarian word (1985, 234):"**There is something powerful in the whispering of obscenities about those in power. There's something delightful about it, something naughty, secretive, forbidden, thrilling. It's like a spell, of sorts. It deflates them, reduces them to the common denominator where they can be dealt with.** In the paint of the washroom cubicle someone unknown had scratched: Aunt Lydia sucks . It was like a flag waved from a hilltop in rebellion." The scene of an obscenity anonymously scribbled on a bathroom wall is enough to evoke the subversive aspects of this act. Anonymity provided the security necessary to scream out what cannot even be whispered in the face of the oppressors. There is a clear target, but no visible author, no agitator who could be prosecuted. The audience is potentially limitless. Scott insists that such a politics of hidden dissent, of disguise and anonymity, is neither empty posturing nor a substitute for real resistance. It is resistance of the most effective kind, for **these subversive gestures eventually insinuate themselves, in disguised form, into the public discourse. They lead to a slow transformation of values, they nurture and give meaning to subsequent, more overt forms of resistance or rebellion.** They may bring upon an explosive political situation during which the cordon sanitare between the hidden and public transcripts is torn apart (Scott, 1990, 19-20, 183-227). The range of possible everyday forms of resistance is, of course, endless. **One could find them in all epoques, places and aspects of life.** Michael Bakhtin has shown how the 16th century French writer Francois Rabelais successfully interfered with discursive practices at the time. His five books about the adventures of Gargantua and his son Pantagruel are episodes of carnival, laughter, mockery and fantastical imagination. They include, for example, a chapter on how his father realized 'Gargantua's marvellous intelligence by his invention of an Arse-wipe' (Rabelais, 1966, 66-69). Laughter opened up, at least for a short moment, a glimpse at utopian freedom, a life beyond the heavy Christian mythology of death and eternal punishment in the form of Hell after death. Laughter, Bakhtin argues, purified from dogmatism and pedantry, from fear and intimidation. It shattered the belief that life has a single meaning (Bakhtin, 1968, 123). In this sense, laughter, in both practice and writing, created mobile subjectivities and situated knowledges. Carnival becomes a revolutionary act, one that slowly transformed values and norms, one that entered political spheres. Rabelais satire, blessed with immediate popular success and equally swift condemnation from the leading clergy, rendered support for an emerging humanist movement and contributed to the eventual death of God, the gradual decay of an unchallenged theocentric weltanschauung. Discursive dissent happens even in those circumstances where domination seems all but total. Docker (1994), for instance, discovered resistance in the seemingly homogenizing forces of popular culture, such as television, where he detects, much like Rabelais did half a millennium before, carnevalesque challenges to the narrow and single representation of reason in the public sphere. The historian Kotkin found signs of resistance in a very different suffocating context. He analysed in great detail aspects of everyday life in the Soviet industrial city of Magnitogorsk during the 1930s. Although life during this period almost perfectly epitomized the despotic character of Stalinism, Kotkin demonstrates how ordinary citizens constantly reshaped the environment in which they lived. 'New categories of thinking suddenly appeared, old ones were modified; nothing stood still' (Kotkin, 1995, 356). Challenges to authority occurred through seemingly insignificant acts, such as the process of naming and explaining new phenomena people encountered in the market place or their living quarters. **Kotkin (1995, 21), relying on a Foucaultean approach, documents how individuals were often able to circumvent existing rules by engaging in 'resourceful, albeit localise, resistance to the terms of daily life** that developed within the crusade of building socialism.'

#### Root cause is ineffective and incorrect – it is more important to focus on material instances of oppression

Harman, 09 Graham, professor of philosophy American University of Cairo, “Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics” p. 22

Even *power*, that favourite occult quality of radical political critics, is a result rather than a substance (PF, p. 191). The supposed ‘panopticon’ of modern society stands at the mercy of the technicians and bureaucrats who must install and maintain it, and who may go on strike or do a sloppy job because of bad moods. The police are outwitted by seven-year-olds in the slums. The mighty CIA, with its budget of billions, loses track of *mujahideen* riding donkeys and exchanging notes in milk bottles. A lovely Chinese double agent corrodes the moral fiber of Scotland Yard true believers. Actants must constantly be kept in line; none are servile puppets who do our bidding, whether human or nonhuman. The world resists our efforts even as it welcomes them. Even a system of metaphysics is the lengthy result of negotiations with the world, not a triumphant deductive overlord who tramples the details of the world to dust. The labour of fitting one concept to another obsesses a Kant or Husserl for decades, and even then the polished final product will be riddled with errors detectible by a novice. The same is true for our prisons, our gas and water infrastructure, the sale of potato chips, international law, nuclear test bans, and enrollment in universities. Systems are assembled at great pains, one actant at a time, and loopholes always remain. We are not the pawns of sleek power-machines grinding us beneath their heels like pathetic *Nibelungen*. We may be fragile, but so are the powerful.

#### And, we are all politicians because our actions are motivated by how we relate to others and how we affect others on a logical and emotional level – to think like a politician is to think about how we affect others.

**Harman, 09** Graham, professor of philosophy American University of Cairo, “Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics” p. 21-22

 It is never the actant in naked purity that possesses force, but only the actant involved in its ramshackle associations with others, which collapse if these associations are not lovingly or brutally maintained: ‘In order to extend itself, an actant must program other actants so that they are unable to betray it, despite the fact that they are bound to do so […]. *We always misunderstand the strength of the strong*. Though people attribute it to the purity of an actant, it is invariably due to a tiered array of weaknesses’ (PF, p. 201). Anticipating his later full-blown rejection of modernism, Latour scoffs at the notion that the imperialist West succeeded by purifying objective truth from the naïve superstition of gullible Indians. The Spaniards triumphed over the Aztecs not through the power of nature liberated from fetish, but instead through a mixed assemblage of priests, soldiers, merchants, princes, scientists, police, slavers (PF, pp. 202-3). Call them legion, for they are many. Imperialism is not an almighty center, but a chain of raggedy forces in equal parts spiritual, intellectual, and economic. The same sort of motley-coloured force is unleashed by politicians, and hence Latour is among the few present-day philosophers who admires politicians rather than sneering at their venal compromises: ‘It takes something like courage to admit that we will *never do better* than a politician [… Others] simply have somewhere to hide when they have made their mistakes. They can go back and try again. Only the politician is limited to a single shot and has to shoot in public’ (PF, p. 210). And again: ‘What we despise as political “mediocrity” is simply the collection of compromises that we force politicians to make on our behalf’ (PF, p. 210). The politician forever balances information, funding, threats, kindness, politeness, loyalty, disloyalty, and the perpetual search for ways and means. In this respect the politician is the model for every sort of actor. To declare oneself untainted by strife between conflicting forces is to deny that one is an actant. Yet there are only actants, forever lost in friendships and duels. Any attempt to see actants as the reducible puppets of deeper structures is doomed to fail. The balance of force makes some actants stronger than others, but miniature trickster objects turn the tide without warning: a pebble can destroy an empire if the Emperor chokes at dinner. Forces are real, and real tigers are stronger than paper ones, but everything is negotiable (PF, p. 163). There is no pre-established harmony among the actants in the world, but only a *post*-established harmony (PF, p. 164). The current order of things is the result of a long history of negotiations and midnight raids of one actant against the weak points of others. It takes work to subordinate serfs to the Czar or equations to a theory. The world could have been otherwise. But neither is there merely a random play of chance, since the Tartar hordes do not vanish from the Middle East with a wave of the hand. Harmony is a result, not a guiding principle.

**They should not be allowed to prescribe what our intentions are – these types of arguments force you to try and understand our intentions, which remove all objectivity in interpretation. Instead, what should come first is the content in the debate round**

**Fish ’89**  (Stanley Fish Professor of Humanities and Law at Florida International University 1989, “Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies” p.7, \*\*\*gender modified\*\*\*)

Formalism, as Unger correctly sees, is not merely a lin­guistic doctrine, but a doctrine that implies, in addition to a theory of language, a theory of the self, of community, of rationality, of practice, of politics. A formalist believes that words have clear meanings, and in order to believe that (or because [s]he believes that) [s]he must also be­lieve (i) that minds see those clear meanings clearly; (2) that clarity is a condition that persists through changes in context; (3) that noth­ing in the self interferes with the perception of clarity, or, that if it does, it can be controlled by something else in the mind; (4) that meanings are a property of language; (5) that language is an abstract system that is prior to any occasion of use; (6) that occasions of use are underwritten by that system; (7) that the meanings words have in that system (as opposed to the meanings they acquire in situations) are or should be the basis of "general" discourses like the law; (8) that because they are general rather than local, such discourses can serve (in the form of rules or statutes) as constraints on interpretive desires; (9) that interpretive desires must (and can) be set aside when there is serious public business afoot; (10) that the fashioning of a just political system requires such a setting aside, the submission of the individual will to impersonal and public norms (encoded in an im­personal and public language); (11) that this submission would be a rational act, chosen by the very will that is to be held in check; (12) that rationality, like meaning, is an abstract system that stands apart from the contexts in which its standard is to be consulted; (13) that the standard of rationality is available for the settling of disputes be­tween agents situated in different contexts; (14) that the mark of a civilized (lawful) community is the acknowledgment of that **standard as a referee or judge**; (15) that communities whose members fail to acknowledge that standard are, by definition, irrational; and (16) that irrationality is the state of being ruled by desire and force—that is, by persuasion—rather than by a norm that reflects the desires of no one, but protects the desires of everyone. All of these beliefs and more follow from and give support to the belief that words have clear mean­ings, and many of the essays in this book begin by challenging the linguistic thesis and end by challenging everything else. Often the challenge is made in the name of intention, a much debated topic in literary studies since the late 1940s and one that has been in­creasingly the center of controversy in legal studies. To some it seems curious that such a minor topic should receive so much attention, and from several quarters there has been an almost incredulous response to Steven Knapp's and Walter Michaels' assertion that "what a text means is what its author intends."3 Knapp and Michaels have been misread as urging a methodology in order to assure that interpretation will pro­ceed "objectively"; but in fact their **identification of intention with meaning removes the possibility of objectivity in interpretation¶** by making its object something the interpreter constructs. It is only if meaning is embedded in texts—is a formal fact—that one could devise a method for "reading it off"; but if meaning is a matter of what a speaker situated in a particular situation has in mind (precisely the thesis of speaker-relative presupposition), one can only determine it by **going behind the words** to the intentional circumstances of production in the light of which they acquire significance. Nor is it the case that these circumstances can themselves be regarded as a new (and higher) set of formal facts, a new text whose meaning can now be read off; for if it is by means of the intentional context and not directly that a reader imputes meaning to a text, that context must itself be im­puted—given an interpreted form—since the evidence one might cite in specifying it—the evidence of words, marks, gestures—will only be evidence, have a certain shape rather than another, if its own shape has already (and interpretively) been assumed. Once words have been dislodged as the repository of meaning in favor of intention, **no amount of them will suffice to establish an intention** since the value they have will always depend on that which they presume to establish. In Unger's words, "as soon as it is necessary to engage in a discussion of purpose [another word for intention] to determine what an utterance means formalism has been abandoned" (p. 93); and it is my contention in the essays that follow that the abandonment of formalism—of the derivation of meaning from mechanically enumerable features—has always and already occurred.

**This argument turns them into a politics of purity. Their project becomes one that allows only those who are “pure” to join, and they will subjectively exclude anyone else deemed “unworthy” from joining their movement. They are the kind of project that will ignore John Brown’s struggle against white supremacy because he white**

Michael J. **Monahan,** Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Marquette University, Racial Justice and the Politics of Purity, 20**08**, <http://www.temple.edu/isrst/Events/documents/MichaelMonahanUpdated.doc>

The abolitionist/elimitavist position demands that any legitimately anti-racist endeavor stand simultaneously as a rejection of race, or at least racialized identity. As Alcoff and Outlaw have argued (though in different ways), this demands that one have an ahistorical sense of identity – that one reject the way in which one’s “interpretive horizon” has been positioned by one’s racial membership. Again, this is because the abolitionist ontology both reduces whiteness to white supremacy – whiteness just is – purely - an affirmation of white supremacy, and offers an effectively disembodied account of agency, such that the only way to be anti-racist is to reject whiteness. But what I have been trying to show is the way in which the history of white people has always been one of ambiguity and contestation over the meaning of whiteness (and that the same is true, though in different ways, for members of all racial categories). The history is one of different people who were white in certain important ways, but were not white in other ways, or at least were white in ways different from other white people, engaging in a process of arbitrating the meaning and significance of that whiteness. Part of the project of white supremacy, therefore, was not merely the domination of non whites, but the **determination of the meaning of whiteness as fixed, given, and above all, pure**. It is a history of brutal conquest, genocide, chattel slavery, torture, and Jim Crow, and by no means do I wish to suggest that we ignore or “white wash” that history. But it is also the history of John Brown, Sophie Scholl, the San Patricio Brigade, and, among others, those Irish servants in Barbados who risked their lives alongside enslaved Africans. The insistence that antiracism must reject whiteness – that John Brown, in struggling against white supremacy, was therefore not white –capitulates to the politics of purity. We must understand racial membership, therefore, not as a static and pure category of identity, but as an ongoing context for negotiating who “we” are (both as individuals and as groups) and how we relate to each other. Because races, like all social categories, are historical, and this history gives them meaning and significance, their reality is manifest both politically (in how our social structures and organizations take shape and interact) and individually (in how we understand ourselves and our place in the world). But, and this is the crucial point for my approach, the histories themselves are histories of contestation of meaning, and fraught with ambiguity, such that we participate in the process of shaping the meaning of race not only in the here and now, but also its meaning and significance historically. The elimitavist ontology insists, therefore, not only on purity for racial categories themselves (one either is or is not white), but also employs a politics of purity in its approach to history. That is, it treats the history of whiteness purely as a history of white supremacy, and any individuals or groups who break politically with white supremacy thereby demonstrate their non-whiteness. What I am calling for is a rejection of purity in both of these senses. Racial memberships and the identities that go along with them never really function as all or nothing categories (though they may pretend to do exactly that), and to ignore white struggles against white supremacy is as much of an inadequate interpretation of history as it would be to ignore white affirmation of white supremacy. And this is true for all racial categories and identities. They are all fraught with ambiguity, indeterminacy, and even outright contradiction, and part of my claim is that the damage is done in large part by trying to conceive of them as purified of that ambiguity and contradiction, for it is that insistence on purity that links racial categories to oppressive norms.

Vote aff to redefine whiteness as anti-racist.

Shannon **Sullivan**.Penn State University Charles S. Peirce Society. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. Buffalo: 20**08**. Vol. 44, Iss. 2; pg. 236, 27 pgs

It is commonly acknowledged today, at least in academic circles, that racial essences do not exist. Racial categories, including whiteness, are historical and political products of human activity, and for that reason the human racial landscape has changed over time and likely will continue to change in the future. In the wake of this acknowledgement, critical race theorists and philosophers of race debate whether whiteness must be eliminated for racial oppression to be ended. Given whiteness's history as a category of violent racial exclusion, eliminativists and "new abolitionists" have argued that it must be abolished. If "whiteness is one pole of an unequal relationship, which can no more exist without oppression than slavery could exist without slaves," then as long as whiteness endures, so does racial oppression.2 In contrast, critical conservationists have claimed even though it has an oppressive past, whiteness could entail something other than racism and oppression. Moreover, since lived existential categories like whiteness cannot be merely or quickly eliminated, white people should work to transform whiteness into an anti-racist category. I count myself as a critical conservationist, but I also acknowledge the force of eliminativist arguments. If whiteness necessarily involves racist oppression, then attempting to transform whiteness into an antiracist category would be a fool's game at best, and a covert continuance of white supremacy at worst. My goal here is not to rehearse the disagreement between new abolitionists and critical conservationists; excellent work explaining the details of their positions already exists.3 I instead approach that disagreement by asking the pragmatic question of whether a rehabilitated version of whiteness can be worked out concretely. What would a non-oppressive, anti-racist whiteness look like? What difference would or could it make to the lives of white and nonwhite people? If the question of how to transform whiteness cannot be answered in some practical detail-if it's not a difference that makes a difference-then critical conservatism would amount to a hopeful, but ultimately harmful abstraction that makes no difference in lived experience and that damages anti-racist movements. In that case, abolitionism would appear to be the only alternative to ongoing white supremacy and privilege. I propose turning to Josiah Royce for help with these issues, more specifically to his essay on "Provincialism."4 This turn is not as surprising as it might initially seem given that Royce wrote explicitly about race in "Race Questions and Prejudices."5 In that essay, Royce issued an antiracist, anti-essentialist challenge to then-current scientific studies of race, especially anthropology and ethnology, which claim to prove the superiority of white people, and he even briefly but explicitly names whiteness a possible threat to the future of humanity. 6 I focus here on "Provincialism," however, because even though the essay never explicitly discusses race, it can help explain the ongoing need for the category of whiteness and implicitly offers a wealth of useful suggestions for how to transform it. "Provincialism" is an exercise in critical conservation of the concept of provincialism, and while not identical, provincialism and whiteness share enough in common that "wise" provincialism can serve as a model for developing "wise" whiteness.7 Royce's essay thus can be of great help to critical philosophers of race wrestling with questions of whether and how to transformatively conserve whiteness. Exploring similarities and differences between wise provincialism and wise whiteness, I use Royce's analyses of provincialism to shed light on why whiteness should be rehabilitated rather than discarded and how white people today might begin living whiteness as an anti-racist category. Comparing Provincialism and Whiteness Race Traitor is a contemporary journal with the motto "Treason to whiteness is loyalty to humanity," and its editor, Noel Ignatiev, makes a scathing case against the critical conservation of whiteness.8 Ignatiev argues that there is no valid white culture to transform. Nor is there any biological rationale for whiteness. In his view, whiteness merely concerns status, privilege, and exclusion and thus cannot form a legitimate, antiracist identity. To suggest that it can, as critical conservationists do, is to encourage white supremacists by giving their worldview intellectual support. Even if critical conservationists do not intend to provide this support, the effect of arguing for the conservation of whiteness is still extremely dangerous. In addition to unintentionally validating white supremacy movements, it tends to divert the energies of well-intentioned white people away from political struggle for racial justice to whiteindulgent racial sensitivity and diversity workshops. According to Ignatiev, what anti-racist movements need is not a white identity that well-intentioned white people can feel good about, but race traitors who are willing to defect from whiteness. The only way for white people to be loyal to the human race is for them to be disloyal to their racial identity. Like critical conservationists regarding whiteness, Royce knows that he faces an uphill battle in convincing many of his interlocutors of the value of provincialism. Put positively, provincialism tends to connote a healthy fondness for and pride in local traditions, interests, and customs. More negatively, it means being restricted and limited, sticking to the narrow ideas of a given region or group and being indifferent, perhaps even violently hostile to the ways of outsiders. What connects these different meanings is their sense of being rooted in a particular cultural-geographical place. In Royce's definition, which emphasizes conscious awareness of this rootedness (an important point to which I will return), a province is a domain that is "sufficiently unified to have a true consciousness of its own unity, to feel a pride in its own ideals and customs, and to possess a sense of its distinction from other[s]." And correspondingly, provincialism is, first, the tendency for a group "to possess its own customs and ideals; secondly, the totality of these customs and ideals themselves; and thirdly the love and pride which leads the inhabitants of a province to cherish as their own these traditions, beliefs and aspirations" (61). Emphasizing unity, love, and pride, Royce's definitions steer away from the negative connotations of provincialism. But in Royce's day- and not much has changed in this regard-it was the negative, or "false," form of provincialism that most often came to people's minds when they thought about the value and effects of the concept. As Royce was writing in 1902, the false provincialism, or "sectionalism," of the United States' Civil War was a recent memory for many of his readers. In the Civil War, stubborn commitment to one portion of the nation violently opposed it to another portion and threatened to tear the nation apart. Provincialism, which appealed to regional values to disunite, had to be condemned in the name of patriotism, which united in the name of a higher good. Royce's rhetorical strategy is to take the challenge of defending provincialism head-on: "My main intention is to define the right form and the true office of provincialism-to portray what, if you please, we may call the Higher Provincialism, -to portray it, and then to defend it, to extol it, and to counsel you to further just such provincialism" (65). Royce readily acknowledges that "against the evil forms of sectionalism we shall always have to contend" (64). But he denies that provincialism must always be evil. Going against the grain of most post-Civil War thinking about provincialism, Royce urges that the present state of civilization, both in the world at large, and with us, in America, is such as to define a new social mission which the province alone, but not the nation, is able to fulfil [sic] . . . .[T]he modern world has reached a point where it needs, more than ever before, the vigorous development of a highly organized provincial life. Such a life, if wisely guided, will not mean disloyalty to the nation. (64) Wisely developed, provincialism need not conflict with national loyalty. The two commitments can-and must, Royce insists-flourish together. Likewise, whiteness need not conflict with membership in humanity as a whole. The two identities can-and must-flourish together. The relationship between provincialism and nationalism, as discussed by Royce, serves as a fruitful model for the relationship of whiteness and humanity, and critical conservationists of whiteness should follow Royce's lead by taking head-on the challenge of critically defending whiteness. Like embracing provincialism, embracing whiteness might seem to be a step backward for the modern world-toward limitation and insularity that breed ignorance, prejudice, and hostility toward others who are different from oneself. Like having a national rather than provincial worldview, seeing oneself as a member of humanity rather than of the white race seems to embody an expansive, outward orientation that is open to others. But there is a "new social mission" with respect to racial justice that whiteness, and not humanity as a whole, can fulfill. Race relations, especially in the United States, have reached a point where humanity needs a "highly organized" anti-racist whiteness, that is, an anti-racist whiteness that is consciously developed and embraced. How then can we (white people, in particular) wisely guide the development of such whiteness so that it does not result in disloyalty to other races and humanity as a whole? Before addressing this question, let me point out two important differences between whiteness and provincialism as described by Royce. First, while Royce calls for the development of a wise form of provincialism, he is able to appeal to existing "wholesome" forms of provincialism in his defense of the concept. He addresses himself "in the most explicit terms, to men and women who, as I hope and presuppose, are and wish to be, in the wholesome sense, provincial," and his demand that "the man of the future . . . love his province more than he does to-day" recognizes a nugget of wise provincialism on which to build (65, 67). The development of wise provincialism does not have to be from scratch. In contrast, it is more difficult to pinpoint a nugget of "wholesome" whiteness to use as a starting point for its transformation. Instances of white people who helped slaves and resisted slavery in the United States, for example, certainly can be found-the infamous John Brown is only one such example-but such people often are seen as white race traitors who represent the abolition, not the transformation of whiteness.9 The task of critically conserving whiteness probably will be more difficult than that of critically conserving provincialism since there is not a straightforward or obvious "right form and true office" of whiteness to extol. Second, true to his idealism, Royce describes both provincialism and its development as explicitly conscious phenomena. Royce notes the elasticity of the term "province"-it can designate a small geographical area in contrast with the nation, or it can designate a large geographical, rural area in contrast with a city (57-58)-but it always includes consciousness of the province's unity and particular identity as this place and not another. Put another way, probably every space, regardless of its size, is distinctive in some way or another. What gives members of a space a provincial attitude is their conscious awareness of, and resulting pride in, that space as the distinctive place that it is. On Royce's model, someone who is provincial knows that she is, at least in some loose way. The task of developing her provincialism, then, is to develop her rudimentary conscious awareness of her province, to become "more and not less selfconscious, well-established, and earnest" in her provincial outlook (67). In contrast-and here lies the largest difference between provincialism and whiteness-many white people today do not consciously think of themselves as members of this (white) race and not another, not even loosely. Excepting members of white militant groups such as the Ku Klux Klan or the Creativity Movement, contemporary white people do not tend to have a conscious sense of unity as fellow white people, nor do they consciously invoke or share special ideals, customs, or common memories as white people. They often are perceived and perceive themselves as raceless, as members of the human species at large rather than members of a particular racial group. This does not eliminate their whiteness or their membership in a fairly unified group. Just the opposite: such "racelessness" is one of the marks and privileges of membership in whiteness, especially middle and upper class forms of whiteness. White people can feel a pride in the ideals and customs of whiteness and possess a sense of distinction from people of other races without much, if any conscious awareness of their whiteness and without consciously identifying those ideals and customs as white. To take one brief example, styles and customs of communication in classrooms tend to be raced (as well as classed and gendered), and white styles of discussion, hand-raising, and turn-taking tend to be treated as appropriate while black styles are seen as inappropriate.10 White students often learn to feel proud and validated by their teachers as good students when they participate in these styles, and this almost always happens without either students or teachers consciously identifying their style (or themselves) as white. Such students appear to belong and experience themselves as belonging merely to a group of smart, orderly, responsible students, not to a racialized group. In the United States and Western world more broadly, unconscious habits of whiteness and white privilege have tended to increase after the end of de jure racism.11 Unlike provincialism as described by Royce, whiteness tends to operate more sub- and unconsciously than consciously. But I do not think that this fact spoils wise provincialism as a fruitful model for wise whiteness. First, and reflecting a basic philosophical disagreement that I have with Royce's idealism, I doubt that provincialism always functions as consciously as Royce suggests it does. The unity, pride, and love that are the hallmarks of provincialism could easily function in the form of unreflective beliefs, habits, preferences, and even bodily comportment. In fact I would argue that many aspects of our provincial loyalties-whatever type of province is at issue-operate on sub- or unconscious levels. In that case, provincialism and whiteness would not be as dissimilar in their operation as Royce's description implies. Second, even if provincialism tends to consciously unify people while whiteness does not, Royce's advice that people should attempt to become more, rather than less self-conscious in their provincialism still applies to white people with respect to their whiteness. Given whiteness's history as a racial category of violent exclusion and oppression, one might think that white people need to focus less on their whiteness, to distance themselves from it. But just the opposite is the case. Given that distance from racial identification tends to be the covert modus operandi for contemporary forms of white privilege, white people who wish to fight racism need to become more intimately acquainted with their whiteness. Rather than ignore their whiteness, which allows unconscious habits of white privilege to proliferate unchecked, white people need to bring their whiteness to as much conscious awareness as possible (while also realizing that complete self-transparency is never achievable) so that they can try to change what it means. But why focus on increased awareness of whiteness simpliciter? I mentioned briefly above that raced styles of communication also tend to be gendered and classed, and even more accurate would be to say that race, gender, class, sexuality, and other significant axes of lived experience transactionally co-constitute one another. Race, including whiteness, is never lived in isolation from these other axes. In the United States, the way that a white person experiences and is impacted by her whiteness likely will vary depending on his/her ethnicity, gender and class in particular, and across the globe, national differences can give whiteness a very different meaning.12 For these reasons, one might wonder why I do not urge white people's increased consciousness of, for example, their Irish-American-whiteness, Southern-woman-whiteness, or lesbian-working-class-whiteness. Such forms of hyphenated whiteness might seem more likely to be sources of consciously felt unity, shared customs, and memory than would generic whiteness. In that case, "wise whiteness" should be read as mere shorthand for an indefinite number of forms of anti-racist whiteness. I agree that one of the functions of the term wise whiteness is to serve as an umbrella for the infinitely rich and complicated ways that white people embody their whiteness. But I think it is important that the term not be understood merely as a bit of convenient shorthand that could be discarded without loss. It has a more substantial function than that of an umbrella, and treating it as mere shorthand risks letting white privilege and white supremacy off the hook too easily. Especially in the case of white ethnicities, insisting that whiteness always be considered in connection with other axes of identity can collapse race into ethnicity and work to deflect attention away white domination and oppression. Whiteness does mean different things for, e.g., Irish-American-whites and Italian-American-whites, and these two groups of white people have different racial histories and therefore at least somewhat different racial presents. But its full meaning is not contained in those different ethnicities. There is something to being white that being contemporarily Irish or Italian alone does not capture. So while whiteness is always transactionally constituted in and through other categories of lived experience, a functional separation of race from those other categories can be and sometimes needs to be made. In practice there is no such thing as whiteness by itself, and yet for particular purposes and because of the tendency of its erasure, it can be useful to focus on whiteness in abstraction from other lived categories. In that pragmatic sense, with the term "wise whiteness" I speak not only of the rehabilitation of a collection of hyphenated forms of whiteness, but also for a rehabilitated whiteness simpliciter. Royce's eloquent pleas on the behalf of provincialism speak to my point about bringing whiteness to as much conscious awareness as possible. As Royce appeals to his readers, he urges, "I hope and believe that you all intend to have your community live its own life, and not the life of any other community, nor yet the life of a mere abstraction called humanity in general" (67). On the same theme, he later compares the problem of wise provincialism with the problem of any individual activity, which admittedly can become narrow and self-centered. Acknowledging this problem, Royce counters, But on the other hand, philanthropy that is not founded upon a personal loyalty of the individual to his own family and to his own personal duties is notoriously a worthless abstraction. We love the world better when we cherish our own friends the more faithfully. We do not grow in grace by forgetting individual duties in behalf of remote social enterprises. Precisely so, the province will not serve the nation best by forgetting itself, but by loyally emphasizing its own duty to the nation . . . . (98) The disappearance of the individual does not well serve larger social enterprises. Those enterprises thrive only if the personal, passionate energies of individuals are poured into them. Large enterprises and institutions tend to become anemic abstractions if they are not rooted in felt individual commitments. Likewise, properly understood, the nation need not be in a competitive relationship with the various communities that it shelters. Loyalty to and love for one's more local connections can be a powerful source of meaningful loyalty to and love for one's nation. In both cases, the same pattern can be detected: rich ties to the smaller entity-the individual or the community-are what sustain meaningful connections to the larger entity-the philanthropic cause or the nation. The two are not necessarily in conflict, as is often thought, and in fact the larger entity would suffer if ties to the smaller entity were cut off. It is useful to anti-racist struggle to think of a similar relationship holding between particular races, including the white race, and humanity at large. While it might initially seem paradoxical, the larger entity of humanity can best be served by people's ties to smaller, more local entities such as their racial groups. A person's racial group is not the only smaller entity that provides the rich existential ties of which Royce speaks-he rightly mentions family, and we could add entities such as one's neighborhood, one's church, mosque or synagogue, and even groups based on one's gender or sexual orientation. But race also belongs in this list of sites of intimate connection that can and often do sustain individual lives and that can support rather than undermine the well being of humanity. Forgetting one's duty to one's particular race in the name of working for racial justice, for example, tends to turn that goal into a remote abstraction. "You cannot be loyal to merely an impersonal abstraction," Royce reminds us.13 Effectively serving the goal of racial justice is more likely to occur if one concretely explores how racial justice could emerge out of loyalty to one's particular race. This claim might not seem objectionable when considering racial groups that are not white. Loyalty to other members of their race has been an important way for African Americans, for example, to further the larger cause of racial justice. Black slaves who helped each other escape their white masters fought against slavery and thus helped humanity as a whole. But the history of whiteness suggests that white people's loyalty to their race not only would not help, but in fact would undermine struggles for racial justice. How could white people serve the larger interests of the human race by being loyal to a race that has oppressed, colonized, and brutalized other races? What possible duties or obligations to their race could white people have, responsibilities that must be remembered if racial justice is to be a concrete, lived goal for white people to work toward? On the one hand, these questions can seem outrageous, even dangerous. Talk of duty to the white race smacks of militarist white supremacist movements, and indeed the first of the Creativity Movement's sixteen commandments in their "White Man's Bible" is that "it is the avowed duty and holy responsibility of each generation to assure and secure for all time the existence of the White Race upon the face of this planet," and the sixth is that "your first loyalty belongs to the White Race."14 Noel Ignatiev's concern about the scholarly validation of white supremacy through the critical conservation of whiteness could not be better placed than here. Temporarily setting aside the dangerous aspect of these questions, they also can seem nonsensical if they do not refer to the goals of white supremacist movements. What antiracist duties, we might ask with some sarcasm, do white people have that must not be forgotten? African Americans and other non-white people might be able to combine loyalty to their racial group with loyalty to humanity, but white people cannot. Their situations are too different to treat their relationships to their races as similar. Those relationships are asymmetrical, which means that white people's loyalty to the human race, including racial justice for all its members, conflicts with loyalty to whiteness. Loyalty to humanity would seem to require white people to be race traitors. On the other hand, these questions present a needed challenge to white people who care about racial justice. Rather than rhetorically or sarcastically, the questions can be asked in the spirit of Royce's call for each "community [to] live its own life, and not the life of any other community, nor yet the life of a mere abstraction called humanity in general" (67). For white people to fight white supremacy and white privilege does not mean for them to attempt to shed their whiteness and become members of the human species at large. Attempting to become raceless by living the life of an abstraction called humanity merely cultivates a white person's ignorance of how race, including whiteness, and racism inform her habits, beliefs, desires, antipathies, and other aspects of her life. It does not magically eliminate her white privilege for even if she succeeds in thinking of herself as a raceless member of humanity, she likely will continue to be identified and treated as white, even if unreflectively or unconsciously, by others. By allowing her white privilege to go unchecked in this way, a white person's living the life of abstract humanity actually tends to increase, not reduce her racial privilege. To increase the chances of reducing her racial privilege, she must resist the temptation to see herself as raceless and instead figure out what it could mean for her to live her own life as a racialized person. Living as a racialized, rather than abstract person does not mean attempting to take on a different race. Attempting to take on a different race implicitly acknowledges that whiteness is problematic, and it can seem to be an expression of respect for non-white people. But it often is no better a response to white privilege than attempting to shed one's whiteness. This is because a white person's taking on the habits, culture, and other aspects of another race often is an expression of ontological expansiveness, which is a habit of white privileged people to treat all spaces-whether geographical, existential, linguistic, cultural, or other-as available for them to inhabit at their choosing.15 Appropriating another race in this way thus is closer to imperialist colonialism than a gesture of respect. For this reason, white people need to stop trying to flee the responsibilities and duties that come with being white and figure out how to live their own racialized life, not the life of another race. Once they no longer ignore or attempt to flee their whiteness, they can then ask how work for racial justice fits with their duties and responsibilities as a white person and how they might live their own anti-racist white life. Three "Evils" Eliminated by Wise Whiteness Royce lists three specific problems in modern American life that cannot be solved without wise provincialism. His discussion of these "evils," as Royce calls them, also illuminates "evils" that a wise form of whiteness could help meliorate. The first evil is the neglect of and disruption to a community when people are only loosely associated with it and do not invest in, care about, or have a significant history with it. Royce argues that this problem is growing in frequency and significance as people are increasingly mobile, changing their residency multiple times over their lifetime and often moving great distances from where they were born and raised. This means that communities are increasingly dealing with a large number of newcomers who do not (yet) have an intimate, caring connection to the new place they inhabit. This is "a source of social danger, because the community needs well-knit organization" (73). Provincialism helps these newcomers care for their new home, and a wise provincialism does so without generating any hostility toward either other provincial communities or larger social bodies such as the nation. In a similar fashion, when white people who care about racial justice have virtually no conscious or deliberate affiliation with their whiteness, the meaning and effect of whiteness is left to happenstance or, more likely, is determined by white supremacist groups. Royce's primary concern is the dissolution of communities through neglect, and if well intentioned white people do not care about, invest in, or acknowledge a significant history with their whiteness, then whiteness will be neglected. But unlike provincial communities, whiteness does not necessarily unravel or wither away because of simple neglect by anti-racist white people. Its neglect by anti-racists whites instead leaves it wide open for racist white groups to develop. Like a garden, whiteness can easily grow tough weeds of white supremacy if it is not wisely cultivated. The evil of abandoning whiteness, allowing white supremacists to make of it whatever they will, can be mitigated by a wise form of whiteness. In practice, this means that white people who care about racial justice need to educate newcomers to whiteness-namely, white children-to be loyal to and care about their race. While Royce's comments about the problem of newcomers due to increased geographical mobility do not apply directly to whiteness,16 white children can be thought of as newcomers to the community of whiteness who do not (yet) have an intimate connection to their race or know how to cultivate and care for it. Here again is an instance in which white supremacists have been allowed to corner the market on whiteness: almost all explicit reflection and writing on how to raise white children as white has been undertaken by groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, World Church of the Creator, and Stormfront.17 The association is so tight that the mere suggestion of educating white children in their whiteness is alarming to many people. But educating white children about their whiteness need and should not mean educating them to be white supremacists. A wise form of whiteness would help train the developing racial habits of white children in anti-racist ways. 18 Royce calls the second problem addressed by provincialism that of "the leveling tendency of recent civilization" (74), but more accurate, I think, would be to characterize the problem as one of monotonous sameness. Royce is concerned that the increase of mass communication means that people all over the nation, indeed the globe, are reading the same news stories, sharing the same ideas, fashions, and trends, and more and more imitating one another. The rich diversity of humankind, the independence of the small manufacturer, and distinctiveness of the individual are being absorbed into a vast, impersonal social order. A wise provincialism is not wholly opposed to these tendencies. There is great value in large groups of people coming to understand each other across their differences. But, Royce argues, there often also is great value to be found in their differences, and those differences ought to be allowed to thrive. A wise provincialism helps protect the variety of different places and communities so that they are not forced to be identical with each other. In a similar way, wise whiteness helps preserve racial differences without treating people of various races as wholly alien to each other and thus incapable of understanding each other across their differences. As Lucius Outlaw asks, "Why is it, after thousands of years, that human beings are not all 'light khaki' instead of exhibiting the variety of skin tones (and other features) more or less characteristic of various populations called races?"19 The answer, according to Outlaw, is not merely that racism and invidious ethnocentrism have worked to establish inviolable boundaries between white and non-white races. It also is that different races are "the result of bio-cultural group attachments and practices that are conducive to human survival and well-being."20With W.E.B. Du Bois, Outlaw argues that racial differences can enrich everyone and that even if racism disappeared tomorrow, we should want discernibly distinct races to continue to exist.21 The baby need not be thrown out with the bathwater. The rich variety of human racial and ethnic cultures need not be eliminated to eliminate racism and invidious ethnocentrism. A wise whiteness also would caution, however, that white people's appreciation for racial diversity and variety also can be an insidious form of whiteness in disguise. Too often, celebrations of multiculturalism and racial diversity function as a smorgasbord of racial difference offered up for (middle-to-upper class) white people's consumption and enjoyment. They do this by acknowledging some differences while simultaneously concealing others. It is very easy for white people to recognize and even celebrate racial difference in the form of different food, dress, and cultural customs. It tends to be much more difficult for them to recognize racial difference in the form of economic, educational, and political inequalities. Royce's criticism of the leveling tendencies of modern culture does not explicitly depoliticize the issue, and he does mention that variety is needed particularly to counter "the purely mechanical carrying-power of certain ruling social influences," an example of which is the hegemony of white culture (76). But given the tendency of white (middle-to-upper class, in particular) people to see whiteness as cultureless and boring and thus want to spice it up by dabbling in other, "exotic" cultures, care must be taken that appreciation of diversity is not sanitized through an avoidance of the history and present of white privilege. When that happens, appreciation of plurality and diversity tend to become a covert vehicle for white ontological expansiveness. In contrast, a wise whiteness values and thus transactionally conserves different races, as Outlaw does, without depoliticizing the meaning of those differences. The third evil discussed by Royce, the mob spirit, occurs when all individual judgment has been given up and a person becomes totally absorbed in a large social mass. Without discriminating individuals, the crowd or mob is psychologically vulnerable to a strong leader, idea, or even a song that enflames emotions and leads people to act in ways they ordinarily would not act. This danger is closely related to the one of sameness for behind the two dangers lay the same phenomenon: that of wide, inclusive human sympathy (92-93). Openness to and sharing in the lives and the feelings of others is not always a positive event, Royce cautions us. Undiscriminating sympathy can lend support to base absurdities as easily as to noble kindness, and as such sympathy is more of a neutral base for psychological development than an automatic good to be ubiquitously cultivated. Under certain conditions-conditions that Royce thinks are increasingly present in the modern world-wide, inclusive sympathy for others can become not only monotonous, but also dangerous (95). Loss of the small-the particular, the local, the individual-as it is absorbed into the large is something to resist, and a wise provincialism helps prevent that loss Royce's concern about the mob spirit does not directly speak to problems faced by a wise whiteness.22 But in this concern we can see the streak of organic individualism that runs through Royce's work, which can tell us something important about the relationships of white individuals to their race. Royce's legendary concern for community does not sacrifice or dissolve the individual into the larger whole. Just as false forms of provincialism set up a false opposition between provincialism and nationalism, false forms of individualism set up a false opposition between individualism and community or social causes. That kind of individualism fails because of its "failure to comprehend what it is that the ethical individual needs," which is a cause greater than the individual that she can passionately serve (38). Here is where Royce's individualism is distinctive: it insists that real individuality is found through personal choice of a larger cause that one loyally serves, not through endless insistence that one is a single individual with personal initiative. This insistence is empty if never acted upon, leaving the so-called autonomous individual lost and floundering. "Be an individual," Royce urges exasperatedly, "[b]ut for Heaven's sake, set about the task."23 To be a real individual, a person needs something larger than herself to be a part of. And as communities of meaning, racial groups historically have developed as one of those things. In Lucius Outlaw's words, racial and ethnic identification in part "develop[ed] as responses to the need for life-sustaining and meaningful acceptable order of various kinds (conceptual, social, political)."24 Human beings need to create conceptual, social, political and other structures, including individual and social identities, to give their lives meaning and purpose. While Outlaw talks about this need in terms of order and Royce speaks of it in terms of a cause to devote one's self to, both point to an existential need that racial identity, including whiteness, can serve and historically has served. And they both suggest that **a theory of racial justice that ignores this need will *not be effective in practice*.**

**Turn: Politics of purity. Voting negative creates a static notion of whiteness: “Whiteness is white supremacy. That politics contributes to the project of white supremacy.**

Michael J. **Monahan,** Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Marquette University, Racial Justice and the Politics of Purity, 20**08**, http://www.temple.edu/isrst/Events/documents/MichaelMonahanUpdated.doc

The abolitionist/elimitavist position demands that any legitimately anti-racist endeavor stand simultaneously as a rejection of race, or at least racialized identity. As Alcoff and Outlaw have argued (though in different ways), this demands that one have an ahistorical sense of identity – that one reject the way in which one’s “interpretive horizon” has been positioned by one’s racial membership. Again, this is because the abolitionist ontology both reduces whiteness to white supremacy – whiteness just is – purely - an affirmation of white supremacy, and offers an effectively disembodied account of agency, such that the only way to be anti-racist is to reject whiteness. But what I have been trying to show is the way in which the history of white people has always been one of ambiguity and contestation over the meaning of whiteness (and that the same is true, though in different ways, for members of all racial categories). The history is one of different people who were white in certain important ways, but were not white in other ways, or at least were white in ways different from other white people, engaging in a process of arbitrating the meaning and significance of that whiteness. Part of the project of white supremacy, therefore, was not merely the domination of non whites, but the determination of the meaning of whiteness as fixed, given, and above all, pure. It is a history of brutal conquest, genocide, chattel slavery, torture, and Jim Crow, and by no means do I wish to suggest that we ignore or “white wash” that history. But it is also the history of John Brown, Sophie Scholl, the San Patricio Brigade, and, among others, those Irish servants in Barbados who risked their lives alongside enslaved Africans. The insistence that antiracism must reject whiteness – that John Brown, in struggling against white supremacy, was therefore not white –capitulates to the politics of purity. We must understand racial membership, therefore, not as a static and pure category of identity, but as an ongoing context for negotiating who “we” are (both as individuals and as groups) and how we relate to each other. Because races, like all social categories, are historical, and this history gives them meaning and significance, their reality is manifest both politically (in how our social structures and organizations take shape and interact) and individually (in how we understand ourselves and our place in the world). But, and this is the crucial point for my approach, the histories themselves are histories of contestation of meaning, and fraught with ambiguity, such that we participate in the process of shaping the meaning of race not only in the here and now, but also its meaning and significance historically. The elimitavist ontology insists, therefore, not only on purity for racial categories themselves (one either is or is not white), but also employs a politics of purity in its approach to history. That is, it treats the history of whiteness purely as a history of white supremacy, and any individuals or groups who break politically with white supremacy thereby demonstrate their non-whiteness. What I am calling for is a rejection of purity in both of these senses. Racial memberships and the identities that go along with them never really function as all or nothing categories (though they may pretend to do exactly that), and to ignore white struggles against white supremacy is as much of an inadequate interpretation of history as it would be to ignore white affirmation of white supremacy. And this is true for all racial categories and identities. They are all fraught with ambiguity, indeterminacy, and even outright contradiction, and part of my claim is that the damage is done in large part by trying to conceive of them as purified of that ambiguity and contradiction, for it is that insistence on purity that links racial categories to oppressive norms.

# Doubles v. Dartmouth DY

## 2AC

### Nanotech

#### Demonstration projects are key to motivate scientist recruitment – salaries can be adjusted regardless of funding

**National Acadamies Press 12** [2012, Improving the Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers: A Report to the Carnegie Commision on Science, Technology and Government, <http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=2102&page=37>]

There have been no significant changes in NIST's workforce quality indicators—undergraduate grade-point averages, quality of graduate schools, and performance appraisal ratings—which traditionally have been high. Turnover rates, already very low, have not changed,¶ although surveys of leavers indicate that salary has become a less important reason for leaving. Department of Agriculture Demonstration The committee also heard presentations by officials from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and its Agricultural Research Service (ARS) about a personnel demonstration project begun in mid-1990 in 140 experimental and 70 comparison sites of the Forest Service and the ARS. The project is largely a testing of a comprehensive simplification and decentralization of the hiring system, but it does include recruitment bonuses and relocation expenses and use of an extended probationary period for scientists in research positions.14 The committee heard that the recruitment incentives have been rarely used, although they were important in attracting a microbiologist and a plant physiologist. It is too early to evaluate the results of the longer probationary period on the retention and productivity of research scientists. Lessons While they are only quasi-experiments, and they do not measure the effects of the interventions on organizational effectiveness, other effects of the various interventions have been measured, the Navy and NIST demonstration projects are consistent with the proposition that a more flexible pay and position structure improves the ability of federal agencies to recruit more qualified scientists and engineers and to reward and motivate good performers and thus retain them. They also show that the direct cost of such efforts is modest, in part because the agencies can (and do, because of budget constraints) tailor the compensation package to each case rather than increase salaries across the board. In addition, the differences among the demonstrations designed by each agency to 14 The extended probationary period does not apply to foresters and other scientists not in research positions.¶ OCR for page 56¶ Improving the Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers: A Report to the Carnegie Commision on Science, Technology and Government meet its needs show that the various mechanisms can and should be adapted to the particular conditions facing each agency. Thus the agencies faced with implementing FEPCA should consider it an opportunity to design their own recruitment and retention programs. Unfortunately, FEPCA does not include all the devices and flexibilities being used by the demonstration projects. Additional steps needed beyond FEPCA to improve the federal government's capacity to recruit well-qualified scientific and technological personnel are recommended in the last chapter. First, the next chapter discusses the flexibilities offered under FEPCA to agencies faced with attracting and keeping well-qualified scientists and engineers and identifies potential obstacles to effective implementation of FEPCA.

### Elections

#### Romney’s impact on Russian relations is unclear

The Economist 9/1 (9/1/12, Romney Could Screw Up US Relations With Russia, <http://www.businessinsider.com/mitt-romneys-foreign-policy-chops-come-into-light-2012-9>, RBatra)

At the same time, the potential impact of a Romney presidency should not be exaggerated. Mr Romney is not an ideological politician, and he will have solid reasons to maintain a working relationship with Russia. These include reliance on Russian transit corridors to support US forces in Afghanistan to 2015 and beyond, Russia's veto in the UN Security Council, and its potential to act as interlocutor between the US and rogue states. Finally, there is a significant element of uncertainty that stems from the lack of clarity about what Mr Romney, who has often changed his position, actually stands for. In particular, the extent of the influence on him of several competing Republican foreign policy schools (neo-conservativism, populist isolationism, realism, liberal internationalism) is unclear.

#### Putin a/c

**Weiss 6-19** – Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Weiss Asset Management, a Boston-based investment firm,[[2]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrew_Weiss_%28economist%29#cite_note-time-1) and Professor Emeritus [Boston University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boston_University) (Andrew, 2012, “[Putin's Waiting Game](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/19/waiting_game)” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/19/waiting_game?page=full>) Jacome

The most important yet overlooked aspect of the current situation, however, may be the cynicism and casual indifference that Putin has displayed toward the U.S.-Russian relationship in the face of his much bigger problems at home. At the moment, Putin appears to be preoccupied by the political mess created by his decision to [switch jobs with Medvedev](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/09/world/europe/slight-hiccup-as-putin-and-medvedev-switch-jobs-in-russia.html) and the [badly flawed Duma elections](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16042797) last December. He also must contend with the ripple effects of the eurozone drama and global economic slowdown, which together have contributed to a [20 percent decline](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303734204577467893480636270.html?mod=ITP_moneyandinvesting_3) in global oil prices over the past two months alone.

Against this backdrop, the ups and downs of relations with Washington may be little more than a distraction from the more urgent challenge of restoring the aura of invulnerability and bezal'ternativnost' (the lack of any alternative) that bolstered Putin's authority during his first 12 years in power. Already, he seems to have fallen back on the tried-and-true formula of portraying himself as the protector of a Fortress Russia beset by imaginary foreign enemies and spies.  This gambit has long helped the Kremlin cultivate support from average citizens and build up the regime's legitimacy.

The chief beneficiaries of Putin's rule -- the increasingly affluent and middle-class residents of places like Moscow -- show no signs of muffling their anger about his return to the Kremlin despite an ongoing crackdown on political dissent. Still, Putin knows how to cater to the two-thirds of the Russian electorate that voted for him in March and reside primarily in Russia's smaller cities and countryside. He may find it hard to resist the temptation to play upon their worst fears and anti-Western stereotypes. **Sacrificing the past several years of dramatic improvement in the U.S.-Russian relationship may seem like a small price to pay if it breathes new life and legitimacy into his rule.**

**Romney has a small lead- all polls showing Obama ahead use incorrect turnout models**

Dick **Morris,** American [political](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics) author and [commentator](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_commentator) who previously worked as a [pollster](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pollster), [political campaign consultant](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_campaign_staff), and general [political consultant](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_consultant), Former Adviser to President Bill Clinton, **9-21-12**, p. http://www.dickmorris.com/why-the-polls-under-state-romney-vote/

Republicans are getting depressed under an avalanche of polling suggesting that an Obama victory is in the offing. They, in fact, suggest no such thing! Here’s why:¶ **1.** All of the polling out there uses some variant of the 2008 election turnout as its model for weighting respondents and this overstates the Democratic vote by a huge margin.¶ In English, this means that when you do a poll you ask people if they are likely to vote. But any telephone survey always has too few blacks, Latinos, and young people and too many elderly in its sample. That’s because some don’t have landlines or are rarely at home or don’t speak English well enough to be interviewed or don’t have time to talk. Elderly are overstated because they tend to be home and to have time. So you need to increase the weight given to interviews with young people, blacks and Latinos and count those with seniors a bit less.¶ Normally, this task is not difficult. Over the years, the black, Latino, young, and elderly proportion of the electorate has been fairly constant from election to election, except for a gradual increase in the Hispanic vote. You just need to look back at the last election to weight your polling numbers for this one.¶ But 2008 was no ordinary election. Blacks, for example, usually cast only 11% of the vote, but, in 2008, they made up 14% of the vote. Latinos increased their share of the vote by 1.5% and college kids almost doubled their vote share. Almost all pollsters are using the 2008 turnout models in weighting their samples. Rasmussen, more accurately, uses a mixture of 2008 and 2004 turnouts in determining his sample. That’s why his data usually is better for Romney.¶ But polling indicates a widespread lack of enthusiasm among Obama’s core demographic support due to high unemployment, disappointment with his policies and performance, and the lack of novelty in voting for a black candidate now that he has already served as president. ¶ If you adjust virtually any of the published polls to reflect the 2004 vote, not the 2008 vote, they show the race either tied or Romney ahead, a view much closer to reality.¶ **2.** Almost all of the published polls show Obama getting less than 50% of the vote and less than 50% job approval. A majority of the voters either support Romney or are undecided in almost every poll. ¶ But the fact is that the undecided vote always goes against the incumbent. In 1980 (the last time an incumbent Democrat was beaten), for example, the Gallup Poll of October 27th had Carter ahead by 45-39. Their survey on November 2nd showed Reagan catching up and leading by three points. In the actual voting, the Republican won by nine. The undecided vote broke sharply — and unanimously — for the challenger.¶ An undecided voter has really decided not to back the incumbent. He just won’t focus on the race until later in the game.¶ So, when the published poll shows Obama ahead by, say, 48-45, he’s really probably losing by 52-48!¶ Add these two factors together and the polls that are out there are all misleading. Any professional pollster (those consultants hired by candidates not by media outlets) would publish two findings for each poll — one using 2004 turnout modeling and the other using 2008 modeling. This would indicate just how dependent on an unusually high turnout of his base the Obama camp really is.

#### The GOP will steal the election

**Drew, 9/23/12 –** Journalist (Elizabeth, Huffington Post, “Voting Wrongs”,

<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elizabeth-drew/voting-wrongs_b_1907263.html?utm_hp_ref=elections-2012>

The Republicans' plan is that if they can't buy the 2012 election they will steal it.¶ The plan, long in the making and now well into its execution, is to raise great gobs of money -- in newly limitless amounts -- so that they and their allies could outspend the president's forces; and they would also place obstacles in the way of large swaths of citizens who traditionally support the Democrats and want to exercise their right to vote. The plan would disproportionately affect blacks, who were guaranteed the right to vote in 1870 by the 15th Amendment; but then that right was negated by southern state legislatures; and after people marched, were beaten, and died in the civil rights movement, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Now various state legislatures are coming up with new ways to try once again to nullify that right.¶ In a close election, the Republican plan could call into question the legitimacy of the next president. An election conducted on this basis could lead to turbulence on election day and possibly an extended period of lawsuits contesting the outcome in various states. Bush v. Gore would seem to have been a pleasant summer afternoon. The fact that their party's nominee is currently stumbling about, his candidacy widely deemed to be in crisis mode, hasn't lessened their determination to prevent as many Democratic supporters as they can from voting in November.¶ This national effort to tilt the 2012 election is being carried out on the pretext that the country's voting system is under threat from widespread "voter fraud." the fact that no significant fraud has been found doesn't deter the people pursuing this plan. Myths are convenient in politics. Want to fix an election? No problem. Just make up a story that the other side is trying to rig the election -- and meanwhile try to rig the election. (Jon Stewart recently concluded a searing segment about the imagined voter fraud by saying: "Next, leashes for leprechauns.")¶ The Republicans have been making particularly strenuous efforts to tilt the outcomes -- in most of the "swing states": Florida, Ohio, Iowa, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin. The Republican leader of the House in Pennsylvania, previously considered a swing state, was careless enough to admit publicly that the state's strict new Voter ID law would assure a Romney victory in November. In fact, a state document submitted in court offered no evidence of voter fraud. On September 18, Pennsylvania's supreme court sharply rebuked a lower court's approval of the law, questioning whether the law could be fairly applied by the time of the election. This battle continues despite the fact that the Romney campaign in mid-September suspended its efforts in Pennsylvania because polls show that Obama was substantially ahead. Even if the state's electoral votes are not in question the outcome could still decide whether a great many people will be allowed to vote in November, and could also affect the popular vote.

#### Alt-causes – debates and labor statistics

**Lombardo, 9/12**/12 - Global CEO, StrategyOne (Steve, “Why This Election Comes Down to Two Days in October,” Huffington Post, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-lombardo/election-monitor-why-this_b_1877815.html>)

Several national polls released this week show that President Obama received a small but meaningful bounce after the conventions. The bounce -- in the 3-5 point range -- is within the median for convention bounces since 1964. The problem for Republicans is that Romney got no bounce from his convention. In fact, his vote share likely shrunk a point or two in the last two weeks. While the Republican convention may have strengthened Romney's position with the base, it did little to expand his coalition. The momentum from "You didn't build that" has been halted. ¶ However, we see nothing in the data yet to suggest this is anything but a dead heat. For all the hand wringing over the GOP convention and the Romney campaign they are in a dead heat with an incumbent President with 55 days to go. When you look at likely voters in key swing states, this thing is truly 50/50. ¶ Here is our take as of 12 a.m. EST: ¶ The murder of Ambassador Stevens and the unrest in Libya will thrust both candidates into the foreign policy fray. It will be very interesting to see how each handles the coming hours and days and how much the media -- and ultimately voters -- focuses on the issue.¶ Look for a higher level of advertising spend from the Romney campaign in key battleground states over the next two weeks. History has shown that the candidate who is clearly in the lead by mid to late September will likely be the winner in November. That doesn't mean things can't change in October -- they can. But sentiment will start to firm up in the next two weeks. The Romney campaign has a $60 million cash-on-hand advantage, and they should use it now. Team Obama defined Romney in the spring using their cash advantage; the Romney campaign should not wait until October. They need to change the dynamic before October 1.¶ The two biggest dates of the campaign are October 3rd and October 5th. The first debate will be held on Wednesday, October 3rd at the University of Denver at 9 p.m. EST. For three reasons this will be far and away the most important debate:¶ It is the first and therefore, unless there is a major blunder, is likely to be the one that sets the image of Romney in stone.¶ We really do not believe that the other two will matter if Romney has a poor debate performance here. Romney has to win this debate pure and simple.¶ This one is purely on domestic policy, i.e. the economy. If Romney can't win this one, he is unlikely to win the other two, barring a miscue by the President.¶ On October 5th at 8:30 a.m. EST the Bureau of Labor Statistics will release the September unemployment numbers. This will be the most impactful announcement of the campaign. If the unemployment rate goes up it could be devastating for the president's reelection chances. Similarly, if it goes down -- especially if it goes below 8 percent -- it may pretty much secure an Obama victory in November.

#### Nuclear power doesn’t swing the election

**Wood, 9-13-12**

[Elisa, AOL, “What Obama and Romney Don't Say About Energy,” http://energy.aol.com/2012/09/13/what-obama-and-romney-dont-say-about-energy/]

Fossil fuels and renewable energy have become touchy topics in this election, with challenger Mitt Romney painting President Barack Obama as too hard on the first and too fanciful about the second – and Obama saying Romney is out of touch with energy's future. But two other significant resources, nuclear power and energy efficiency, are evoking scant debate. What gives? Nuclear energy supplies about 20 percent of US electricity, and just 18 months ago dominated the news because of Japan's Fukushima Daiichi disaster – yet neither candidate has said much about it so far on the campaign trail. Romney mentioned nuclear power only seven times in his recently released white paper, while he brought up oil 150 times. Even wind power did better with 10 mentions. He pushes for less regulatory obstruction of new nuclear plants, but says the same about other forms of energy. Obama's campaign website highlights the grants made by his administration to 70 universities for research into nuclear reactor design and safety. But while it is easy to find his ideas on wind, solar, coal, natural gas and oil, it takes a few more clicks to get to nuclear energy. The Nuclear Energy Institute declined to discuss the candidates' positions pre-election. However, NEI's summer newsletter said that both "Obama and Romney support the use of nuclear energy and the development of new reactors."

#### Plan popular with public

Bowman, 4-18-12

[Karlyn, American Enterprise Institute, “Polls on the environment, energy, global warming and nuclear power,” http://www.aei.org/papers/politics-and-public-opinion/polls/polls-on-the-environment-energy-global-warming-and-nuclear-power-april-2012/]

\* President Obama is getting low marks on his handling of gas prices. In a February 2012 AP/GfK-Roper poll, 39 percent approved of the job he is doing in this area. Significant majorities say rising gas prices have caused difficulties in their households. \* The majority of Americans still think nuclear power is safe. In a March 2012 Gallup poll, 57 percent favored using nuclear energy as one way to provide electricity for the United States. But people still wouldn’t want to build a nuclear plant in their backyard. Only 35 percent told CBS pollsters in March 2011 that they would approve of a nuclear power plant in their community, and 62 percent disapproved. \* Americans like an “all-of-the-above” energy strategy that includes more energy production, developing alternative energy sources, more conservation and nuclear power.

#### Plan creates jobs in swing states like Ohio – popular

Korte, 4-27-12

[Gregory, USA Today, “Politics stands in the way of nuclear plant's future,” http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/story/2012-04-13/usec-centrifuges-loan-guarantees/54560118/1]

The stakes are high: It's an election year, and Ohio is a swing state. USEC estimates the project at its peak will generate 3,158 jobs in Ohio, and 4,284 elsewhere. Pike County, home to the centrifuges, has a 13% unemployment rate — the highest in Ohio. The median household income is about $40,000. The average job at USEC pays $77,316. Centrifuge parts are stacked up in Piketon. "It's as shovel-ready as they come," says spokeswoman Angela Duduit. Indeed, the project has enjoyed bipartisan support. A USA TODAY review of DOE records shows that no fewer than 46 members of Congress — 32 Republicans and 14 Democrats — have pressured the Obama administration to approve the loan guarantee for USEC. "Quick action is paramount," said one bipartisan letter. "It is imperative that this application move forward now," said another. The congressional support comes from states such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Kentucky, West Virginia, Missouri, Alabama, Indiana, Maryland, North Carolina and South Carolina— an almost exact overlay of the states that would benefit from the 7,442 jobs the company says would be created.

**Ohio key**

**Sowinski 12** [Greg Sowinski, Lima News, “Senator tells Husky workers he’s got their backs”, Aug 15, 2012]

Brown said Ohio is key for President Barack Obama’s re-election.¶ “Ohio is still the most important state in this election,” he said.¶ But the biggest issue is the economy, he said.¶ “The economy always is,” he said. “We’re going in the right direction but we need to do better.”¶ Brown said the state has reduced unemployment from 10.5 percent to less than 7.5 percent under Obama, and the country has added 500,000 manufacturing jobs after losing 5 million of those jobs.

### Coal

**Link doesn’t make sense – lots of coal now which should be sufficient to trigger Coal plants every wek**

Vaitheeswaran, 07 [Vijay, Correspondent, the Economist, “Panacea or Pipe Dream? Energy Policy and the Search for Alternatives: Session II: Energy Alternatives in the Market”, Council on Foreign Relations Roundtable Transcript, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/12864/panacea_or_pipe_dream_energy_policy_and_the_search_for_alternatives.html?breadcrumb=%2Fthinktank%2Fiigg%2Findex>

Coal plants are going up every week, as is often commented upon.  One has to explain to me why this will not continue.  I am not one to believe that developing countries will choose expensive energy forms -- energy conversion means, because they care so much about global warming.

In my experience, Indians, the Chinese, South Africans, are aware that global warming is a problem -- that they will be affected by it.  But they believe the moral case for action lies first with the United States -- since we got rich polluting the atmosphere -- and we should act first.

No UQ

**Lacey 12** [Stephen Lacey on May 14, 2012, ThinkProgress, U.S. Coal Generation Drops 19 Percent In One Year, Leaving Coal With 36 Percent Share Of Electricity”]

Power generation from coal is falling quickly. According to new figures from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, coal made up 36 percent of U.S. electricity in the first quarter of 2012 — down from 44.6 percent in the first quarter of 2011.¶ That stunning drop, which represented almost a 20 percent decline in coal generation over the last year, was primarily due to low natural gas prices. As EIA explains, natural gas generation will climb steadily this year, while coal will see a double-digit drop by the end of 2012:

**Catastrophic consequences to CCP collapse are just fear-mongering – instability is key to ensure democracy and won’t cause chaos**

Bruce Gilley, 2004. PhD Candidate Politics @ Princeton U. and Adjunct Prof. Int’l. Affairs @ New School U. “China's Democratic Future: How it Will Happen and where it Will Lead,” p. 115-116, Google Print.

Would the entire PRC edifice simply collapse from the accumulated pressures of crisis and mass protest? In cross-countn' comparisons, "post-totalitarian" states like China are the most vulnerable to collapse because they are unable to respond creatively to protest and yet there is no organized opposition to assume control.' The East German regime was a perfect example. It simply collapsed when huge defections front the state occurred at fltl) level and there was no organized opposition ready to take over. In the C.cnnan case, there was a neighboring fraternal state whose arms provided some cushion for the collapse. China would not have the same support. For this reason, the CCP and many of its supporters have warned of the dangers of collapse in words designed to scare the regime's opponents into quiescence. Fear-mongering about the consequences of regime collapse in China has been a staple of PRC propaganda since reforms began. Deng said: if the political situation in China became unstable the trouble would spread to the rest of the world, with consequences that would be hard to imagine 7' Foreign scholars have taken up the histrionics with relish. One has worried about societal disintegration" and even "the fragmentation of China into several competing polities." Another warns: At worst the resulting chaos from a collapsing China would have a profound effect on the stability of Asia and on the US. policy to guarantee the security of its Asian allies, At the least, China could turn to the West for economic relief and reconstruction, the price tag of which would be overwhelming. Yet these fears appear overblown or misplaced. First, as we saw in the last pad, many of these dire descriptions are an accurate portrayal of China today. The problems of Party rule have created the very crisis that the fear-mongers allude to. China already has an AIDs crisis, an illegal emigration crisis, a pollution crisis, and an economic crisis. Given it’s well-established state and social cohesion, China has far more to gain than to lose from political liberalization. Second, there is a good argument that governance in China will not collapse further even with a top leadership in crisis. The country actually functioned quite normally during the Cultural Revolution, when there was often no rule at the top, as a result of strong local governments and a social fabric that held together. At this stage, with popular protests in full swing, a military on good behavior and a regime trying to confront the possibility of change, there is no reason to believe that the country will abruptly disintegrate. As in 1989. it, fact, there is even' reason to believe that people will act better toward each other and that local governments will look kindly upon the movement, an outpouring of civic behavior linked to the ideals of democracy. Finally, as above, if we are concerned with the creation of a more just system, then **some degree of chaos" relating to unstable government may be a worthwhile price to pay, including for the world.** Claims by some U.S. foreign policy analysts that "there is as great a 'threat' to US interests from a weak and unstable China as there is from a strong and antagonistic China" are based on a highly instrumental and even then flawed view of U.S., and world, interests. A world community committed to the principles of justice through democracy has an overriding interest in its realization in China. To the extent that instability in China worsens conditions for greater justice there or abroad, it would indeed "threaten" world interests. But if the instability, despite its costs, leads to greater gains through a more just order in China and, through it, abroad, then this is very much in the world's interest. Few Americans, French, Croats, Romanians, South Africans, Filipinos, South Koreans, or Indonesians would say the "chaos" of their democratic revolutions was not a price worth paying. China's people should be allowed to make the same choice. However, an alarmist view of growing popular mobilization against an authoritarian regime has too often landed the US. in particular on the wrong side of a democratic movement. During a visit to South Korea in 1986, then U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz voiced support for the military regime's rejection of opposition demands for a direct presidential election, calling such an arrangement "unusual" A year later, the regime conceded to the demands, The US., now portrayed as an enemy of democracy in South Korea, found its consulates and embasss the subject of popular protest A better policy from both normative and instrumental points of view, then, would be to call for a peaceful resolution of the protests and to lean on the Party to heed the voice of the people. This might require some quiet coalition building in the region to backstop the instability and fall-out. But again, from both normative and instrumental points of view, this is in the long-term in- terests of the world community. China will not collapse, even in the face of metastatic crisis and popular mobilization, But it will certainly face grave instability. The best policy for the world community in responding to this instability will be to ensure that the democratic breakthrough occurs as quickly as possible.

**They can’t win offense – the transition will be stable**

Bruce Gilley, January 2007. Assistant professor of political studies at Queen's University in Canada, and former contributing editor at the Far Eastern Economic Review. “Is China Stuck?” Journal of Democracy, 18.1, Project Muse.

Yet what if the CCP is actually quite responsive? What if it is in tune with popular demands, and finds ways to move and adapt as those demands change? In other words, what if the party stays or goes because of [End Page 173] popular pressures? Pei himself recognizes this possibility. He cites "rising public dissatisfaction" (p.14) as one thing that would prod the regime to change. "A democratic opening may emerge in the end, but not as a regime-initiated strategy undertaken at its own choosing, but more likely as the result of a sudden crisis" (p. 44). Perhaps the word crisis is being used in two different senses here. One crisis and another can, after all, vary in urgency: There are crises and there are crises. The crisis of which Pei speaks seems to be of the more benign sort, a mere shift in public preferences that prods the regime to change. Such a crisis will not require democracy to rise upon the ashes of a razed public square, but rather will stir the regime to recognize that its time has come, and to do the right thing by going fairly gentle into that good night. If so, then the prospects for a relatively smooth democratic transition in China are bright and no collapse is likely.

### Kritik

#### Epistemological debate is irrelevant - concrete action is inevitable - they fail to create useful knowledge

**Friedrichs, 09** [Jorg, University Lecturer in Politics at the Oxford Department of International Development, “From Positivist Pretense to Pragmatic Practice Varieties of Pragmatic Methodology in IR Scholarship” Pragmatism and International Relations]

As Friedrich Nietzsche ([1887] 1994:1; cf. Wilson 2002) knew, the knower isstrangely unknown to himself. In fact, it is much morehazardous to contemplate theway how we gain knowledge than to gain such knowledge in the ﬁrst place. This is not to deny that intellectuals are a narcissistic Kratochwil lot, with a penchant for omphaloskepsis. The typical result of their navel-gazing, however, is not increased self-awareness. Scholars are more likely to come up with ex-post-facto rationalizations of how they would like to see their activity than with accurate descriptions of how they go about business. As a result, in science there is a paradoxical divide between positivist pretenseand pragmatic practice. Many prominent scholars proceed pragmatically in gen-erating their knowledge, only to vest it all in a positivist cloak when it comes topresenting results. In the wake of Karl Popper (1963), fantasies about ingeniousconjectures and inexorable refutations continue to hold sway despite the muchmore prosaic way most scholars grope around in the formulation of their theo-ries, and the much less rigorous way they assess the value of their hypotheses. In proposing pragmatism as a more realistic alternative to positivist idealiza-tions, I am not concerned with the original intentions of Charles Peirce. Theseare discussed and enhanced by Ryto¨ vuori-Apunen (this forum). Instead, Ipresent various attempts to make pragmatism work as a methodology for IR scholarship. This includes my own preferred methodology, the pragmaticresearch strategy of abduction. As Fritz Kratochwil and I argue elsewhere, abduction should be at the center of our efforts, while deduction and induction areimportant but auxiliary tools (Friedrichs and 2009).Of course, one does not need to be a pragmatist to proceed in a pragmatic way. Precisely because it is derived from practice, pragmatic commonsense is a sold as the hills. For example, James Rosenau (1988:164) declared many yearsago that he coveted ‘‘a long-held conviction that one advances knowledge most effectively by continuously moving back and forth between very abstract and very empirical levels of inquiry, allowing the insights of the former to exert pressurefor the latter even as the ﬁndings of the latter, in turn, exert pressure for the for-mer, thus sustaining an endless cycle in which theory and research feed on eachother.’’ This was shortly before Rosenau’s turn to postmodernism, while he wasstill touting the virtues of behaviorism and standard scientiﬁc requisites, such asindependent and dependent variables and theory testing. But if we take his state-ment at face value, it appears that Rosenau-the-positivist was guided by a sort of pragmatism for all but the name. While such practical commonsense is certainly valuable, in and by itself, it does not qualify as scientiﬁc methodology. Science requires a higher degree of methodological awareness. For this reason, I am not interested here in pragma-tism as unspoken commonsense, or as a pretext for doing empirical researchunencumbered by theoretical and methodological considerations. Nor am I con-cerned with pragmatism as an excuse for staging yet another epistemological debate. Instead, I am interested in pragmatism as an instrument to go about research with an appropriate degree of epistemological and methodologicalawareness. Taking this criterion as my yardstick, the following three varieties of pragmatist methodology in recent IR scholarship are worth mentioning: theory synthesis, analytic eclecticism (AE), and abduction.Theory synthesis is proposed by Andrew Moravcsik (2003), who claims that theories can be combined as long as they are compatible at some unspeciﬁedfundamental level, and that data will help to identify the right combination of theories. He does not explicitly invoke pragmatism but vests his pleading in apositivist cloak by using the language of theory testing. When looking closer,however, it becomes apparent that his theoretical and methodological noncha-lance is far more pragmatic than what his positivist rhetoric suggests. Moravcsiksees himself in good company, dropping the following names: Robert Keohane,Stephen Walt, Jack Snyder, Stephen Van Evera, Bary Buzan, Bruce Russett, John O’Neal, Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink. With the partial excep-tion of Finnemore, however, none of these scholars explicitly links his or herscholarship to pragmatism. They employ pragmatic commonsense in theirresearch, but devoutly ignore pragmatism as a philosophical and methodologicalposition. As a result, it is fair to say that theory synthesis is only on a slightly higher level of intellectual awareness than Rosenau’s statement quoted above. Analytic eclecticism, as advertized by Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, links acommonsensical approach to empirical research with a more explicit commit-ment to pragmatism (Sil and Katzenstein 2005; Katzenstein and Sil 2008).The 7 Even the dean of critical rationalism, Karl Popper, is ‘‘guilty’’ of lapses into pragmatism, for example when hestates that scientists, like hungry animals, classify objects according to needs and interests, although with the impor-tant difference that they are guided in their quest for ﬁnding regularities not so much by the stomach but ratherby empirical problems and epistemic interests (Popper 1963:61–62). 646 Pragmatism and International Relations idea is to combine existing research traditions in a pragmatic fashion and thusto enable the formulation and exploration of novel and more complex sets of problems. The constituent elements of different research traditions are trans-lated into mutually compatible vocabularies and then recombined in novel ways.This implies that most scholars must continue the laborious process of formulat-ing parochial research traditions so that a few cosmopolitan colleagues will beenabled to draw upon their work and construct syncretistic collages. 8 In additionto themselves, Katzenstein and Sil cite a number of like-minded scholars such asCharles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Paul Pierson, and Robert Jervis. 9 The ascription isprobably correct given the highly analytical and eclectic approach of these schol-ars. Nevertheless, apart from Katzenstein and Sil themselves none of these schol-ars has explicitly avowed himself to AE.My preferred research strategy is abduction, which is epistemologically asself-aware as AE but minimizes the dependence on existing research traditions.The typical situation for abduction is when we, both in everyday life and as socialscientists, become aware of a certain class of phenomena that interests us for somereason, but for which we lack applicable theories. We simply trust, although we donot know for certain, that the observed class of phenomena is not random. Wetherefore start collecting pertinent observations and, at the same time, applyingconcepts from existing ﬁelds of our knowledge. Instead of trying to impose anabstract theoretical template (deduction) or ‘‘simply’’ inferring propositions fromfacts (induction), we start reasoning at an intermediate level (abduction). Abduction follows the predicament that science is, or should be, above all amore conscious and systematic version of the way by which humans have learnedto solve problems and generate knowledge in their everyday lives. As it iscurrently practiced, science is often a poor emulator of what we are able toachieve in practice. This is unfortunate because human practice is the ultimatemiracle. In our own practice, most of us manage to deal with many challenging situations. The way we accomplish this is completely different from**,** and far moreefﬁcient than, the way knowledge is generated according to standard scientiﬁc methods. If it is true that in our own practice we proceed not so much by induction or deduction but rather by abduction, then science would do well tomimic this at least in some respects. 10 Abduction has been invoked by numerous scholars, including Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie, Jeffrey Checkel, Martin Shapiro, Alec Stone Sweet, andMartha Finnemore. While they all use the term abduction, none has ever thor-oughly speciﬁed its meaning. To make up for this omission, I have developedabduction into an explicit methodology and applied it in my own research oninternational police cooperation (Friedrichs 2008). Unfortunately, it is impossi-ble to go into further detail here. Readers interested in abduction as a way toadvance international research and methodology can also be referred to my recent article with Fritz Kratochwil (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009).On a ﬁnal note, we should be careful not to erect pragmatism as the ultimateepistemological fantasy to caress the vanity of Nietzschean knowers unknown tothemselves, namely that they are ingeniously ‘‘sorting out’’ problematic situa-tions. Scientiﬁc inquiry is not simply an intimate encounter between a researchproblem and a problem solver. It is a social activity taking place in communitiesof practice (Wenger 1998). Pragmatism must be neither reduced to the utility of results regardless of their social presuppositions and meaning, nor to the 8 Pace Rudra Sil (this forum), the whole point about eclecticism is that you rely on existing traditions to blendthem into something new. There is no eclecticism without something to be eclectic about. 9 One may further expand the list by including the international society approach of the English school (Ma-kinda 2000), as well as the early Kenneth Waltz (1959). 10 Precisely for this reason, abduction understood as ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ plays a crucial role inthe ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence. 647 The Forum fabrication of consensus among scientists. Pragmatism as the practice of dis-cursive communities and pragmatism as a device for the generation of useful knowledge are two sides of the same coin

#### No risk of “endless warfare”- we should embrace pragmatism in security

Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is **not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic**.

#### Their alternative fails—security can’t be deconstructed. The ethical response is to engage in scenario planning to minimize violence

Weaver 2k - Ole International relations theory and the politics of European integration, p. 284-285

The other main possibility is to stress' responsibility. Particularly in a field like security one has to make choices a nd deal with the challenges and risks that one confronts – and not shy away into long-range or principled trans-formations. The meta political line risks (despite the theoretical commit­ment to the concrete other) implying that politics can be contained within large 'systemic questions. In line with the classical revolutionary tradition, after the change (now no longer the revolution but the meta-physical trans­formation), there will be no more problems whereas in our situation (until the change) we should not deal with the 'small questions' of politics, only with the large one (cf. Rorty 1996). However, the ethical demand in post-structuralism (e.g. Derrida's 'justice') is of a kind that can never be instan­tiated in any concrete political order – It is an experience of the undecidable that exceeds any concrete solution and reinserts politics. Therefore, politics can never be reduced to meta-questions there is no way to erase the small, particular, banal conflicts and controversies.  In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the 'opening' oriented version of deconstruction, we could with Derrida stress the singularity of the event. To take a position, take part, and 'produce events' (Derrida 1994: 89) means to get involved in specific struggles. Politics takes place 'in the singular event of engage­ment' (Derrida 1996: 83). Derrida's politics is focused on the calls that demand response/responsi­bility contained in words like justice, Europe and emancipation. Should we treat security in this manner? No, security is not that kind of call. 'Security' is not a way to open (or keep open) an ethical horizon. **Security is a** much **more situational concept oriented to the handling of specifics**. It belongs to the sphere of how to handle challenges – and avoid 'the worst' (Derrida 1991). Here enters again the possible pessimism which for the security analyst might be occupational or structural. The infinitude of responsibility (Derrida 1996: 86) or the tragic nature of politics (Morgenthau 1946, Chapter 7) means that one can never feel reassured that by some 'good deed', 'I have assumed my responsibilities ' (Derrida 1996: 86). If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone, I know that it is to the detriment of an other; of one nation to the detriment of my friends to the detriment of other friends or non-friends, etc. This is the infinitude that inscribes itself within responsibility; otherwise there would be no ethical problems or decisions. (ibid.; and parallel argumentation in Morgenthau 1946; Chapters 6 and 7) Because of this there will remain conflicts and risks - and the question of how to handle them. Should developments be securitized (and if so, in *what* terms)? Often, our reply will be to aim for de-securitization and then politics meet meta-politics; but occasionally the underlying pessimism regarding the prospects for orderliness and compatibility among human aspirations will point to scenarios sufficiently worrisome that **responsibility will entail securitization in order to block the worst**. As a security/securitization analyst, this means accepting the task of trying to manage and avoid spirals and accelerating security concerns, to try to assist in shaping the continent in a way that creates the least insecurity and violence - even if this occasionally means invoking/producing `structures' or even using the dubious instrument of securitization. In the case of the current European configuration, the above analysis suggests the use of securitization at the level of European scenarios with the aim of pre­empting and avoiding numerous instances of local securitization that could lead to security dilemmas and escalations, violence and mutual vilification.

**Gusterson is wrong**

Stone Et al 2005 (Elizabeth, “Globalization and WMD Proliferation Networks: Challenges to U.S. Security” <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/Conferences/recent/ComparativeStrategicCultureSep05_rpt.html>)

¶ Gusterson’s take on culture and politics is all wrong ¶ Is culture static? Is it malleable? How permeable are cultural boundaries and influences? These questions pervaded the conference’s discussions on strategic culture. Among the participants of the conference, there was disagreement as to whether or not strategic culture was a static and continuous concept, or a constantly evolving, permeable variable.¶ During a panel highlighting the academic implications and multidisciplinary perspectives of strategic culture, Dr. Hugh Gusterson of MIT highlighted the Achilles heel of both attempting to define strategic culture, as well as attempting to use strategic cultural analysis in defense and security studies. He claimed that issues that depend on or are influence by culture cannot be predictive. He reminded the audience that, “As you write about the culture of a people and as they read your writings, their cultures change; human sciences can never be predictive because they investigate entities with consciousness.”¶ Gusterson went on to remind the audience that culture is complex, descriptions are partial and subjective, and descriptions change what it is they are trying to describe once they describe it. In his opinion, not only can a definition of strategic culture never be widely agreed upon by scholars, but strategic culture may, in fact, not be definable at all. Indeed he noted that the mainstream work in anthropology had moved away from attempting to define or measure culture at a societal level.¶ Attempting to move beyond the pessimism implied by Gusterson’s comments and as a way to integrate across the different levels of strategic cultures discussed in the conference, Professor Jeannie Johnson of Utah State University laid out one view of how analysts might think about strategic culture .¶ Her graphic depicted the many inputs and outputs that could influence a state’s overall strategic thinking. Her perception centered on a systems level approach, and emphasized how permeable all levels of strategic culture can be. Johnson emphasized the need to view strategic culture as an ever-changing and evolving system.¶ Johnson reiterated that broad theories of human nature do not, by themselves, allow us to make short-term predictions about country-by country-foreign policy behavior, and scholars need to keep in mind that definitions of strategic culture must be dynamic and will contain embedded contradictions. ¶ Dr. Lantis rejoined the discussion to emphasize that culture is an evolving system of shared meaning that governs perceptions, communications, and actions, and offers little in the way of testable hypotheses. While asking whether or not strategic cultures can evolve, he emphasized that strategic culture possessed a strong degree of continuity, and highlighted that more often than not past learning becomes sedimented into the collective consciousness of a population or group. Lantis also raised the important concept of external shocks to a culture group, which sometimes drastically alter and force a reconsideration of historical norms. This implies that strategic culture must be thought of and analyzed as a fluid, continuously evolving concept.¶ Dr. Theo Farrell of King’s College, London, echoed this notion when he concluded that strategic culture must always be viewed and analyzed as an open system. However, Farrell argued that culture itself is more or less consistent. He admitted that both internal and external shocks occur—and the impact of such shocks are hugely important—but that culture more often than not settles and continues on as a constant norm. Farrell emphasized that if we are ever to attempt to use strategic culture as an analytical independent variable, we must view it as a fixed, continuous concept.¶ In juxtaposition—but not in opposition—to examples of how strategic culture must be thought of as constantly evolving and always changing, Dr. Robert Hickson raised the important examples of the continuity and coherency of both Jewish and Chinese cultures. Both of these cultures, and subsequently the strategic cultures of the states most influence by these traditions, possess an enduring longevity—even with the enormous numbers of external and internal shocks the cultures have undergone. He asked whether or not we can learn more about the debate between continuity and change in strategic culture from societies and groups such as these? Although such a continuity would certainly ease the task of using strategic culture, it is notable that most other participants in the conference saw a much more fluid form of culture in the cases they knew best.

#### Discussion of technical nuclear strategy is inevitable - their attempts to silence nuclear discourse doesn't solve the problem, it just makes it invisible - this prevents critical response

Chaloupka '92 William Chaloupka, Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University, Knowing Nukes: The Politics and Culture of the Atom, 1992, p. 9-10

Both Derrida’s insight and Schwenger’s anecdote invite the opening of a whole realm of oppositional activity, of which only a few examples now exist. The premise of this genre (“speaking unspeakables”), as Derrida claims, may have been best realized before the nuclear era, in the literary texts of Mallarmé, Kafka, or Joyce. But there have been contemporary attempts that nuclear criticism could address.26 One could imagine a comparison, for example, of two highly publicized television films of the Reagan era, “The Day After” and the right-wing response to it, “Amer¬ika.” The level and ferocity of the response suggest that “The Day After” broke a taboo. “Amerika” charges weakness, appeasement, and even col¬laboration, but these charges so completely miss their target that we search for a better interpretation. Perhaps “The Day After” transgressed in a special way, and the only available way of responding was the arcane code of anticommunism. The actual taboo it broke, it broke by speaking at all. At the same time, the activity of finding new ways to read (literary or cinematic) texts about nukes must relate to the broader project of empowering responses if such activity is to fit within the antinuclear schema I am discussing. Leaping over hypothetical psychological diagnoses to speak politically, such a development is not so hard to imagine. “Speaking the unspeakable” has never been a happy entry into activism. Nuclear opponents have adopted any number of rhetorical strategies for overcoming this obstacle. They argue that this “unspeakability” denotes an importance so huge that we must dissolve the reticence and disgust that is our “first reaction.” Or, alternatively, they dissolve their political position into a therapeutic one, implying that the contemporary citizen would be healthier and less conflicted if she would admit and confront the nuclear demon. In either case, the political use of unspeakability produces a paradoxical stance at odds with the naturalism of the survivalist, species-interest position. This unacknowledged (unacknowledgeable) taste for paradox goes even a step further. Having bound themselves in multiple, endlessly and effortlessly proliferating dilemmas, nuclear opponents then announce that it is their goal to impose the condition of “unspeakability” on nuclear managers. The solution to the paradox of nuclear strategy is to silence strategists, such as Caspar Weinberger, who dare to speak of limited nuclear war. This enforced silence has long since ceased to be uncomfortable for nuclear managers, who now clearly understand that their control will proceed more satisfactorily when it is invisible. Opponents, then, have undertaken the odd project of enforcing unspeakability, on the one hand, while also seeking to make nukes visible, thus making them controversial—a topic of conversation.27 Such strategies have a validity, as I will discuss in a later chapter, but it is not necessarily the validity the opponents promote. Just making the artifacts of nuclearism visible isn’t enough; they don’t speak for themselves. These artifacts—whether warheads or power plants—surely offer little help out of the paradox of unspeakability that both veils and unveils them, and all the while also seems to expect a solution. Finding nukes not only “speakable” but “fabulously textual,” nuclear criticism can respond to this odd political situation in part because many more strategic approaches become possible once we move the response to paradox out of an ‘‘unspeakable discourse’’ and into a textual or literary context.

#### Environmental security challenges state legitimacy and lead to a paradigm shift away from militarism

BARNETT, RESEARCH COUNCIL FELLOW IN THE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENQUIRY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE, 2001 [JON, THE MEANING OF ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY: ECOLOGICAL POLITICS AND POLICY IN THE NEW SECURITY ERA, CHAPTER 9, 137-41]

The question of whether it is valid to understand environmental problems as security problems recurs throughout any thoughtful discussion of environmental security. The dilemma should by now be apparent; securitising environmental issues runs the risk that the strategic/realist approach will coopt and colonise the, environmental agenda rather than respond positively to environmental problems (as discussed in Chapter 6). For this reason critics of environmental security, such as Deudney (1991) and-Brock (1991), Suggest that it is dangerous to understand environmental problems as security issues: This book's position on the matter has been emerging in previous chapters. It contends that the problem turns not on the presentation of environmental problems as security issues, but on-the meaning and practice of security in present times. Environmental security, wittingly or not, contests the legitimacy of the realist conception of security by pointing to the contradictions of security as the defence of territory and resistance to change. It seeks to work from within the prevailing conception of security, but to be successful it must do so with a strong sense of purpose and a solid theoretical base. Understanding environmental problems as security problems is thus a form of conceptual speculation. It is one manifestation of the pressure the Green movement has exerted on states since the late 1960s. **This** pressure has pushed state legitimacy nearer to collaps**e,** for if the state cannot control a problem as elemental as environmental degradation, then what is its purpose? This legitimacy problem suggests that environmental degradation cannot further intensify without fundamental change or the collapse of the state. This in turn implies that state-sanctioned environmentally degrading practices such as those undertaken in the name of national security cannot extend their power further if it means further exacerbation of environmental insecurity. While the system may resist environmental security's challenge for change, it must also resist changes for the worse. In terms of the conceptual venture, therefore, appropriation by the security apparatus of the concept of environmental security is unlikely to result in an increase in environmental insecurity (although the concept itself may continue to be corrupted). On the other hand, succeeding in the conceptual venture may mean a positive modification of the theory and practice of national security. It may also mean that national governments will take environmental problems more seriously, reduce defence budgets, and generally implement policies for a more peaceful and environmentally secure world. This dual goal of demilitarisation and upgrading policy may well be a case of wanting to have one's cake and eat it — but either the having or the eating is sufficient justification for the concept (Brock 1996). The worst outcome would be if the state ceased to use the concept of environmental security, heralding the end of the contest and requiring that the interests of peace and the environment be advocated through alternative discourses**.** This is perhaps the only real failure that is likely to ensue from the project of environmental security.

#### Environmental reps good

Kurasawa 4– Prof Sociology, York (Fuyuki, Cautionary Tales, Constellations 11.4, AG)

And yet dystopianism need not imply despondency, paralysis, or fear. Quite the opposite, in fact, since the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain traction against their determinist and absolutist counterparts. Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any course of action produces both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene before they strike becomes compelling. From another angle, dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their own nightmare scenarios (‘Frankenfoods’ and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale for Western feminism, McWorld and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action, spurring citizens’ involvement in the work of preventive foresight.

#### Democracy checks their K impact

**O’Kane 97 –** Prof Comparative Political Theory, U Keele (Rosemary, “Modernity, the Holocaust and politics,” Economy and Society 26:1, p 58-9, AG)

Modern bureaucracy is not 'intrinsically capable of genocidal action' (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalin's USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method. By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very 'ordinary and common' attributes of truly modern societies. It is these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which **stand in the way of modern genocides.**

### Add-ons

**US leadership in reprocessing supercharges conversion of HEU**

**Timbers 3** William Timbers president and CEO of the USEC, explains in 2k3: Timbers, President and Chief Executive Officer USEC Inc, 9-19-2k3

(William, "Nuclear Power & Global Security: Mutual Interest, Mutual Opportunities, Delivered at the Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace Second International Non-Proliferation Conference Moscow, Russia. P. <http://www.usec.com/v2001_02/Content/News/Speeches/09-19-03-CEIPMoscowRe>marks.pdf )

While significant steps have been taken by Russia and the United States to strengthen the security of stored fissionable nuclear materials, a different approach goes right to the heart of the matter—the very elimination of nuclear warhead materials.

After several years of consultations, in 1993 Russia and the United States formally agreed to a 20-year, $12 billion program to eliminate 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) taken from dismantled Russian warheads. To put this in perspective, 500 metric tons of HEU is the equivalent of more than 20,000 nuclear warheads. This U.S.-Russian agreement is often referred to it as the “HEU-LEU” agreement or “the Russian HEU Agreement.” We, who are responsible for commercially implementing this agreement, call it the “Megatons to Megawatts” program. I want to take a moment to acknowledge that, over the years, many of you—both Russians and Americans—have played a vital role in making this HEU to LEU program possible and in helping to ensure its continuity. You can be justifiably proud of your role in making this remarkable effort a success. For those of you who are not familiar with Megatons to Megawatts, you may be wondering why a private sector company is involved. That is because the 1993 U.S.-Russian Agreement requires that it be implemented strictly on commercial terms. Simply put, the strategy of the two governments was to ensure that a substantial amount of excess weapons material was irreversibly converted to peaceful uses as quickly as possible and to utilize the dynamics of the commercial market for nuclear fuel to pay for this effort. Their accurate assessment was that the program could commercially sustain itself over the 20-year period through the sale and purchase of fuel derived from warhead materials. Accordingly, in 1994 executive agents appointed by both governments signed a commercial implementing contract—Techsnabexport (TENEX) acting for the Russian government and the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) acting for the United States government. The value of this program also extends beyond its basic mission of eliminating nuclear warhead materials. There is also a human dimension. Proceeds from this program support thousands of Russian workers who take part in the process of transforming HEU into reactor fuel, who work on environmental cleanup and restoration and who enhance the safeguards for these materials. This underscores the importance of addressing issues concerning highly talented people who were previously involved in weapons programs. The talents of these dedicated scientists and engineers, representing a broad range of technical capabilities, can and should be utilized for non-weapons related work. Companies such as USEC stand ready to work with their Russian partners to facilitate and accelerate such endeavors. 2 When you consider the achievements of the Nunn-Lugar and Megatons to Megawatts programs and the human resources implications, it is clear that they have made a definite contribution to reducing the threat of nuclear weapons. But, what about the future? I believe that we can substantially increase the amount of nuclear warhead material that is eliminated by burning it as fuel in a new generation of commercial nuclear power stations. Regardless of where this bomb-grade material may come from, **its conversion into fuel will end its military value.** And last, but not least, the private sector can play a financial and facilitating role in making this happen. Today, the nuclear fuel market is in balance—supply is matching demand. A rapid increase in the number of nuclear power plants would increase the demand for nuclear fuel. While we would meet long-term demand primarily with expanded enrichment capacity, this new demand would also enable accommodation of additional fuel derived from nuclear warhead material. The good news is that we are at an intersection of mutual interests. It is increasingly evident that a global expansion of commercial nuclear power operations is being actively considered—especially in Russia, Asia and the United States. Several events are driving this trend. Events, such as increasing worldwide demand for electricity, power shortages, and global climate change, air pollution and growing dependency upon long, fragile lifelines of energy resources, are increasing the appeal of nuclear power. These factors present us with a unique opportunity. I believe there is a mutual interest among those who advocate the expansion of commercial nuclear power plants and those who seek to eliminate nuclear weapons materials. Advocates of nuclear nonproliferation can accelerate the increased elimination of nuclear bomb-grade materials and secure the dynamics of the marketplace to facilitate these activities Concerns about proliferation are often raised by those opposed to the further development of nuclear power. At the same time, it is widely recognized that there are numerous technical routes to produce nuclear warhead materials and that commercial nuclear power operations, with appropriate and rigorous fuel safeguards, is not the route of choice for those intent on securing weapons materials.

**That solves accidental Russian launch**

**Hecker 1** “Thoughts about an Integrated Strategy for Nuclear Cooperation with Russia”, The NonProliferation Review, Volume 8, Number 2, Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker is a Senior Fellow at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. He was Director of the laboratory from 1986 through 1997. Dr. Hecker has interacted closely with the Russian nuclear weapons complex since the exchange visit of Russian and U.S. nuclear weapons laboratory directors in February 1992.

Although the breakup of the Soviet Union has dramatically reduced the probability of a nuclear exchange, we must remain ever vigilant against the possibility of accidental or unauthorized launches. In the longer term, it will be important to develop a new strategy for strategic stability. The end of the Cold War and the U.S. move toward a national missile defense (NMD) clearly challenge the traditional strategies. A new strategy for strategic stability will evolve slowly and only after the role of traditional arms control, nuclear force structure balance, second-rank nuclear powers, and proliferation issues are reexamined.[14] Observations The cooperative and reciprocal measures taken to date by the United States and Russia to avoid accidental or unauthorized launches are not sufficient to guard against a potential nuclear catastrophe. The **deterioration in Russian military infrastructure and the abysmal economic conditions of its military servicemen have exacerbated the risk dramatically.**

**Global nuclear war**

**Forrow**, MD, **98**

(Lachlan, MD, et al, "Accidental Nuclear War – A Post-Cold War Assessment", New England Journal of Medicine)

Public health professionals now recognize that many, if not most, injuries and deaths from violence and accidents result from a predictable series of events that are, at least in principle, preventable.44,45 The direct toll that would result from an accidental nuclear attack of the type described above would dwarf all prior accidents in history. Furthermore, such an attack, even if accidental, might prompt a retaliatory response resulting in an all-out nuclear exchange. The World Health Organization has estimated that this would result in billions of direct and indirect casualties worldwide.4

**Nuclear power solves water wars**

**Beller 2004** - Dr., Department of Mechanical Engineering at UNLV, Chair of the Public Information Committee of the American Nuclear Society (Denis E., Journal of Land, Resources, & Environmental Law, "Atomic time machines: back to the nuclear future", 24 J. Land Resources & Envtl. L. 41, Lexis, WEA)

Our global neighbors need much more energy to achieve the standards of living of the developed world. One-third of the six billion people on Earth today lack access to electricity. n3 Another two billion use just 1000 kilowatt hours (kWh) per year, which is barely enough to keep a single 100-watt light bulb lit. n4 In addition, one billion people have no sanitary water, n5 which could [\*43] be provided easily and inexpensively if energy were available to operate desalination and/or purification plants. Energy is needed for development, prosperity, health, and international security. The alternative to development, which is easily sustained with ample energy, is suffering in the form of poverty, disease, and death. This suffering creates instability and the potential for widespread violence, such that national security requires developed nations to help increase energy production in their more populous developing counterparts.¶ The relationship between energy use and human well being is demonstrated by correlating the United Nations' Human Development Index (HDI) with the annual per capita use of electricity. The UN compiles the HDI for almost every nation annually. It is a composite of average education level, health and well being (average life expectancy), and per capita income or gross domestic product. One such correlation that was done a few years ago showed that electric consumption first increases human well being, then people who are well off increase their electric consumption. n6 Figure 1 illustrates this for almost every nation on Earth (the data includes more than 90 percent of the Earth's population). Note there is a threshold at about 4000 kWh per capita. Below this threshold, human development increases rapidly with increases in available electricity (there are, of course, exceptions to every rule). Above this threshold, use of electricity increases rapidly as people become more healthy, wealthy, and educated. A deeper investigation into the data underlying the HDI reveals the effects of what Dr. Eric Loewen, a delegate to the United Nations 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa, now calls "energy apartheid." n7 People in the Western world, who have and use large amounts of energy, have a life expectancy of about eighty years, while those on the lower left side of this graph, undeveloped nations where most people have no access to electricity, will die decades earlier. Thus, billions of our global neighbors without sufficient electricity die decades before they should. Those who live in poverty live in the most dangerous of conditions.¶ Without substantial increases in electricity generation, the proportion of the Earth's population without sufficient electricity will increase in the next fifty years as it grows by 50 percent to near 9 billion people. n8 Preventing global conflict will require even more addition of electricity. The product of increased population and increased per capita energy usage by people who today have access to nearly none is a great growth in global electricity usage. Estimates [\*44] for future increases in energy and electricity use, even with substantial efficiency improvements and conservation efforts, range between doubling and tripling in the next fifty years. n9 Even with conservation, "energy star" appliances and homes, mandated fuel economy, massive government purchases of "renewables," and energy saving and efficiency measures, our use of electrical energy has been growing faster than total energy usage; electricity use in the United States increased 57 percent between 1980 and 2000, while total energy use increased just 27 percent. n10

**Water wars go nuclear**

**Weiner in ’90** (Jonathan, Pulitzer Prize winning author, “The Next One Hundred Years”, p. 270)

If we do not destroy ourselves with the A-bomb and the H-bomb, then we may destroy ourselves with the C-bomb, the Change Bomb. And in a world as interlinked as ours, one explosion may lead to the other. Already in the Middle East, from North Africa to the Persian Gulf and from the Nile to the Euphrates, tensions over dwindling water supplies and rising populations are reaching what many experts describe as a flashpoint. A climate shift in that single battle-scarred nexus might trigger international tensions that will unleash some of the 60,000 nuclear warheads the world has stockpiled since Trinity.

## 1AR

### Framework

#### Don’t be an academic—their framework dooms the alt

**Gitlin 5** (Todd Gitlin formerly served as professor of sociology and director of the mass communications program at the University of California, Berkeley, and then a professor of culture, journalism and sociology at New York University. He is now a professor of journalism and sociology and chair of the Ph.D. program in Communications at Columbia University.  “The Intellectuals and the Flag”, <http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/book/git01/git01_04.pdf>

Yet the audacious adepts of “theory” constitute themselves the equivalent of a vanguard party—laying out propositions to be admired for their audacity rather than their truth, defending themselves when necessary as victims of stodgy and parochial old-think, priding themselves on their cosmopolitan majesty. “Theory” dresses critical thought in a language that, for all its impenetrability, certifies that intellectuals are central and indispensable to the ideological and political future. The far right might be firmly in charge of Washington, but Foucault (and his rivals) rules the seminars. At a time of political rollback, intellectual flights feel like righteous and thrilling consolations. Masters of “theory,” left to themselves, could choose among three ways of understanding their political role. They could choose the more-or-less Leninist route, flattering themselves that they are in the process of reaching correct formulations and hence (eventually) bringing true consciousness to benighted souls who suffer from its absence. They could choose the populist path, getting themselves off the political hook in the here and now by theorizing that potent forces will **some day,** willy-nilly, gather to upend the system. Or they could reconcile themselves to Frankfurt-style futilitarianism, conceding that history has run into a cul-de-sac and making do nevertheless. In any event, practitioners of “theory” could carry on with their lives, practicing politics by publishing without perishing, indeed, without having to set foot outside the precincts of the academy. As the revolutionary tide has gone out, a vanguard marooned without a rearguard has made the university into an asylum. As many founders and masters of “theory” pass from the scene, the genre has calcified, lost much of its verve, but in the academy verve is no prerequisite for institutional weight, and so the preoccupation and the style go on and on.

### Alternative

#### Reinforcing the state is strategic—your alternative will either get violently crushed or cause private tyranny

**Chomsky 98** – Prof Linguistics, MIT (Noam, The Common Good, p 84-5, AG)

So Argentina is "minimizing the state"—cutting down public expenditures, the way our government is doing, but much more extremely. Of course, when you minimize the state, you maximize something else—and it isn't popular control. What gets maximized is private power, domestic and foreign. I met with a very lively anarchist movement in Buenos Aires, and with other anarchist groups as far away as northeast Brazil, where nobody even knew they existed. We had a lot of discussions about these matters. They recognize that they have to try to use the state—even though they regard it as totally illegitimate. The reason is perfectly obvious: When you eliminate the one institutional structure in which people can participate to some extent—namely the government—you're simply handing over power to unaccountable private tyrannies that are much worse. So you have to make use of the state, all the time recognizing that you ultimately want to eliminate it. Some of the rural workers in Brazil have an interesting slogan. They say their immediate task is "expanding the floor of the cage." They understand that they're trapped inside a cage, but realize that protecting it when it's under attack from even worse predators on the outside, and extending the limits of what the cage will allow, are both essential preliminaries to dismantling it. If they attack the cage directly when they're so vulnerable, they'll get murdered. That's something anyone ought to be able to understand who can keep two ideas in their head at once, but some people here in the US tend to be so rigid and doctrinaire that they don't understand the point. But unless the left here is willing to tolerate that level of complexity, we're not going to be of any use to people who are suffering and need our help—or, for that matter, to ourselves.

### Prolif

#### Their alt is political grandstanding- no progress towards disarmament will occur until we alter the security calculations that drive weapons development

DR. LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR NONPROLIFERATION AND REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL, 3-13-96 http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/speeches/schein/scheiott.htm

The 1995 NPT Conference decisions reflect the strong interest on the part of NPT non-nuclear-weapon states to see greater progress made toward full implementation of NPT Article VI and, in particular, the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Following the 1995 NPT Conference, the small minority of countries (both within and without the NPT regime) that were not satisfied with the NPT Conference outcome began to agitate publicly for those measures not agreed by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. They began selectively to reinterpret the Conference decisions and to demand the establishment of certain arms control measures. In a direct challenge to the agenda set forth at the 1995 NPT Conference, these states have called for creation of linkage between important and internationally agreed initiatives, such as a FMCT, and rhetorical and unagreed initiatives, such as creating a time-bound framework for nuclear disarmament. The actions of these few states, including some not party to the NPT, belie the very real cooperative atmosphere that resulted in the agreement to the 1995 NPT Conference decisions as well as the growing de-emphasis on "bloc politics" in favor of national or regional security perspectives. Their actions have undermined efforts to move forward constructively on important arms control initiatives, including the CTBT and FMCT. It has also run counter to stated interest in continuing the constructive dialogue that flourished during the 1995 NPT Conference process. If continued progress is to be made toward mutually shared arms control objectives, such as those outlined in the "Principles and Objectives" decision, it will be essential for these few states to stand down from the kind of approach that has characterized their participation in the arms control debate over the past eight months. Allow me, if you will, to take this point a bit further. Disarmament on demand or timetable disarmament **is not a tenable proposition** -- rather, it is **political grandstanding** that blocks out of consideration whether and to what extent the **security environment** in which disarmament is to take place is conducive to such measures. We live today, and will for some time to come, in a period of transition between a world anchored on two relatively well disciplined superpower alliances which defined the international security order, and a future that is unknown and difficult to map with confidence and which is more likely than not to be characterized by forms of complex multipolarity in which local, regional and transnationalist forces weigh heavily. **Building down one security order requires a commensurate building up of alternative orders if stability is to be safeguarded.** The goal of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons must take this consideration into account. What is critically important at this stage is to engage in a process that moves us inexorably toward that goal but avoids the error of generating expectations that cannot be met, thus feeding the flames of disillusionment and frustration and reinforcing those who would **argue against changing the nuclear status quo.** This debate over nuclear disarmament presents a continuous challenge, and one that is not easily addressed. The insistence on the part of non-nuclear weapon states for "disarmament on demand" must be reconciled with the reality that achievement of **nuclear disarmament will not happen unless and until** the international security situation evolves to the point where, in effect, nuclear weapons can be written out of our national security doctrine and strategies. Certainly the international security situation has changed dramatically from the days of the Cold War; U.S. strategic doctrine has evolved in response to this changed security environment and, as we announced in completing our Nuclear Posture Review, nuclear weapons today play a smaller role in U.S. military planning than at any time in the past. The reality, however, is that while much improved, the security situation today continues to present significant threats to the United States and its allies, and to global stability overall.Many states appear unwilling to accept the fact that, in spite of the commitment of the United States and other nuclear weapon states to the elimination of nuclear weapons -- commitments that have been repeatedly reaffirmed and reinforced through the continued progress in nuclear arms reduction -- nuclear **disarmament cannot and will not be achieved overnight**. Our long experience illustrates the fact that nuclear arms reduction and elimination is a tedious process -- necessarily so. Like it or not, the fact is that the implementation schedule for START I and II -- agreements that already have been negotiated -- will take many years to fulfill. Without getting into a detailed discussion of what this audience already well knows concerning U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control and disarmament measures, let me just say that now that the U.S. Senate has provided its advice and consent to START II our primary concern is achieving consent to ratification by the Russian Duma. Following this, we intend to work with Russia on the deactivation of START II forces. During their September 1994 summit meeting, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin committed to consider further reductions of, and limitations on, remaining nuclear forces once START II was ratified. In the meantime, implementation of START I is running several years ahead of schedule.

1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)